The blocking of Zeebrugge by Carpenter, A.F.B.

oV^
^^-'.
.^'
^^
V.
o^'
.<J^
A
"^
^
-A
.0
.^^
t-0^
C
.^^
.^'
0' ^v
.^^
,0
.«ra^. .-
.40,
Q^
t^.0^
^^^
^0•
1
"^ V''< *
4 o
-^o^
Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive
in 2011 witii funding from
Tine Library of Congress
http://www.arcliive.org/details/blockingofzeebru01carp


THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE


Drawn bij Charles De Lacyjroiu details snjiplied by the Author
STORMING THE MOLE
THE BLOCKING OF
ZEEBRUGGE
BY
Captain A. F. B. CARPENTER, V.C, R.N.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY
AND APPRECIATIONS BY
MARSHAL FOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS
AND
COUNT VISART
(burgomaster of Bruges)
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
Wi)t 3^ibete(tit l^ttse Cambntroe
1922
DCOPYRIGHT, 1922, BY ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
3o-^
tlTbc Slibetsiitie ^reiss
CAMBRIDGE • MASSACHUSETTS
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.
APR 2G 1922
©CI.A661436
TO
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INTRODUCTION
By admiral EARL BEATTY
IN
appreciating the military reasons which directed
the operations connected with the blocking of
Zeebrugge, it is desirable to recall to mind the
general naval situation at the beginning of 191 8.
Briefly stated, the German High Seas Fleet was
contained within the waters of the Heligoland Bight
by the British Grand Fleet, whilst German subma-
rines were engaged on vast operations, having for
their object the stoppage of the trade of Great Britain,
and interference with our lines of communication.
In the face of such an attack, the aim of Great
Britainwas either to destroy the enemy submarines, or,
failing destruction, to prevent their egress from their
bases. Convoy operations, patrol operations, and min-
ing operations in all seas were carried out to achieve
the former aim, and accomplished great results.
But enemy submarines continued to be built almost
as rapidly as they were destroyed. It was essential,
therefore, to take what measures were possible to
render useless their bases and interfere with their
freedom of exit, and it was with this military object
that plans for the blocking of Zeebrugge were initiated.
Emphasis has been laid on the military reason which
underlay this operation, because an erroneous impres-
sion has existed in some quarters that the Zeebrugge
operations were more in the nature of an offensive de-
signed to lower the morale of the enemy and enhance
that of the British Navy, which, as a whole, had little
opportunity of coming to grips with the enemy.
viii INTRODUCTION
Whilst these moral results undoubtedly were felt
after the operation, they were not the military
reasons, reasons alone which justified so complex and
difficult an undertaking, reasons which were never
lost sight of during the planning and carrying out of
the operations.
The plan was surely laid ; simple in general design,
details were worked out with foresight and exactitude.
The factors of surprise, mystification, and diversion
were utilised to the utmost. The resources of science
were given full scope. Training to carry out the plan
proceeded with energy and understanding, co-ordina-
tion and co-operation being apparent throughout.
It was carried out with determination.
In Captain Carpenter's book we are let into the
full secret, and are led step by step through the va-
rious phases referred to above, which were to be
crowned by the glorious achievement of St. George's
Day, 19 1 8. His pages bring out once again the moral
and military virtues of the British Navy, Officers and
Men. They demonstrate that the spirit which existed
in our Naval Wars of past centuries, wars which laid
the foundation of the Empire, remains undiminished
in the naval personnel of to-day.
It is for us to ensure that these glorious traditions
are understood by all, and in being understood are
handed on to those who come after us. This book,
in placing on record the matchless qualities displayed
by all concerned in the blocking of Zeebrugge, I wel-
come for this purpose.
BEATTY
Admiral oj the Fleet
igth JulyJ 192
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APPRECIATION
By marshal FOCH
C'EST dans un sentiment de solidarlte que s'est
realisee I'union des Allies, en 1914, quand la
cause de la Civilisation s'est trouvee menacee.
A tous les moments critiques de la guerre, I'union
s'est ainsi resserree devant le danger, et lorsqu'il s'est
agi de fermer un des repaires d'ou les sousmarins
ennemis mena^aient les communications vitales des
A-llies, dans une manoeuvre splendide, avec un esprit
commun de sacrifice absolu, le port de Zeebrugge a
ete attaque et definitivement ferme.
Le Commandant du Vindictive a tenu a rappeler
les details de I'operation dans laquelle il a joue un
role si brillant, et son livre constituera un precieux
enseignement et donnera aux generations futures un
exemple splendide.^
F. FOCH
* When in 1914 the cause of civilisation was menaced, it was the in-
stinct of solidarity that brought about the Union of the Allies.
At every critical moment of the war, in the face of peril, this bond
was renewed; and when it became a question of closing one of the lairs
from which the enemy submarines threatened the vital communica-
tions of the Allies, the port of Zeebrugge was attacked and closed once
and for all by a superb manoeuvre involving a common spirit of su-
preme sacrifice.
The Captain of the Vindictive has undertaken to tell in detail the
story of the action in which he played so brilliant a part, and his
book will afford a valuable record and set forth a fine example to future
generations.

APPRECIATION
By rear-admiral SIMS, U.S.N.
FEW incidents of the Great War had a greater in-fluence in inspiring enthusiasm in the fighting
forces and increasing their morale than the suc-
cessful attack upon Zeebrugge ; and it will long remain
as an example of what can be accomplished by the
thorough co-ordination of the elements of a sound plan
with the various limiting conditions of place, time,
state of sea and air, and the material equipment suit-
able and available.
The reader of this volume will at once be struck by
the painstaking care with which it was necessary that
each detail be worked out, and each unit assigned its
particular task to be executed at a specified time and
place. Also that the amount of detail was necessarily
so great, and their dependence one upon another so
vital to ultimate success, that the whole may be com-
pared to a complicated mechanism so designed to
meet peculiar conditions that the failure of any part
—any unit or group— or a material change in any of
the conditions, would have deranged essential ele-
ments of the plan and might have jeopardised the suc-
cess of the expedition.
But the principal lesson to be learned from the
attack is not so much the thoroughness of the prepa-
ration and training and the efficiency of the weapons,
essential as they of course were, as it is the influence
of the spirit and the initiative and loyalty of the per-
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sonnel that carried it out. These elements supplied
the "steam," the flexibility, and the lubrication that
ensured the harmonious working of the whole mecha-
nism of which they were the soul. The basic principle
was the splendid morale of the personnel inspired by
the high character of its leaders.
Apart from the great interest of this narrative to
the laymen, as a military exploit of the most brilliant
character, and an inspiring story of heroism in war,
it will always prove of great value to those military
men of both branches of the service who realise the
tremendous influence of the morale of their forces—
the confidence in the ability of the leader which
encourages initiative and inspires the highest type of
loyalty.
Wm. S. SIMS
APPRECIATION
By count VISART
{Burgomaster of Bruges)
j4TNSI que tous mes concitoyens j'ai appris
/JL avec une grande satisfaction que la fameuse
JL .m. attaque de Zeebrugge par le Vindictive allait
faire le sujet d'un livre public prochainement par
Capitaine Alfred F. B. Carpenter, un des heros qui
ont pris une part glorieuse a cet exploit.
Cette entreprise de la Marine de Guerre Anglaise
a ete assurement une des faits de guerre les plus extra-
ordinaires des temps anciens et modernes. Elle a ete
accomplice avec une energie et une audace qui a de-
joue toutes les previsions des Allemands.
Ainsi en depit de toutes les difficultes, de tous les
dangers, et de pertes cruelles, I'assaut prodigieux du
mole a jete I'epouvante parmi les ennemis et en meme
temps le Vindictive et les bateaux qui le suivaient ont
emboutcille dans leur repaire les abominables U.B.
La cannonade entendue a Bruges nous avait deja
donne I'eveil et bicntot les rumeurs que les Allemands
n'avaient pu intercepter et la consternation qu'ils
tentaient vainement de dissimuler nous ont appris
que I'Angleterre avait frappe un grand coup. Un tel
evenement relcva tous nos courages.
Nous esperons qu'a Zeebrugge, sur le territoire de
Bruges, un magnifique monument immortalisera ce
fait inoui, mais c'est avec le plus grand interet que
nous connaitrons par le livre de Capitaine Carpenter
toutes les circonstances de cette bistoire hero'ique et
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les noms des hommes qui ont donne une nouvelle
gloire a la Marine Anglaise.^
AMIDER VISART
BouTgemestre de Bruges
* It was with great satisfaction that I and all my fellow citizens
learned that the famous attack on Zeebrugge by the Vindictive was to
be the subject of a book, to be published in the near future, written by
Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter, one of the heroes who took a glorious
part in that exploit.
This enterprise of the British Navy was assuredly one of the most
extraordinary feats of war in both ancient and modern times. It was
accomplished with such energy and audacity as to baffle all the German
plans.
In spite of all the difficulties, dangers, and cruel losses, the wonderful
assault on the mole created consternation amongst the enemy; and the
ships which followed the Vindictive bottled up the abominable sub-
marines in their base.
The sound of heavy firing heard in Bruges had already warned us;
later, the receipt of rumours which the Germans had been unable to
intercept, and their consternation which they were vainly endeavouring
to conceal, proved to us that England had struck a mighty blow. Such
an event renewed our courage.
We hope that at Zeebrugge, which is within the territory of Bruges, a
magnificent memorial will eventually immortalise this unprecedented
action, and it is with the greatest interest that we shall learn from Cap-
tain Carpenter's book all the circumstances of this heroic episode and
the names of the men who added this new glory to the British Navy.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
A S a result of having delivered many lectures,
/ \ under official auspices and in compliance
JL JL withprivateinvitationSjOn" The Blocking of
Zeebrugge," the author has received several requests
to record the story in more permanent form. Under-
lying these requests there appears to be a feeling that
first-hand accounts of enterprises in the Great War
should be of some value towards preserving that spirit
which rallied all classes of individuals in the British
Empire, in the Allied Countries, and in the United
States of America, to the common cause of upholding
civilisation in the face of danger. That opinion, in-
deed, has been openly stated to the author in Great
Britain, by leading members of the educational pro-
fession and of the Church, by naval and military
officers and others. Opinions of a similar type also
have been received from the United States, where,
during a recent series of visits to many of the larger
cities, the author personally experienced that solid
friendship for Great Britain which is sometimes hid-
den beneath surface irritations of a political nature.
Misunderstandings must occasionally arise be-
tween communities and between the members of any
single community; they readily take root and develop
into serious argument where the existence Oii z common
cause is forgotten. For that reason the author feels
that the above-mentioned opinions are not without
foundation. Whilst attempting to show that co-
operation between the several units of a fighting force
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and confidence between superiors and subordinates
are important factors towards success in war, he has
made this humble endeavour to induce the belief that
co-operation and confidence in other walks of life
are no less necessary.
There is danger of this blocking enterprise being
allotted a false position in the contemporary histories
of the late war owing to the somewhat prevalent
custom of describing war operations with little refer-
ence to the various considerations, factors, and events
which gave them birth.
The man-in-the-street is sometimes carried away
by enthusiasm or despondency, as the case may be,
when unexpected events occur during hostilities; he
is apt to give little thought to the "why" and "where-
fore" of the occurrences. That fact has been exem-
plified clearly enough with respect to this particular
event, for, on all sides, one heard the public verdict,
given in the colloquial vulgarism of the period, that
the aff^air was a fine "stunt." The word "stunt,"
as unmusical to the ear as it was offensive to those
concerned in the operations, has been defined as
"a voluntary act, spectacular, usually unnecessary,
sometimes involving risk, and designed to attract
attention." However, the man-in-the-street meant
well, and, after all, could justifiably plead that his
lack of education on naval matters was to blame.
The author has therefore addressed this book to the
man-in-the-street, and has endeavoured to "put him
wise," as our cousins across the water are in the habit
of remarking.
The ofl^icial despatches dealing with the bloc-king
operations on the Flanders coast were published early
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in 1919, and, as far as despatches can go, gave a
splendid account of the enterprise forming the subject
of this book. But despatches are strictly limited in
length and necessarily deal more with cold-blooded
statements of fact than with psychological aspects.
When one reads despatches of the great leaders of the
past concerning the operations in their campaigns
one cannot fail to notice the almost complete absence
of any reference to the moral factor in war. Yet
Napoleon himself declared, "The moral is to the
physical as three is to one." Material results can
easily be gauged under peace conditions, whereas
moral effect on human nature in war is only discover-
able from one's own war experiences, which are neces-
sarily limited, and from the experiences of others as
set forth in the historical records of past wars. It was
partly for that reason, presumably, that Napoleon
studied the campaigns of Caesar and Hannibal al-
though their instruments of war were long since out of
date.
The usual reasons for the omission of the moral
factors from despatches are twofold. Firstly, the
leader from whom the despatch emanates may con-
sider it inadvisable to publish his preconceived ideas
as to the eventual effect of the operations on the mo-
rale of the enemy; this concealment is especially neces-
sary if the despatch is published before the declara-
tion of peace. Secondly, the writer of the despatch is
often unaware, at the time of writing, of the effect
already obtained against the enemy's morale; such
effects may not be discoverable for many months
after the operations have been concluded. Under
certain circumstances it may also be temporarily in-
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advisable to present to the enemy, through the me-
dium of despatches, information concerning psycho-
logical effects on one's own personnel. These omis-
sions, therefore, must not be taken to infer that the
moral factors were ignored. It is clear, then, that
post-war accounts 'of operations may be far from
superfluous whether considered from the point of
view of the man-in-the-street or that of the student
of war.
Without some conception of the strategical situa-
tion arising from the German occupation of the
Flanders coast it would be difficult to grasp the true
nature of the enterprise described herein. An ex-
amination of the strategical outlook alone, however,
would be insufficient. The geographical and hydro-
graphical, and even the meteorological, situations
largely influenced the choice of tactical methods to be
pursued for the attainment of the object in view. It
is therefore important to consider the situation from
these various standpoints in some detail.
The book has been divided into two parts. Part I
deals with the Situation, the Object, the General Plan
for the attainment of the Object, the Preparatory
Work involved, and the various occurrences up to the
eve of the Attack. Part II describes the events which
occurred during the operation itself, and includes
some consideration of both the material and moral
results of the enterprise and the lessons to be drawn
therefrom.
For the illustrations the author is much indebted
to the Admiralty, Air Ministry, Imperial War Mu-
seum, and Press, to whom he makes this grateful
acknowledgment.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE xix
With regard to the personal side of the story, it may
be as well to point out that many of the officers and
men concerned were mentioned in the official des-
patch; that fact lessens one of the difficulties attached
to the author's task. A compromise between the
purely impersonal attitude and the very natural desire
to render full justice to each individual, regardless of
the reader's patience, has been aimed at.
The author trusts that the reader will be tolerant
of omission and repetition, and will forgive the rather
obvious shortcomings of a literary nature which, alas,
appear all too frequently in the book.
ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
Sth March, 1921
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PART I
I
THE BLOCKING
OF ZEEBRUGGE
CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION. THE GERMAN BASES
IN FLANDERS. THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLAN
THE main function of a navy in war is that of
obtaining the command of the sea. The pur-
pose for which such "command" is desired is
the utihsation of the sea-lines of communication and
the denial of the same to the enemy.
Soon after the commencement of the war in 19 14
the sea-lines of communication across the English
Channel assumed considerable, if not paramount,
importance for the transfer of personnel and material
from Britain to the Allied forces in France. It was
equally incumbent on the navy to maintain the trans-
Atlantic and other lines of communication along which
the necessities of life and war were carried to the
Allies in all theatres of war.
The first step towards obtaining " command of the
sea" is the removal of the obstacles which stand in
one's way. In this particular case the main obstacle
(admittedly constructed for the purpose) was the
German High Seas Fleet. Thus the first duty of the
British Grand Fleet was that of destroying the so-
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called High Seas Fleet, or, if destruction was found to
be impracticable, of reducing it to inactivity. The
German Fleet was fully alive to that fact, and, almost
throughout the war, hid themselves away in their
naval bases under the protection of their coast de-
fences. Thus, as events showed, the High Seas Fleet
did not prove to be a very serious obstacle to our
command of the sea ; but, and this fact is easily for-
gotten, we could not joresee the continuance of their
ineptitude and lack of spirit. The German subma-
rines, however, were a formidable obstacle indeed.
It is unnecessary to reiterate what is already common
knowledge on that point. •
Submarines, by their nature, have certain limita-
tions. Except in the case of the submarine cruisers,
which only materialised in the latter part of the war,
such craft are considerably hampered in their move-
ments by their comparatively small radius of action.
Owing to the geographical situation of Germany, her
submarines were forced to expend an important per-
centage of their fuel during the outward and home-
ward voyages between their bases and the trade
routes. This expenditure cannot merely be judged
by the distances which had to be traversed; the ex-
penditure of fuel in the submarine bears some relation
to the whole circumstances of the voyage.
The endurance of the personnel is another im-
portant factor, and is similarly affected by the cir-
cumstances under which they are employed. For
instance, in waters patrolled by enemy vessels, high
speed must always be readily available and the strain
on the personnel, consequent on the danger of sudden
attack from surface craft, aircraft, or other subma-
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rines, to say nothing of the presence of mine-fields,
is increased. Thus the longer the passage that the
German submarines were forced to undertake in
comparatively narrow and dangerous waters— such
as the North Sea— the less work could they do on
our more important trade routes. That statement is
closely connected with the subject of this book.
It did not require very much intelligence on the
part of the German Admiralty to realise that the
possession of bases on the Flanders coast would
greatly facilitate their submarine campaign owing to
the consequent reduction of the voyages to and from
the trans-Atlantic, or Channel, trade routes. Flanders
was therefore used, as will be explained later in detail,
to provide advanced bases for German submarines.
The coast of Flanders lent itself to other naval uses.
In addition to the guerre-de-course tactics of the
enemy— i.e., the direct attack on Allied merchant
vessels— it was always open to Germany to take
their whole main fleet to sea for the purpose of seeking
advantageous conditions for bringing a portion of our
Grand Fleet to action.
Movements of modern fleets under war conditions
necessitate the use of various types of small craft to
precede them— e.g., mine-sweepers for clearing chan-
nels for the fleet to pass through, destroyers for sup-
porting the mine-sweepers and for driving back the
enemy's small craft, light cruisers for scouting pur-
poses, etc. Mine-sweepers and torpedo craft, by vir-
tue of their small size, are unable to keep the sea for
long periods. It will therefore be realised that, in the
event of the High Seas Fleet putting to sea for opera-
tions in southern waters, the Flanders coast provided
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Germany with an advanced base from which their
Hght craft could operate.
The German torpedo craft based in Flanders, there-
fore, would be able to serve a double purpose, viz.,
that already mentioned and that of attacking our
patrol craft, our coast and our merchant vessels when
opportunity offered. The mine-sweepers could also
serve a double purpose in that they were required to
sweep channels for the ingress and egress of subma-
rines based in Flanders whilst being suitably placed
for sweeping duties in advance of the main fleet.
That Flanders was also suitable for aircraft bases is
as well known as it is obvious; but it may not be
generally understood that such aircraft would also be
of special vaiue to the main fleet under the conditions
stated above. Thus, to sum up, the occupation of the
Flanders coast by the German sea forces would be of
treble value— to provide, firstly, a base for the sub-
marines employed on commerce destruction ; secondly,
a base for the advanced flotillas and aircraft operating
in conjunction with the main fleet in the event of the
latter coming south ; and, thirdly, a base from which
to attack our southern coasts or sea-patrols and from
which to indulge in air raids against British and
French territory.
The foregoing consideration of the possible uses of
Flanders to the German Navy shows the inherent
value of an advanced base in that locality; tht in-
trinsic value obviously depended upon the existence
of suitable harbours for use as bases. Let us now
examine the geographical situation.
In the latter part of 1917 the Flanders coast, as far
westward as Nieuport, was in the possessio-n of the
CHART SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DOVER, ZEEBRUGGE, HELIGOLAND,
AND THE EXITS FROM THE NORTH SEA
Reproduced by Admiralty Permission
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Germans. The northern extremity of the line separat-
ing the German and AUied armies was situated ap-
proximately on the Yser Canal, which emanates from
Nieuport harbour. The latter was dominated by the
gun-fire of both armies; its use was, therefore, denied
to both. The only other harbours on the coast of Flan-
ders were Ostende, Blankenberghe, and Zeebrugge.
These will be described in some detail presently.
The Flanders coast consists mainly of flat country
barely elevated above the level of the sea. Sand-hills
along the shore act as a barrier between the sea and
the land. Parallel to the shore the tidal current runs
to and fro with considerable velocity. The tendency
for the tidal current to wash away the sand from the
shore is partially countered by the use of groynes,
such as are similarly used to maintain our own coast-
line in many parts of England. Although the groynes
on the Flanders coast are carried well out into the
sea— they are often 100 yards in length— the move-
ment of sand along the coast is very considerable,
and, as will be explained later, has a strong influence
on the harbour situation in that locality.
The approaches to the coast are beset with shoals
reaching to a distance of eight miles from the land.
These shoals have always provided serious obstacles
to navigation. During times of peace the charts of
this locality had been kept corrected by virtue of
continual surveying. The shoals were frequently
moving and new shoals appeared from time to time.
The channels required almost constant dredging.
For obvious reasons during the occupation of Flanders
by the Germans it was not possible for the Allies to
continue either the surveying or the dredging.
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Before the war navigation off this coast required
the use of many faciUties such as buoys and light-
houses. At the best of times buoys are not very
dependable as navigational aids owing to their ten-
dency to break away in heavy weather or to drag
their anchors along the bottom. Their positions need
to be "fixed" from time to time by means of angles
to shore objects, or by methods of astronomical ob-
servation, and then compared with the positions
shown on the charts. Lighthouses, however, unless
they are of the small type without lighthouse-keepers,
are more efficient aids to the navigator. During the
war the lighthouses east of Nieuport were only used
by the Germans during short periods when specially
required for their own craft; the majority of the
buoys were withdrawn and the remainder were
moved to new positions which were frequently altered
to prevent the Allies from making use of them.
Thus, during the war, the charts available to the
Allies were very soon obsolete; no others were ob-
tainable. Navigation off the Flanders coast, for
Allied vessels of any size, therefore, became decidedly
hazardous.
The tides on the coasts, in addition to running al-
ternately eastward and westward with considerable
velocity, also caused large differences in sea-level
amounting to fifteen feet between the highest and
lowest states of the tide.
Mention has already been made that the only har-
bours on the coast eastward of Nieuport were situated
at Ostende, Blankenberghe, and Zeebrugge. But
these were not natural harbours. They had been
artificially cut out of the coast-line by means of
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dredging. The entrance channels were preserved by
piers built out into the sea and by dredging opera-
tions designed to retain the desired depths of water.
Ostende, before the war, had been much used as
a commercial harbour, and was therefore provided
with numerous wharves, basins, and docks. It was
a suitable harbour for all classes of submarines and
torpedo craft. Blankenberghe was a little harbour
about nine miles east of Ostende and three miles west
bird's-eye view of canals
of Zeebrugge. Its depth was exceedingly small; it
could, therefore, only be used for shallow draught
vessels such as fishing boats, motor boats, and the
like. It was true that the rise of tide, amounting
to approximately fifteen feet, would enable larger
vessels to enter or leave near the time of high water,
but any naval vessel stationed in a harbour from
which it can only proceed to sea during a limited
portion of the twenty-four hours at once loses much
of its value. Zeebrugge could accommodate vessels
up to a considerable size: the harbour works and
depths will be described in detail presently. Although
these three places provided the only harbours on the
coast, there was a harbour of great importance at
Bruges, about eight miles inland from Zeebrugge.
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Bruges harbour was also entirely artificial, consist-
ing of locks, basins, and waterways built on the canal
system. Bruges was connected to the sea by means
of canals running to Zeebrugge and Ostende, these
canals converging on the waterways of Bruges in such
a manner that vessels of a certain limited size could
pass from Ostende to Zeebrugge, and vice versa, with-
out actually proceeding into the open sea. A series of
small canals also connected Bruges to Antwerp, via
Ghent, but this canal system, being only constructed
to accommodate barges, did not materially add to the
value of Bruges as a harbour for sea-going vessels.
Of the three canal systems connecting at Bruges,
the canal to Zeebrugge easily held first place in im-
portance. This canal was built by the Belgians. It
was commenced in 1896 and completed in 1907. Six
and a quarter miles in length, it was almost entirely
straight throughout. It could accommodate torpedo-
boat destroyers or submarines, both of the largest
size, and could, if required, have been used by light
cruisers.
At the seaward end of the Ostende and Zeebrugge
canals, locks were constructed so that vessels could
pass from the canals to the sea, or the reverse, at
any state of the tide, without lowering the level of the
water in the canal.
The above-mentioned harbours were used for naval
purposes by Germany as follows. Bruges was chosen
as the main naval base. Shelters for protecting sub-
marines from aerial attack, floating docks, repair
workshops, all the other facilities which go to make a
modern dockyard for small vessels, and the necessary
stores and ammunition, were to be found there. The
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number of naval craft based on Flanders appeared
to vary considerably; but, at the beginning of 191 8,
approximately eighteen submarines and twenty-five
destroyers or torpedo-boats would be at Bruges on an
average day. The submarines lay in the special shel-
ters which were covered by roofs of reenforced con-
crete several feet in thickness. Bruges, then, was not
only the dockyard but also the resting-place of prac-
tically all the German naval craft based on Flanders.
The sea exits from Bruges, as already mentioned,
were situated at Ostende and Zeebrugge. There was
some doubt, however, whether the Bruges-Ostende
canal could be used for the passage of anything larger
than very shallow draught vessels such as motor boats
or barges. The Ostende canal was known to be nar-
row, tortuous, and shallow; it had been constructed
many years earlier than the Zeebrugge canal.
At Zeebrugge and Ostende a few German craft
were usually stationed for duties of an immediate
nature such as mine-sweeping, patrolling, and duties
connected with the defence of the coast. These har-
bours were specially useful as taking-off places for
vessels which had concentrated in readiness for
operations at sea, or as bolt-holes for the same craft
when pursued by our patrol vessels. Both harbours
were open to bombardment from the sea; that reason,
more than any other, probably influenced the Ger-
mans to use Bruges for their main base. Ostende,
being more open to attack from the sea and air than
was Zeebrugge, was the less important harbour of
the two.
Blankenberghe harbour, owing to its small size and
shallow depth, was used as a base for the German
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armed motor boats; It is believed that about thirty
were stationed there. This harbour, being uncon-
nected with the canal system, was not in direct inland
communication with Bruges by water.
In addition to the submarines and torpedo craft
already mentioned, the Germans had a large number
of trawlers based on the various harbours for mine-
sweeping and patrol duties. At Zeebrugge they had
their largest seaplane base in Flanders; another sea-
plane base was situated at Ostende.
In due course Flanders had become a veritable
hornet's nest. Let us consider for a few moments to
what extent these hornets could trouble us.
Across the English Channel, and especially in its
eastern portion, we had established lines of com-
munication of tremendous importance. It is no ex-
aggeration to state that, every few minutes of the day
and night, a vessel, of one sort or another, left the
English shore for France with her cargo of personnel,
guns, ammunition, food or fuel, etc. Day after day,
night after night, for months on end, a constant
stream of vessels poured across the Channel in sup-
port of the Allied armies or on the return trip to Eng-
lish ports with wounded, men to whom a welcome
spell of leave had been granted, empties for refilling,
motor transport vehicles for repair, and the like.
The wounded were carried in hospital ships; but, as
the world knows and can never forget, the Germans
ruthlessly torpedoed them whenever the chance
offered, regardless of the Geneva Convention, heed-
less of the damnable inhumanity of the proceeding,
seeking only for opportunities for indulging in the
frightfulness which formed part of their Kultur.
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All these vessels were continually open to attack,
not only from submarines but also from the surface
craft and aircraft based in Flanders. At any chosen
moment, preferably at night or during misty days,
these hornets could emanate from Ostende or Zee-
brugge on their deadly missions. Further westward
our trans-Atlantic lines of communication offered in-
numerable opportunities for the German submarine
commanders to display their brutality against com-
paratively defenceless merchant vessels, or to attack
transports carrying munitions of war and troops from
the American Continent. The passage through the
English Channel afforded the most direct route for
German submarines proceeding to, or returning from,
their hunting-grounds.
The mercantile traffic off the southeast coast of
England and in the entrance to the Thames was also
within easy reach of the German bases in Flanders;
so were our seaside resorts, such as Ramsgate and
Margate, which provided favourable opportunities
for bombardments with resultant casualty lists of
innocent women and children.
Dunkerque and Calais on the French coast were
the nearest seaport objectives to the Flanders coast;
they both experienced frequent aerial attacks and an
occasional bombardment from the sea.
As a counter to the German craft in Flanders the
British Admiralty had established a force known as
the "Dover Patrol." As the name implies, this force
was primarily based on Dover. Their duties were
mainly those of protecting the transports bound
across the English Channel, preventing the German
naval craft from passing through the Straits of
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Dover, and watching the exits from Bruges so as to
obtain timely information of concentrated German
forces putting to sea. The story of the Dover Patrol
is of intense interest, but so many pages would be
required to do it even bare justice that I can only
refer the reader to books written especially on that
subject. Suffice it to say here that, day and night,
winter and summer, fair weather and foul, the Dover
force patrolled the sea so successfully that the Ger-
man attempts to use their surface craft for attacking
the Allies were few and far between. The difficulties
of preventing the submarines passing through the
Straits of Dover were immense. We must realise that
the maximum portion of a submerged submarine
visible above water amounts to a periscope of a few
inches in diameter. Compare that dimension to the
width of the Strait which at its narrowest part is
twenty miles. A jew inches in twenty miles— if I have
calculated aright that means that the visible portion
of the submarine would cover little more than one^
millionth part of the surface between Dover and Cape
Grisnez. And when we also realise that the periscope
would only be raised above water for a few seconds
at long intervals we shall begin to understand the
difficulty of the problem. Yet, as we know now, the
Dover Patrol force, under the diiection of Vice-
Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, eventually rendered the
passage through the Straits to all intents and purposes
impossible for a submarine. All honour to the Dover
Patrol!
A point which, until recently, unaccountably
seemed to have escaped notice was that the work of
the Dover Patrol was carried out on behalf of all the
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Allies and of the United States. It was not a British
force acting solely in British interests. Though it is
difficult, and perhaps invidious, to apportion the
credit for protecting the Allied lines of communica-
tion, yet there is no shadow of doubt that the troops
from Canada and from the United States of America
owed to the Dover Patrol force a tremendous debt
of gratitude for their safe passage overseas. Recog-
nition of this fact has since been shown by the erec-
tion at New York, and on the French coast, of
memorials to the Dover Patrol. When the late war
has faded into history, and those of us who took part
have long since "gone west," such memorials will re-
main to bear witness to the splendid sacrifice and
unselfish gallantry of those hardy seamen who did
their utmost to uphold the honour of civihsation
and to destroy the forces working for its overthrow.
(This opportunity of acknowledging the success of
their extremely arduous efforts, humble and brief
though the acknowledgment may be, partially coun-
terbalances my regrets at not having had the chance
of serving with the "Dover Patrol" except on the
occasion which this book is designed to describe.)
The final closing of the Straits, however, was far
from accompHshed by the spring of 191 8. At that
time we had reason to believe that a large percentage
of the total Allied losses in merchant ships was caused
by the Flanders submarines, and that the percentage
was on the increase.
Now patrol work of the type described above is
essentially defensive in its nature. This statement is
not intended to imply that the Dover Patrol force
were always employed on defensive tactics; such was
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by no means the case. Our monitors frequently bom-
barded the coast defences and the harbour works at
Ostende and Zeebrugge; our motor boats were con-
tinually patrolling close off the three coast harbours,
watching for opportunities to torpedo any German
vessels which ventured to sea; our mine-laying craft
were employed, night after night, in laying mines to
the detriment of the German submarines. But from
time to time various suggestions had been made that
we should adopt still more offensive measures against
the enemy. It is a very simple matter to make sug-
gestions, but by no means so simple to accompany
them with a reasoned statement, based on logical
deduction, which will convince the authorities of their
value. Until a particular Plan has been put into
execution it may, in the literal sense, be rightly des-
ignated a "paper scheme." It is both unreasonable
and unfair to attach a derogatory sense to the term.
It is equally unreasonable for authors of schemes
which have not passed the paper stage to belittle
operations when the latter, based on schemes which
differed from their own, have actually taken place
with successful results.
Whatever suggestions were made, it is clear that
there could be only two radical methods of attaining
our object. The most satisfactory, of course, would
have been the recapture of the Flanders coast and
of Bruges, with all the hornets in their nests, by
means of military operations. Unfortunately that
was impracticable; the Allied armies were not yet
sufficiently strong. The only alternative to capture
of the craft in their harbours was that of preventmg
them putting to sea— i.e., destroying or blocking
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their exits. Several schemes for blocking operations
had been proposed. In tactical method they had
varied from blowing up the harbour entrances, as
suggested by the Halifax disaster, to "building in"
the entrances under cover of poison gas. Whether
such methods were considered too risky, too expen-
sive, or too hopelessly fantastic is more than the
author of this book knows.
An attack on Zeebrugge had been strongly advo-
cated by an eminent flag officer in November, 1916,
but no details were given by him as to the nature of
the operation. In May, 1917, detailed proposals for
an attack had been submitted to the Admiralty by
another distinguished officer. This attack involved a
landing on the Mole at Zeebrugge, the general idea of
which was not dissimilar from that eventually fol-
lowed. This particular scheme had not earned the
approval of Their Lordships, nor was it considered
suitable by the Vice-Admiral then in command at
Dover.
Many months after the blocking of Zeebrugge
had become an accomplished fact two earlier schemes
came to light— these having emanated from the
author of that submitted in May, 1917. In Novem-
ber, 191 7, however, the only previous proposals
which were available for consideration by the Plan-
ning Division of the Staff were those of November,
1916, and May, 1917, mentioned above.
* In November, 1917, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was
First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff. He had
requested the Director of Plans to consider, amongst
many other things, the possibility of blocking the
Belgian ports.
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The Plan was evolved in the Admiralty, being com-
menced on November 13th, and laid before Their
Lordships on December 3d. The Plan was accepted
as feasible, and earned Their Lordships' decision to
have it carried out. No previous Plan had reached
that stage. The original edition of the Plan did not
- emanate from another country, or from civilian
sources, or from any other source outside the Ad-
miralty buildings in Whitehall except in so far as the
details of one particular phase of the operation were
the outcome of conversations, at the headquarters
of the Air Force, with an expert on the formation of
artificial fogs.
The foregoing definite fact has been purposely In-
serted to correct other statements which have been
published elsewhere, presumably in error. I shall deal
with the details of the Plan in a subsequent chapter.
Before leaving the consideration of the origin of the
Plan, I should like to emphasise one particular point.
Perhaps this can be most readily illustrated by a sim-
ple simile. An uncorked bottle, containing some
noxious fluid, stands upon the table. You realise the
disagreeable results which will follow on the escape
of its contents. You cork the bottle. Now your action
is so obviously correct that yoa scarcely give it an-
other thought. If any credit was due to anybody you
would probably take it to yourself; you would not
apportion any particular merit to that fond parent
who first initiated you into this obvious solution of
the problem. In the case, therefore, of the Blocking of
Zeebrugge one need not apportion credit to the person
who first suggested the mere idea; the credit is entirely
due to the man who, in spite of all the diflficulties,
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evolved a method of "corking the bottle" and who,
later, overcoming the great obstacles in the way,
carried the method into execution.
Before we pass on to review the difficulties of
blocking the exits from the German bases it would be
advisable to consider the probable effects of such an
operation; this being the logical sequence actually
followed before the details of the Plan were formu-
lated.
The results to be attained by blocking the exits
would probably be as follows. Firstly, there would
be a reduction in the number of Allied vessels sunk by
mine or submarine warfare; secondly, a decrease in
raid activity on the part of the enemy torpedo craft;
thirdly, the loss of a convenient advanced base for
small craft operating in conjunction with certain
movements of the High Seas Fleet; and, fourthly, the
reduction in the number of enemy vessels available
for the purposes mentioned.
The first two results concerned reduction of enemy
activity arising from the longer passages involved by
the use of more distant bases such as Heligoland or
the German rivers from which the small craft could
continue their depredations. The third result speaks
for itself. With regard to the fourth, it has already
been stated that, on an average day, there would be
many torpedo craft or submarines resting and re-
pairing at Bruges. If the exits were blocked the use of
these craft would be denied to the enemy, just as
effectually as if they were sunk, for as long as the
exits remained unopened. This loss to the enemy,
temporary or permanent, could doubtless be de-
scribed in terms of reduction of Allied losses of mer-
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chant tonnage. The Admiralty authorities could
probably have calculated, within fairly correct esti-
mates, the average loss of merchant tonnage caused to
the Allies by a single enemy submarine or surface
torpedo craft. Our former average loss per given
period would thus be lessened in proportion to the
number of enemy vessels bottled up in the canals
during that period.
There would, of course, be other, less important,
consequences arising from the blocking of these exits
;
e.g., the inconveniences caused by the necessary
transfer of fuelling and repair facilities elsewhere, the
extra work thrown on the escorting vessels in the
Bight, and the fact that the craft already at sea and
operating from the Flanders coast would be forced to
curtail their current trips if they desired to arrive at
their new bases with their usual reserves of fuel.
All these material gains to the Allies would be of
considerable importance, but the moral effect was not
unworthy of consideration. The more audacious an
undertaking against an enemy the more intense will
be the victor's enthusiasm consequent on success,
and the greater the despondency and loss of moral to
the vanquished. Attempts to block a hostile port in
the face of carefully prepared defence measures may
certainly be described as audacious, unless the word
"impertinent," which the author is inclined to allo-
cate to this particular event, is deemed to be more
truly descriptive. If we endeavour to imagine what
our own feelings would be on hearing that enemy
vessels had entered one of our strongly defended har-
bours and blocked the entrance, we shall arrive at
some idea as to the probable moral effect produced
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by such an enterprise. In spite of the almost entire
absence of activity on the part of the High Seas Fleet,
the Germans had never ceased to sing its praises with
all the bombast of which their waning spirit was
capable. It was not difficult, therefore, to estimate
the dejection and consternation that would spread
throughout Germany when the success of our efforts
became known. The loss of prestige in the German
Navy would be not merely certain but perhaps of vital
consequence later on.
CHAPTER II
THE LOCAL SITUATION. THE LOCAL DEFENCES
I
"^HE village of Zeebrugge stands near the en-
trance to the Zeebrugge-Bruges canal. At
about half a mile inland from the coast at
Zeebrugge the canal lock was situated. To seaward
of the lock, the entrance channel, being open to the
sea, was tidal. On the eastern side of the entrance
channel, about midway between the lock and the
coast-line, a small tidal harbour had been constructed
for the use of fishing craft. This tidal harbour was of
no special value for naval purposes, owing to its small
depth. From the coast-line the entrance channel was
continued into the sea for a distance of about two
hundred and seventy yards by means of estacades—
i.e., wooden piers. These piers, curving outwards
from the shore, are conspicuous in the illustrations.
For the purpose of protecting the canal entrance from
rough seas, which might interfere with the passage
of vessels to and from the canal, the famous Zeebrugge
Mole had been constructed for the Belgians. Semi-
circular in shape, it emanated from the shore at a
distance of about half a mile to the westward of the
canal entrance; thence it curved round to the north-
ward and eastward. This curved Mole protected a
roadstead, of some three hundred acres in extent,
from northerly and westerly gales. Easterly winds
did not cause such heavy seas as those from the direc-
tions already named owing to the protection afforded
by the Netherlands coast.
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The construction of the Mole was a colossal task.
There are no similar works of such magnitude in
Great Britain or the United States. When lecturing
in the latter country I always made a point of em-
phasising that fact to our American cousins; their
unfailing humour never failed to appreciate this little
friendly "dig."
The total length of the Mole was over one and a
half miles. For purposes of description it may be
divided into four portions. Commencing at the shore-
ward end, the first portion of the Mole took the form
of a stone railway pier built into the sea for a distance
of two hundred and fifty yards. This pier was con-
nected to the second portion, which consisted of an
iron-piled railway viaduct three hundred and thirty
yards in length. This, in turn, was connected to the
third portion, which formed the Mole proper. The
latter was built of concrete blocks on its seaward and
shore sides, the central part being filled with gravel
and paved with granite. The width of this portion of
the Mole was no less than eighty-one yards, and its
length about eighteen hundred and seventy-five, or
rather over a land mile. At its northeastern end, the
fourth portion consisted of an extension piece, two
hundred and sixty yards long and fifteen feet broad,
with a lighthouse at its eastern extremity.
If the Mole had been constructed soHd throughout
its entire length, the task of keeping the channel,
leading to the canal entrance, or the roadstead, at
a convenient depth would have been impossible
owing to silt.
Silt may be defined as the movement of sand or
mud, according to the nature of the sea bottom in the
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locality, due to current. The bottom of the sea in this
locality was sand. The current off the Flanders coast
is caused by tide— it is usually spoken of as tidal
stream. Tidal streams reverse their direction of
movement about every six hours. Now the move-
ment of sand caused by a tidal stream tends to de-
posit that sand in or against any irregularity with
which it meets, whether the latter is a groove on the
sea bed or an obstacle such as a wreck. This deposit
first takes place from one direction, and then, when
the tidal stream reverses, from the opposite direction.
It will therefore be seen that, where a channel is
artificially cut on the floor of the sea, silt will con-
tinually tend to fill that channel again until the bot-
tom is level once more. And a ship which grounds in
a locality affected by silt will have sand deposited
against her sides much to the detriment of salvage
operations. These facts are well enough known to
seamen and have an important bearing on this nar-
rative.
Suppose for a moment that the entire Mole had
been built in solid formation— i.e., that the tidal
stream had no free passage under the viaduct. The
west-going stream would tend to carry sand into the
roadstead between the Mole and the canal entrance,
whereas the east-going stream would be unable to
remove the deposit a few hours later. Thus the road-
stead would soon have become useless, and access to
the canal would have been impracticable.
The sand along the whole Flanders coast was ex-
tremely susceptible to movement. Such tendency
was partially countered by the extensive use of
groynes. These latter, however, could not be carried
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very far out into the sea owing to the difficulties of
construction and repair. There were, therefore, no
artificial barriers to prevent the movement of the
sand to the eastward or westward beyond a short
distance from the shore. Hence the necessity for
keeping a portion of the Mole open to allow the tidal
stream to flow in both directions. Even so, a large
shoal had formed in the roadstead, and reduced the
acreage available for anchorage purposes.
When first designed the open viaduct was of shorter
length than that eventually constructed; the altera-
tion was considered necessary after local experience
of the silt had been obtained. The iron piles, or pil-
lars, on which the viaduct was supported were of
great strength and much interlaced with steel rods to
allow for severe buffeting in heavy gales and to take
the strain of railway traffic. A portion was actually
demolished by a gale when under construction, and
the completion of the Mole was consequently delayed
for many months.
When making enquiries in search of expert advice
on questions of salvage, I had an interesting conversa-
tion with an individual who had had considerable
experience in salving vessels in other waters. Maybe
this book will remind him of our discussion. In his
opinion salvage work presiented no great difficulties.
It was only a matter of obtaining the necessary ap-
parat?js, he thought, and any vessel— concrete-filled
or otherwise— could be removed in a month or so.
"How about silt.?" I asked.
"Oh, silt shouldn't make much difference," he re-
plied, and added, "but we have no silt to speak of ia
that part of the world, so I cannot say for certain."
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We then discussed the possiblHties of salving a
blockship at Zeebrugge, for he had been informed of
the proposed operation. Eventually our conversation
nearly resulted in a wager; that we came to no terms
was perhaps due to the fact that payment might have
necessitated application to a war widow.
The first and second portions of the Mole had not
been materially altered by the Germans during their
occupation.
The third portion of the Mole will require detailed
description. In peace days the Mole had been used as
a commercial wharf as well as a breakwater. Ships
used to secure alongside its inner wall. All the neces-
sary facilities, such as bollards for securing hawsers,
fixed and travelling cranes for loading or unloading
cargo, and arrangements for embarking passengers,
had been provided. A large railway passenger sta-
tion, nearly two hundred yards long, was situated
near its southwestern end ; a goods station aad a coal
shed, both very large buildings, stood further to the
northeastward. The floor level of this portion of the
Mole was about nine feet above the level of high tide.
On the outer (seaward) side a high wall, of great
strength and thickness, had been constructed for the
purpose of preventing rough seas from breaking over
the Mole and damaging the sheds or washing away
the railway. The top of this wall was twenty feet
above the floor level of the Mole and therefore twenty-
nine feet above the level of high tide: at low tide it
towered forty-four feet above the sea.
The fourth portion of the Mole was really formed
by a continuation of the outer wall, which extended
beyond the third portion to the lighthouse.
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The appearance of all portions of the outer wall, as
viewed by anybody situated in a boat alongside it,
was exactly similar throughout its entire length from
the lighthouse to the railway viaduct. Thus the in-
dividual in the boat, except in the unlikely event of
being able to see over the top of the wall, would be
unable to tell, at all definitely, whereabouts his boat
was situated relative to objects on the Mole. But this
fact had not been accidentally overlooked by the de-
signer of the Mole; there was no object in taking it
into consideration, for there was then no idea of any
vessel berthing alongside the outer wall. For instance,
there were no bollards, no cranes, no capstans for
working hawsers, in fact no arrangements whatever
for berthing a ship. I have already stated that this
outer wall was of great thickness, varying from
twenty-five feet on the sea bottom to ten feet in that
portion standing above the floor level of the Mole.
Four feet below the top of the wall there was a path-
way, nine feet broad, running the whole length of the
wall. This pathway was known as the parapet. The
parapet was bounded on its seaward side by the four-
foot wall just mentioned; on its inner side iron rail-
ings, three feet high, were placed to prevent anybody
falling from the pathway to the floor of the Mole six-
teen feet below. Flights of steps led up from the
Mole floor to the parapet, but these flights were very
few and far between.
That portion of the outer wall which formed the
lighthouse extension of the Mole was broadened,
above the sea level, to about seventeen feet through-
out its length. The pathway was similar to that just
described, but fifteen feet in width. This portion of
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the Mole was hollow, a tunnel inside it running from
the third portion of the Mole to the base of the light-
house.
The navigable channel from the open sea to the
canal entrance could only be maintained in an effi-
cient state by means of continual dredging, owing to
the silt. The channel passed close to the lighthouse at
the end of the Mole, and then in a fairly direct line,
for a distance of three-quarters of a mile, to a position
midway between the extremities of the two piers
marking the canal entrance. Thence the deep water
channel passed slightly to the westward of the central
line between the piers. This latter portion of the
channel had become exceedingly narrow by virtue of
the sandbanks which had formed on either side of it
and which actually uncovered at low water. A vessel
drawing more than twelve feet or so was forced to
keep exactly in the middle of this dredged channel
to avoid grounding. Photographs taken at or near
high tide gave the channel the appearance of extend-
ing from one pier to the other, at least a distance of
one hundred yards ; those taken near low water showed
how narrow the channel really was. In the region of
the two piers the silting of the sand was more rapid
than elsewhere: the narrowest part of the channel
was situated near the shore ends of these piers.
The Germans had not rested satisfied with either
the Mole, the canal entrance, or the lock as they
found them. The Mole itself had been transformed
into a fortress, and further defences had been con-
structed for the purpose of guarding the canal.
Batteries were placed on both sides of the canal
entrance. These ranged from four-inch guns to
fp
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A PORTION OF THE GERMAN BATTERY ON THE LIGHTHOUSE
EXTENSION OF THE MOLE
VIEW OF THE CANAL ENTRANCE WITH ITS CURVED PIERS
This photograph was taken at high tide. Note the Mole in the distance
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twelve-inch guns. Barbed wire entanglements were
erected along the shore line ; trenches, containing ma-
chine guns, were dug close behind them. It was be-
lieved that a boom of some sort, capable of being
hauled across the channel or removed at will, was kept
handy to the outer lock gate. The gate itself, " cais-
son" is the correct technical term, was withdrawn
into an armoured housing, impervious to shells or
bombs, when the lock was opened to allow vessels to
pass through. The caisson was also provided with an
armoured roof for defence against aerial bombs. The
lights on the wooden piers were only lit when spe-
cially required to guide a German vessel to the en-
trance.
On the Mole a very large seaplane base was estab-
lished with the original passenger station as its prin-
cipal building. Several other buildings for housing
seaplanes, fuel, or bombs, and workshops were erected
by the Germans close by. A merchant steamer, the
Brussels, formerly commanded by the ill-fated Cap-
tain Fryatt, whom the Germans did to death so
abominably, was moored alongside the station, and
was believed to be used as living quarters for the per-
sonnel of the seaplane base.
The broad portion of the Mole was used as a base
for submarines passing through Zeebrugge en route
for Bruges or to the open sea; it was also used for such
torpedo craft and mine-sweepers as were required for
immediate duty in that locality. From the north-
eastern large shed to the lighthouse the Mole had
been turned into a veritable fortress. It was believed
that the lighthouse was used as the Mole signal sta-
tion. A battery of six or seven guns was situated on
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the lighthouse extension of the Mole. These guns
were at first surmised to be 3.5-inch guns, but it is
probable that they were larger— in fact, up to 5.9-
inch guns firing a shell of approximately one hundred
pounds in weight. It was believed that the guns of
this battery could fire out to sea and could be turned
to fire towards the shore.
Any vessel approaching from seaward and passing
into the dredged channel, en route to the canal, would
be within the danger zone of this battery, from the
latter's extreme range out at sea to the canal lock,
always provided that the state of the visibility al-
lowed the vessel to be seen. Incidentally, owing to the
situation of the deep channel, the vessel would be
obliged to pass within afew yards of this battery when
rounding the Mole end. A vessel endeavouring to
berth alongside the outer wall would have to approach
close to this battery, i.e., on a westerly course. At
first sight it might appear feasible to approach from
the westward on an easterly course and thus avoid
passing close to the battery, but that is not so. High
tide and slack stream do not coincide on this coast.
For about three hours on each side of high tide the
streams run to the eastward: at other states of the
tide there would be insufficient depths of water for a
vessel to berth alongside. It would therefore be nec-
essary to approach from the eastward, i.e., to stem
the tidal stream.
Now let us imagine for a few moments a duel be-
tween this battery and a warship within— say—
one thousand yards. The reader probably knows that
such a distance nowadays comes within the definition
of "point-blank range''; i.e., a range at which a gun
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practically cannot miss a ship. Picture, then, an
average-sized vessel of three hundred feet in length.
The guns could hardly miss her— in fact, the gunners
could select which particular portion of her should
serve as their target. The ship's guns would return
the fire. The most vulnerable portions of the battery
ashore are the guns themselves. The muzzle of each
gun showing just above the wall would, as viewed
from the ship, cover barely one square foot in size.
Now at golf we call it a "fluke" when a golfer holes
out from the tee although he has attained his object.
(I apologise for this to non-golfers.) Similarly, if the
ship's gun hits the shore gun we should call it a
"fluke," although that is the object forming the
target. And, as already implied, if the shore gun
misses the ship, that also will be a "fluke." On the
face of it, it certainly does not look as if the ship
would stand much chance, even at a distance of one
thousand yards. But how if she is closer.? If a thou-
sand yards is point-blank range, how shall we desig-
nate a hundred yards ?
At the eastern end of the broad part of the Mole,
and on its floor level, the Germans had erected a bat-
tery of three heavy guns. These were so placed that
they could fire on any incoming vessel immediately
she rounded the lighthouse. Woe betide a vessel at-
tempting to do so in the face of such guns. The latter
were probably of the 5.9-inch type. Under water,
immediately below this battery, we eventually found
some submerged torpedo tubes, but I am not aware
as to whether they were constructed before the
blocking operation or not ; their direction of fire was
similar to that of the guns above them.
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Close westward of these batteries of heavy guns
and torpedoes, and standing against the high outer
wall, the Germans had constructed a long shed of
reenforced concrete; this shed provided the living
space for the personnel of the Mole garrison.
The total numbers of Germans on the Mole prob-
ably reached not less than a thousand. Although this
number may include the personnel of the seaplane
base yet they would all be available for the defence of
the Mole in case of an attack.
Slightly to the westward of the garrison's quarters,
trenches had been sunk in the floor of the Mole and
surrounded by three complete sets of barbed wire
entanglements. It was believed that the usual ac-
cessories of a coast fort— e.g., searchlights and
range-finders, etc.— were placed on the outer wall
parapet, and that there would probably be some
small guns there also.
So much for the Mole itself. Across the channel
the Germans had placed booms. One of these, con-
sisting of four Rhine barges, was moored between the
eastern end of the broad part of the Mole and a buoy
situated two hundred and seventy yards to the south-
ward. These barges were filled with stone, had nets
slung beneath them, and were connected together by
wire hawsers. If a surface vessel attempted to pass
between the buoy and the Mole she would be brought
up by this boom and probably damaged by collision
with one of the barges. If a submarine attempted to
dive underneath the barges she would be caught up
in the nets. The other boom consisted of entangle-
ment nets moored between a series of buoys to the
southeastward of the barges. Any ship attempting
THE NORTHEASTERN END OF THE MOLE
a. The shadows of the parapet wall and of the lighthouse at its extremity
b. The Mole batteries
c. Trench system surrounded by barbed wire
d. German torpedo craft alongside Mole
e. The barge boom
f. The boom of entanglement nets
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to pass through them would probably have her pro-
pellers entangled, with the result that her engines
would be brought to a complete stop. Thus, which-
ever boom was encountered by a ship, the latter
would, at the least, be partially disabled and stopped.
The Mole batteries could then have sunk her at their
leisure by gunfire. The only route by which a vessel
could pass clear of these two booms was that between
the southeastern barge and the northern entangle-
ment net; i.e., within two hundred and fifty yards of
the heavy gun battery on the Mole. But even if, by
dint of good fortune or special good management, a
vessel managed to pass the Mole batteries and the
booms, she would still have to run the gantlet of
the naval vessels in the anchorage and the batteries
on shore before reaching the canal.
The German torpedo craft, which were available
for local duty, used to berth alongside the inner side
of the Mole, close to the westward of the barge
boom. By virtue of their guns, torpedoes, and search-
lights, and the fact that they probably kept up
steam in readiness for instant action, these craft
provided a valuable addition to the Mole and canal
defences.
The foregoing description of the local defences at
Zeebrugge has probably been sufficiently detailed to
lead to the conclusion that the Germans were fully
alive to the possibility of attacks on the Mole or canal.
Whether or not they considered that such attacks
would only form part of some more ambitious opera-
tion, such as a military landing on the coast, our
enemies had left practically no stone unturned to
repel them. The defence measures must have ap-
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peared, especially to those on the spot, to be more
than sufficient.
It is well known that, although the possession of
detailed local knowledge will usually be of great
value towards the formation of plans of attack, there
are occasions when local knowledge is apt to make
local difficulties loom extremely large. For instance,
in this particular case, the navigational difficulties
caused by the strong tidal stream, the difficulty of
recognising objects on the low-lying shore during
darkness, the uninviting appearance of the outer
Mole wall as an obstacle to be surmounted, and many
other matters would probably have induced the be-
lief, in those who were actually acquainted with these
difficulties, that such attacks would have no chance
of success. There is, therefore, reason to believe that,
although they realised an attack might be attempted,
the Germans were perfectly satisfied that the defences
could neither be improved nor penetrated.
The reader will probably have arrived at the con-
clusion that the Germans were devilish in their thor-
oughness. Yet there was still one joint left in their
armour— and we penetrated it. But I must not
anticipate.
CHAPTER III
THE OUTLYING OBSTACLES. CONSIDERATIONS OF
SALVAGE
THUS far I have only dealt with the local de-
fences of Zeebrugge. But there were many
other obstacles in our way— such as the
coast batteries, mines, surface patrol vessels, sub-
marines, aircraft, and the vagaries of the weather in
addition to the navigational difficulties mentioned in
the first chapter.
The coast-line of Flanders bristled with guns. The
section of the coast from three miles west of Ostende
to six miles east of Zeebrugge, approximately twenty-
one miles in length, was defended by two hundred
and twenty-five guns; one hundred and thirty-six of
these were of the heavy type, i.e., six-inch and above,
up to fifteen-inch guns.
At one period of the war, soon after the Germans
first obtained possession of that locality, the coast
defences had been few and far between. In those days
our ships used to bombard from such short ranges as
ten thousand yards. In course of time heavier guns
were set up on shore so that our vessels were forced to
keep at a more respectful distance. The first bom-
bardments from ten thousand yards had been an-
swered by the establishment of German guns having
a range of fifteen thousand yards. When better
weapons became available for bombardment from
twenty thousand yards the Germans replied with guns
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firing up to twenty-five thousand yards. And thus the
duel continued. Finally, the ranges increased to up-
wards of forty thousand yards (twenty-three land
miles). Monitors were specially constructed for this
purpose and their marksmanship was wonderfully
accurate. This accuracy is borne out by the fact that
scarcely any damage was caused to the residential
quarter, although Ostende was bombarded again and
again; yet works of military importance, such as
docks and railway stations, closely adjoining the resi-
dential quarter, were hit time after time.
' In a straightforward gunnery duel between a ship
and a fort, within the effective range of each, the
former stands no chance. In these days, however,
such duels savour little of the old-time broadside
fighting between ships.
Even the largest and most modern coast guns are
of comparatively small avail for defensive purposes
unless the attacking ships are visible, or unless the
firing can be controlled satisfactorily by such indirect
means as the use of aircraft for observational pur-
poses. At night the attackers must be illuminated by
star-shell, flares, or searchlights. Under the ordinary
fog conditions— i.e., when the whole locality is ob-
scured by fog— aircraft cannot observe the results
of firing nor can the attacking forces be illuminated.
Under exceptional fog conditions— i.e., when a
fog (natural or artificial) lies between the shore guns
and the attacking vessels, the latter being in clear
weather— good co-operation between the batteries
and aircraft in daylight enables the fire to be directed
so accurately as to ensure destruction to vessels which
remain in the danger zone.
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The only alternative to directed firing is that of
barrage firing, such as is used so greatly in modern
land warfare. The defence guns can establish a shell
barrage, for a limited period, across any zone which
the attacking ship is attempting to penetrate en route
to her objective. The vessel which steams into an
efficient heavy gun barrage from modern guns is
unlikely to survive.
I afterwards visited one of the large German bat-
teries near Ostende, called the Jakobynessen battery,
which mounted fifteen-inch guns and fired projectiles
weighing nearly one ton each— seventeen hundred-
weight to be precise. They were mounted in specially
constructed gun-pits amongst the sand-hills close
behind the shore, and were so well hidden that they
could not be seen from a distance of little more than
a single gun's length. The projectiles stood over six
feet high and were murderous-looking instruments of
warfare. These particular guns, and there were others
of a like nature, could probably have ranged up to
sixty thousand yards (over thirty-four land miles).
The whole area off this section of the coast, up to
about twenty miles to seaward, was included in the
danger zone of the coast batteries. No vessel could
maintain her position in that area, under ordinary
conditions of visibility, for more than a few minutes
at the outside limit. The reader may consider, how-
ever, that a ship desiring to attack the coast would
merely have to approach in foggy weather or under
cover of darkness. In foggy weather she would be
unable to locate her objective— so that can be ruled
out. At night she might conceivably arrive within a
few thousand yards without being seen or heard.
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But immediately she was located by the defences the
latter would fire their star-shell and switch on their
searchlights. The whole area would thus be illumi-
nated like daylight. The vessel discovered under such
conditions would probably be blown to pieces within
five minutes.
Thus it is manifest that ships cannot approach a
hostile coast, in the face of modern defences, under the
ordinary conditions of daylight or darkness, or in fog.
We will now consider the mine problem. The Ger-
man mine-fields extended to a distance of several
miles from the coast. We had reason to know of their
presence ; from time to time, as reported in the press,
our vessels had been blown up.
Mine-fields off one's own coast provide a certain
measure of defence. But they are also an embarrass-
ment in that one's own vessels cannot pass through
them, when approaching or leaving harbour, unless
safe channels are kept clear for the purpose. This
applied to the mine-fields under review.
The reader may possibly have jumped to the con-
clusion that all we had to do was to navigate calmly
through the German safe channels. It certainly
sounds plausible. As a matter of fact, such an idea
borders on the ridiculous. Let us think this matter out
carefully. Our forces could not pass through such
channels unless they possessed information as to the
positions of those channels. But if such information
were received, the chances would be long odds on the
information having been "made in Germany." Far
from such information being correct, therefore, the
positions mentioned would probably be those of the
most dangerous mine-fields. Nevertheless, suppose
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we received information which, from the nature of its
source and data, we had every reason to credit; and
suppose we acted on such information. Well, on the
voyage across the sea, or even before we actually
start, the enemy discover that we intend to attack.
What will they do? Their argument would be as fol-
lows : "The British are coming over to attack us; they
may have discovered the positions of our safe chan-
nels; we dare not take any chances so we will mine
our own safe channels immediately." Mine-layers,
kept ready for instant use, would be sent to sea at
once. In a very short space of time, probably an hour
would be more than sufficient, the previous safe chan-
nels would have been converted into areas of the
greatest danger.
There are alternative methods which the attackers
may adopt. Firstly, they may advance to the attack
preceded by a force of mine-sweepers. Now mine-
sweeping is a very slow process if it is to be carried out
thoroughly. It is inconceivable that a large force of
these vessels could steam about, mine-sweeping, near
the enemy's coast for a considerable period without
being discovered. Their discovery would give the
whole show away; the enemy would know that we
were approaching; the whole element of surprise
would be lost.
The other method open to the attackers is that of
proceeding to their objective without mine-sweepers,
after having carefully weighed the probabilities of
danger existing on the various alternative routes, and,
on arriving at the danger area, passing through it and
chancing the result. And that is what we did— we
chanced it! But I am anticipating once more.
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Outside the German mine-fields, and in any inshore
areas which were unmined, German patrol craft would
probably be stationed. Patrol craft, in comparatively
narrow waters, are effective for discovering the ap-
proach of surface vessels in clear weather by day or
night. The minimum harm that they could do to the
attacking force would be that of reporting the latter's
approach. A single alarm rocket might be sufficient.
It is, therefore, almost inconceivable that the patrol
vessels could be passed without the alarm being given.
Any gun-firing would, of course, act as an alarm;
ramming, a much more silent method, would be the
best course open to the attacking craft if they en-
countered the patrols.
There were two other forms of patrol, however,
which could provide even more serious obstacles.
Submarines, stationed on the route between the
attacker's base and the objective, could patrol at
periscope depth. The passing of the squadrons,
viewed through the periscope of the unseen sub-
marine would be reported by wireless telegraphy im-
mediately the submarine could come to the surface.
Thus, long before the attack commenced, the de-
fenders would be perfectly well aware of the at-
tacker's approach, whereas the latter would imagine
that their mission was unsuspected. This use of a
submarine, as a lookout, would be of infinitely greater
importance, in such an event as this, than her use as
a torpedo vessel.
Aircraft patrolling off the coast— say at a height
of five thousand feet— would be able to see as far as
the southeast coast of England, provided the atmos-
phere were clear. Under average conditions of visi-
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bility there would be no difficulty in discovering a
naval force several miles distant. Such discovery
would be immediately reported to the defences with
the same result as that just described in the case of
the submarine. The Germans had a strong force of
seaplanes based on the Flanders coast. These ma-
chines were generally patrolling the vicinity— pro^
vided the Allied aircraft were not about.
We have now arrived at the stage where we can
make a summary of the main obstacles in the way of
a blocking enterprise at Zeebrugge. There were {a)
the aerial patrol; {h) outlying submarines; (c) surface
patrol vessels; {d) mines; {/) uncharted shoals; (/)
lack of navigational aids; (g) coast defence batteries
and illuminating apparatus; (A) the guns on the
Mole; {i) the obstruction booms; (/) the harbour
defence craft; {K) the shore batteries defending the
canal; (/) the difficulties of seamanship in a tideway;
and lastly (m) the vagaries of the weather.
In connection with a blocking enterprise at Ost-
ende the same obstacles applied with the exception of
those resulting from the presence of the Mole.
The list is undoubtedly formidable though not yet
complete. The operation, on the face of it, did not
seem to be altogether simple.
In writing this book I may be taken to task for con-
centrating on the operation at Zeebrugge and leaving
the Ostende stories untold.
The latter operations, there were two, would ne-
cessitate a volume to themselves. And— this is the
all-important point— I am not competent to render
a first-hand account of them because I was not in the
position of an eye-witness. Let us hope that the story
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will be written some day, so that the splendid work
of poor GodsaV who afterwards lost his life at Ost-
ende in my old ship, and of his gallant troop may be
properly recorded.
Owing to the fact that we were uncertain as to the
extent to which Ostende could be utilised as an exit
from Bruges, we naturally decided to assume its effi-
ciency; i.e., to assume that blocking the craft in at
Bruges would necessitate blocking both Zeebrugge
and Ostende.
The harbour entrance at Ostende was somewhat
similar to the canal entrance at Zeebrugge. There
were two piers flanking the entrance channel, the
whole area being commanded by shore batteries.
The only other comparison between the places which
calls for mention here is as follows. Whereas the
Mole at Zeebrugge provided additional obstacles
against entry, it also acted as a landmark from which
the canal entrance could be found. At Ostende the
defence obstacles would be less compHcated, but the
harbour entrance would be more difficult to locate,
Now, the decision to block both exits naturally led
to the conclusion that they should be blocked simul-
taneously if practicable. Otherwise the operation at
one place would serve as a warning to the other. For
instance, it would have been rather absurd for us to
block Zeebrugge one night with a view to coming
along on the following night to block Ostende. The
absurdity would have been only slightly less in degree
if we blocked one exit at— say— midnight with the
idea of blocking the other at 2 a.m. For the defence
batteries at the two places would naturally be in tele-
^ Commander A. E. Godsal.
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phonic communication, and even half an hour's notice
at the second exit would be sufficient to prepare a very-
warm reception for us. Simuhaneous blocking was
our aim; thus the whole operation was directed to that
end, a fact which influenced the events to be related.
It has been suggested that "blocking the exit" was
not the best method of preventing the egress of Ger-
man vessels from the Zeebrugge canal. An alternative
method, that of destroying the lock-gate by gun-fire,
was referred to. The idea sounds plausible enough at
first. As a matter of fact, many attempts had been
made, by means of long-range bombardments, to
achieve that end. They had all failed. The lock-gate
appeared to have a charmed life. Huge shell had
burst in its vicinity and yet it still remained intact.
The suggestion was then put forward that the lock-
gate should be bombarded from close range under
cover of smoke or gas. This suggestion was accom-
panied by the opinion that an attempt at blocking
the channel would be futile. I am much puzzled at
this idea of close bombardment. For it was as ob-
vious, as it was known to be a fact, that the Germans
would withdraw the gate into its armoured recess im-
mediately a bombardment was suspected. This would
have been the work of a feW moments ; the outer lock-
gate would have been rendered absolutely immune
from destruction.
The argument that there were two lock-gates, outer
and inner, and that the Germans could not withdraw
both, owing to the fear of the canal running dry, also
sounds plausible until it is closely examined. Firstly,
however, it is clear that the canal would only run dry
if both lock-gates were opened at low tide; secondly, an
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inshore operation at low tide would preclude the use
of any craft other than those of shallow draught;
thirdly, owing to the presence of the outer wall of the
Mole, whose height would be over forty feet at low
tide, the bombarding vessels could only obtain a
direct line of fire at the lock from a position inside the
Mole where the extensive shoals would allow very
little room for manoeuvring, to say nothing of the
defences on the Mole itself; fourthly, the canal, even
if emptied, would refill from the rising tide within a
few hours, and there was no certainty that the tem-
porary evacuation of the water would cause serious
damage; and lastly, one may assume, if there was
really any substance in the idea, that the Vice-Admi-
ral whose many long-range bombardments had failed
to achieve their purpose would have long since at-
tempted a short-range attack.
So, the decision to block the entrance at Zeebrugge
having been reached, the best position for blocking
had to be considered. It has already been shown that
the narrowest portion of the channel to seaward of
the lock was situated near the shore ends of the
wooden piers. Another position even narrower in size
was that of the lock-gateway itself. But the mere
width of the position chosen was by no means the
only consideration.
The actual sinking of the blockships in position did
not provide the final argument ; a point of great im-
portance concerned the practicability of removing
them out of the channel ; it is of little use to block a
channel in such a manner that it can easily be un-
blocked. This matter concerns the art of salvage.
Salvage is a highly technical subject, but a few re-
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marks at this stage are necessary if the reader is to
appreciate the extent to which considerations of sal-
vage affected the problem under discussion.
Salvage operations must vary according to the cir-
cumstances of each particular case. The size of the
vessel, the damage which she has sustained, the man-
ner in which she is resting on the bottom of the
sea, the nature of the ground, the tides, the depth of
water, the degree of exposure to rough seas, the prox-
imity of shelter for salvage craft, and the distance
from the land are all factors of importance, but they
by no means exhaust the list.
One of our main purposes in considering salvage
operations was that of ascertaining the chief obstacles
to salvage, so that we could provide the enemy with
as many of those identical obstacles as lay in our
power.
Another important object, concerning the imme-
diate problem at Zeebrugge, was that of deciding the
best type and size of vessel to be used in addition to
the question of what particular damage each vessel
should receive, and how she should be fitted to defy
attempts at removal.
There are three principal methods of removing a
sunken ship. First, bodily removal with the aid of
some lifting agent. Second, dispersion by explosive
means. Third, piecemeal removal by cutting away.
Regarding the first-mentioned method, a small
vessel can be lifted by passing hawsers beneath her
and securing the ends to salvage craft on the surface
overhead. The hawsers being hauled taut at low tide,
the vessel will lift off the bottom when the rise of
tide lifts the salvage craft, and can then be trans-
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ported bodily elsewhere. Larger vessels can be lifted
by the use of compressed air, or by pumping out the
vessel after closing all holes under water. Provided
the ship is upright the compressed air method can
leave out of account the damage sustained below the
vessel's normal waterhne, but the remainder of the
hull must be rendered airtight. Air can then be
pumped into the hull until the vessel is lifted, and she
can be towed away as required.
This method has been used successfully when re-
moving large vessels, but the practicability of render-
ing them airtight chiefly depends on the damage
which they have sustained. The pumping-out method,
comparatively speaking, is the most simple one
to adopt, provided that the damage to the hull is
small. The damaged portion must be repaired by
divers unless the more elaborate method of building
a coffer-dam— i.e., a sort of dock—^ around the ship, is
pursued. Divers cannot work in a strong tidal current
or in rough weather. The repair of holes under water
is rendered extremely difficult, if not actually impos-
sible, when the bottom of the ship is badly holed with
the ship resting on the damaged portion. The ship
must be made watertight, or nearly so, below the sur-
face of the sea before she can be lifted. The word
"watertight" is qualified here because, as a matter of
accuracy, the ship can be pumped out and lifted, pro-
vided that the pumps can eject water at a greater rate
than the latter is flowing in. Before passing on to
consider the next method it may be as well to remark
that special difficulty is experienced when moving
sand— i.e., silt— has access to the holes in the ship.
Dispersion by means of explosive charges may, un-
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der certain circumstances, be a simple operation, but,
on the other hand, there are certain conditions which
put this method outside the pale of choice. For in-
stance, in the case of a ship sunk in a narrow channel
where much silt is experienced, the explosive method
is almost worse than useless. For every explosion in
a given section of a vessel will tend to shatter that
portion into several pieces. Each piece falls to the
bottom and forms a new obstruction. Silt then
enormously aggravates the situation, for the sand
will collect against the obstruction until it becomes a
miniature sandbank. Such shoals are then difficult to
remove. A bucket-dredger— i.e., a vessel fitted with
an endless chain of buckets for scooping up the bot-
tom— will break her buckets as soon as they en-
counter the steel kernel of the shoal. On the other
hand, a suction dredger— i.e., a vessel designed to
suck up sand off the sea-bottom— cannot raise solid
material. Neither type of dredger can remove the
cause of the shoal; any removal of sand under such
conditions is merely temporary; the sand will re-
commence building up the shoal as soon as the dredger
ceases work. Dredging against such obstacles is of
little more use than dredging against rocks.
There remains the third method, namely, piece-
meal removal by means of "cutting away." Cutting
away can be accomplished, in the ordinary course of
events, by means of acetylene gas cutters or by
pneumatic tools. Acetylene gas will cut through steel
with little more effort than a knife cutting through
india-rubber. But acetylene gas cannot be used under
water and cannot cut through large thicknesses of
cement. Pneumatic tools provide a very laborious and
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tedious means of cutting large quantities of steel.
Work under water entails the use of divers. Thus, the
removal of a ship by the piecemeal process is an ex-
ceedingly prolonged undertaking, especially as each
piece must be lifted out when cut away; for reasons
already stated the pieces must on no account be al-
lowed to fall to the sea-bottom.
From the foregoing remarks we arrive at the fol-
lowing conclusions. The blockships should be too
large to lift off the bottom by the hawser method.
They should be extensively damaged and sunk in such
a manner that they would rest on the damaged por-
tion of the hull. They should be fitted to counter
"cutting away" tactics, and should be sunk in posi-
tions where silt would render impracticable the ex-
plosive method of dispersion; the damage should be
so situated as to give the silting sand access to the
hull through the holes in the latter.
These general anti-salvage considerations, how-
ever, did not furnish us with all the data required.
They required to be dealt with in greater detail, and
the matter of dimensions was another important factor.
It was essential to render impossible the passage
of the German naval craft out of the canal over the
top of the sunken blockships. The tide at Zeebrugge
rises fifteen feet between its low and high levels. Al-
lowing six feet as the minimum depth required to
float small naval craft, it will be seen that the upper
portion of each blockship should reach to within six
feet of high tide level, or, at least, nine feet above low
tide level, when resting on the bottom. The height
of the blockship's hull, therefore, would need to be
equal to the depth of the sea at low tide level plus, at
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least, nine feet. Now, the choice of vessel is naturally
limited. In the midst of war it is unlikely that a navy
would possess many craft, if any, which were not
already in use for other purposes. Thus, the dimen-
sions just referred to would have to fall within certain
limits, namely, those corresponding to the dimensions
of the only vessels from which one is likely to be able
to choose. That part of the total height due to the
rise of tide was beyond control ; it would be the same
an5^where in the same locality. Thus, the position
chosen for the blocking must necessarily have a low
tide depth of such an amount as would make the total
depth at high water correspond to the total height of
the available hulls.
Then again the number of ships required would
depend on the relation between their horizontal di-
mensions and the breadth of the channel to be
blocked. For instance, a single vessel whose beam di-
mensions were approximately equal to the breadth
of the lock gateway would be sufficient to block the
latter, provided that the height of her hull also agreed
with the conditions just mentioned above.
Now, it had to be borne in mind that if a vessel was
sunk in the lock gateway the "cutting-away" method
would be greatly facilitated by the erection of cranes
and machinery, within a few feet of the vessel, on
dry land. This position, being so far removed from the
tidal current which runs parallel with the Belgian
coast, was unaffected by silt. Thus, although the lock
gateway, by reason of its small breadth, could be
completely blocked by any suitable vessel sunk
therein, the work of salvage would be very much less
difficult here than elsewhere.
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Further out, between the wooden piers at the canal
entrance, the navigable channel was approximately
one hundred and twenty feet in breadth; i.e., slightly
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A vessel of one hundred and twenty feet in length,
therefore, would require to be turned dead across the
navigable channel before sinking if she was to block
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every inch of it. Obviously, a vessel of three hundred
feet in length would not require to turn herself to any-
thing like the same extent. The maximum depth in
this position was believed to be about thirty-six feet
at high tide level. Thus, we arrive at the conclusion
that a blockship sunk between the wooden piers
would need to have a hull whose height was not less
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than thirty feet, and to have a length of at least
one hundred and twenty feet.
In this position the silt was known to be very ac-
tive. That fact, taken in conjunction with the ex-
posure to rough seas, the presence of the tidal current,
and the impracticability of erecting salvage plant on
the land within easy reach of the vessel, rendered it
obvious that, all things considered, the position be-
tween the wooden piers would be the ideal blocking
position if suitable vessels were available for the
purpose, and if such vessels were damaged and sunk
with due regard to anti-salvage considerations.
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It is common knowledge that when vessels are
fitted out as blockships they usually carry a goodly
cargo of cement. The general notion, however, about
the use of this material is that it is merely intended
to make the ships heavier and thus less capable of
being lifted. That is only partially correct. There is
another and more important use for cement, namely,
as a counter against the use of acetylene gas for cut-
ting the ships to pieces. The general scheme is that of
placing the cement in just those positions where cut-
ting would be most necessary; in our case, in those
portions of the ship which would be above the lowest
level of the tide and up to within six feet of the highest
tide level. The depth of our chosen position being
twenty-one feet at low water and thirty-six feet at
high water, this meant that the cement would need
to be placed between the levels of twenty-one feet
and thirty feet above the keel, provided that the ship
was sunk in an upright position. With regard to the
latter proviso, steps must be taken to guard against
the eventuality of the ship resting on her beam ends
on the sea-bottom as a result of capsizing when
foundering. This cautionary measure necessitated
placing the cement between the levels of twenty-one
feet and thirty feet from her beam ends at either side
of the vessel as well as between the same vertical
distances from her keel. Nothing should be left to
chance that can be provided for in advance.
It was clear enough that the task of ever getting
the ships into the desired positions for sinking would
be far from simple; having attained that object it
would be the height of stupidity to sink the ships in
such a manner, and so fitted, that their removal
would be comparatively easy.
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After the operation had been successfully com-
pleted I could not help being rather amused at a cer-
tain individual who expressed the opinion that " the
Germans are so cute that they'll probably remove the
blockships in a day or two." Why were some people
always so ready to credit the Germans with every-
thing that's wonderful? The reasons were not far to
seek; such ideas arose partly from natural ignorance
on technical matters and partly because the Germans
never ceased to assure us how marvellous a nation
they were. And some of us believed it! Verb. sap.
With all the difficulties in the way of attainment,
what counter considerations were there to make the
attempt worth the undertaking?
CHAPTER IV
PAST EXPERIENCE. SMOKE SCREENS. THE CHANCES
OF SUCCESS
HAT were the chances of success .?
The lessons of personal experience and of
past history are the chief guides when cal-
culating the probability of success in any operation.
He who ignores history acts unwisely. He who studies
history and proposes to attempt something which has
always failed hitherto either may be excessively
foolish or may be aware of a new factor affecting the
situation. He may be merely flying in the face of
Providence or basing new proposals on a well-con-
sidered judgment of the new circumstances.
Naval history contains a few examples of operations
somewhat analogous to that under investigation.
The more noted are the attacks on Martinique in
1794, on Teneriffe in 1797, the attack on Ostende in
1798, the cutting out of the Hermione from Puerto
Cabello in 1799, the sinking of the American steamer
Merrimac at Santiago de Cuba in 1898, the Japanese
attempts to block the entrance to Port Arthur in
1904, and, during the late war, the attempt to block
the Rufigi River by a British collier in November,
1914.
In none of these cases were the conditions quite
parallel to those at Zeebrugge and Ostende, but some
features of each bore a certain similarity.
The attacks on Martinique and Puerto Cabello
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showed the great value of determination and initia-
tive in the face of powerful shore defences. They also
showed the disadvantage accruing to the defence
force by reason of the latter's ignorance as to the true
nature and object of an attack by sea forces.
The attack on Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, was led by
the immortal Nelson himself. It involved the storm-
ing of the Mole which was defended by the enemy's
batteries. Two attempts were made. The first was
carried out in the face of adverse weather conditions
which rendered "surprise" impossible; the attack
was withdrawn soon after the landing parties had
left their ships. The second attempt, made two days
later, was also a failure, but a glorious failure indeed.
Very few of the boats reached the Mole, which, how-
ever, after a desperate encounter was captured by the
storming parties. The latter were unable to advance
owing to the fire from the hostile batteries. Nelson,
who, it will be remembered, lost his right arm in this
engagement, failed in his object. This failure pro-
vided the outstanding interruption to the long list
of victories .gained by our greatest naval hero of all
time; Nelson himself expressed his feelings of disap-
pointment and physical incapacity with the words
"I go hence and am no more seen." '
The attack on Ostende in May, 1798, was directed
against the lock gates for the purpose of interfering
with the concentration of the flotillas destined for
the invasion of England. This attack had originally
included a blocking operation, but that idea was ap-
parently abandoned. The attack, carried out in the
face of a rather feeble defence, was completely suc-
cessful, but a severe gale prevented the re-embarka-
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tion of the forces, with the result that over one hun-
dred and sixty were killed or wounded and nearly
eleven hundred and fifty were taken prisoners— an
interesting point in view of the fact that only about
half a dozen casualties occurred during the attack
itself. The embodiment of the main principles of
fighting led to success on that occasion as they will
usually do under similar conditions. The moral effect
in England, in spite of the heavy losses, is recorded as
having been most beneficial. '
The blocking attempts at Santiago and Port Ar-
thur, carried through with complete indifference to
danger in each case, were failures.
The main difficulties with which blockships must
contend may be briefly stated as follows: 1 I
ia) That of locating the destination in darkness, in-
^ creased by the absence of the usual local navi-
gational aids such as lighthouses, buoys, etc. '
\
(b) That of reaching the destination, when located,
in the face of the enemy's opposition.
(c) That of turning and sinking the vessel, after
reaching the destination, so that the channel
will be efficiently blocked.
Dealing with these difficulties in detail, the reader
is probably aware of the fact that navigation is by no
means an exact science. On the open sea a captain is
usually satisfied if he knows his position to within
three or four miles. When approaching the coast this
wide margin of safety must be considerably reduced
— hence the need of lighthouses, buoys, fog signals,
and so forth. The upkeep of such aids is naturally
in the hands of the power which occupies the coast
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concerned. Thus, under war conditions, one aims at
removing all navigational aids, as far as one's own
requirements will allow, which may assist the enemy.
By this means, the enemy when approaching one's
coast, must either trust to the rather inexact methods
used in the open sea or they must establish their own
navigational aids beforehand. The objection to the
latter is manifest; craft sent ahead to lay down buoys,
etc., are apt to give one's intentions away, and it is
open to the enemy to remove such aids as soon as
they are placed.
With regard to the second main difficulty, namely,
that of reaching the destination, when located, in the
face of the enemy's opposition, the difficulty here is
so obvious as to render detailed remarks unnecessary.
With regard to the difficulty of turning and sink-
ing the vessel satisfactorily, this is largely a matter
of seamanship. With wind and tide both affecting
a vessel it is seldom possible either to keep her sta-
tionary over a particular position or to turn her
through a large angle without such aids as tugs,
hawsers, and anchors, etc.
But a ship does not go down instantaneously, nor
is it a simple matter to sink her in an upright position.
One end of the ship is likely to sink before the other
:
most of us have seen photographs of a ship with her
bows or stern standing vertically in the water just
before the vessel makes her final plunge. Whilst the
ship is actually sinking the local current is apt to
move her considerably before she is resting on the
bottom throughout her whole length. Thus the third
difficulty can only be surmounted by a specially fine
display of seamanship, and, in such cases as we are
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reviewing, this display must be rendered under the
most trying conditions imaginable.
Now, in the case of the blocking attempt at San-
tiago the MerrimaCy Lieutenant Hobson of United
States Navy, failed to reach her desired destination
after it had been located. The attempt could scarcely
have been more gallantly made, but the difficulties,
arising from insufficient opportunity to make com-
plete preparations, almost foredoomed the operation
to failure.
At Port Arthur, the Japanese made three attempts
to block the exit against the egress of the Russian
Fleet. No less than eighteen blockships were used.
In spite of great determination and splendid self-
sacrifice on the part of all concerned no blockship
managed to sink herself in the correct position.
During the late war the difficulty of sinking the
ship satisfactorily, after reaching the desired position,
was made manifest both in the River Tigris and in
the Cameroon River. In each case our enemies, the
Turks and Germans respectively, endeavoured to block
their own channels before we even arrived on the scene.
In the absence of all opposition from an enemy, in
brpad daylight, and at their own leisure, they sunk
their ships and jailed to block the channels— two clear
illustrations of seamanship difficulties.
All the searchings into past history failed to dis-
cover one single occasion in which a blocking enter-
prise of any real similarity to that desired had suc-
ceeded. That fact, taken into conjunction with the
difficulties brought to light by a detailed considera-
tion of the problem, was neither productive of en-
couragement nor conducive to optimism.
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The reader will probably admit, at this stage, that
the difficulties of blocking the highly fortified canal
entrances at Zeebrugge and Ostende appeared almost
insuperable.
But where there's a will there's often a way. A way
had to be found. A way was found.
The factors which combined to make "the game
worth the candle" were as follows: firstly, the use of
smoke screens; secondly, the element of surprise and
the use of diversionary measures; thirdly, detailed
preparation and determination combined with effi-
ciency.
The use of smoke screens provided a factor which
had been absent in previous attempts in history.
Mention has already been made of the great de-
terrent afforded by the presence of hostile batteries
and of the varying degrees of efficiency of gun-fire
as a defence against attacks from the sea. If smoke
could be utilised in such a manner as to hide the at-
tacking force from the batteries without com,pletely
blinding the former, and if at the same time the attack
could be made under cover of darkness so as to pre-
vent aircraft from assisting those batteries, a set of
conditions less unfavourable to the attackers would
then be forthcoming. Obviously, this necessitated the
smoke drifting shorewards ahead of the approaching
vessels; i.e., the assistance of a wind blowing more or
less directly towards the shore.
It is well here to caution the reader against a com-
monly erroneous idea in this connection. It is often
supposed that the use of smoke was a sort of panacea
for all evils, that it provided a counter to all obstacles.
This was very far from being the case, as will now be
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explained. Firstly, let us consider the navigational
difficulties. Smoke could not possibly assist the ships
to avoid shoals when approaching the coast. Smoke
could not prevent the vessels from being seen and
reported by surface patrol craft, submarines, or air-
craft during the trip across the sea. The danger from
mines could not be avoided by the use of smoke. It
has already been pointed out that it is quite difficult
enough to locate one's destination on a dark night
when the lighthouses have been extinguished and
other navigational aids withdrawn. Even a landsman
will realise that if, as an addition to such inconvenient
conditions, one places an artificial fog between the
approaching vessels and their destination the prob-
lem is not going to become any more easy to solve.
The utmost that one could gain from the use of smoke
was some measure of protection from the shore bat-
teries, but, as just shown, such use provided a further
obstacle to be surmounted. Then again there is noth-
ing so fickle in the life of a sailor as the wind. If the
wind died away or changed to an off-shore direction,
smoke might be practically useless for covering one's
approach.
I have sometimes been asked why we made no use
of poison gas clouds. There were two main reasons.
The last thing we desired was to risk killing those
downtrodden Belgians who were still allowed to re-
side in their unhappy country. In addition to that,
the fickleness of the wind might waft the poison gas
in the direction of our own vessels.
With regard to the element of surprise and the use
of diversionary measures, one of the principles laid
down by Stonewall Jackson is, "Always mystify,
SURPRISE ESSENTIAL ' 6i
mislead, and surprise the enemy." The meaning of
surprise is apt to be misconstrued. In an operation of
this kind one could not arrange for the blockships to
arrive suddenly "as a bolt from the blue" at a mo-
ment when the enemy have no suspicions whatever
that any trouble is brewing. Thus, surprise and mys-
tification had to go hand in hand. The only practical
method in such cases, whether in trench warfare or in
sea fighting, is to give the enemy as much to think
about as one possibly can, to make him wonder what
on earth is going to happen next, to mislead him into
believing the eventuality is very different from that
intended, and, then, as the late war expression so
aptly puts it, "when the enemy has the wind up,"
surprise him by carrying out your main object in
view.
Diversionary measures in this particular case were
not difficult to evolve. Many different reasons ob-
tained for employing our sea forces off the Flanders
coast. To mention a few, there were bombardments
from the sea, landing operations on the shore, sup-
porting the flank of the military in their land attacks,
mining or mine-sweeping operations, laying subma-
rine traps, supporting aerial attacks, and so on.
The presence of our vessels might indicate any one
of these objects and each would call for a different
set of defensive measures.
The full development of defensive measures cannot
be attained until one can clearly ascertain the at-
tacker's object. Even when the latter has been dis-
covered, the time required to bring all your powers of
defence into action must vary according to how far
you have just previously been misled. Our best
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course, therefore, was to ensure that our object would
be discovered so late in the proceedings that it would
be attained before full advantage of the discovery
could be utilised. Initiative usually pertains to the
attacking force. Where the defence is open to several
different forms of attack, the defending commander
is apt to be so apprehensive beforehand, and so per-
plexed at the time, that his position will be weakly
defended at all points. As the attack develops and he
receives an apparent indication of its object he will
make haste to concentrate all his defence measures
at the threatened position, and then, if the attackers
have acted wisely, there is considerable likelihood of
his being taken by surprise too late to guard effi-
ciently against the real blow. Uneasy lies the head of
the commander who is forced to adopt the defensive
role in war.
The diversionary measures actually undertaken
will be described presently. ;;
Determination and efficiency are not unknown in
His Majesty's Navy. But efficiency of a particular
description was required, and this would necessitate
special training, which, if practicable, must be con-
tinued until every officer and every man knew in-
stinctively what to do and how to set about It, no
matter what circumstances might arise, and until
every piece of machinery and every device, however
intricate, had been proved to be satisfactory for the
purpose in hand.
What then were the chances of success ? Who could
say? Clearly enough, there must have been a diver-
gence of opinion on this point. Difficulties loom large.
Optimism, on the other hand, is a very pleasant en-
ATTENTION TO DETAIL 63
couragement. I believe, however, that even the most
optimistic individual concerned in the enterprise was
not entirely free from qualms as the event drew
nearer. Complete success seemed at times to be so
much to hope for. But Sir David Beatty and Sir
Roger Keyes wouldn't hear of failure, and that alone
did much to ensure success. They did not set them-
selves up on pedestals as men who could not fail—
they left no stone unturned to ensure success. It would
be difficult to imagine anything more calculated to
bring about failure than any sign of doubt, or hesita-
tion, on the part of the leaders of an enterprise. There
must be no failure— that was the long and short of
it— it was the spirit which governed the actions of
the great leaders of the past.
But sentiment alone is insufficient to guarantee suc-
cess. It is but a foundation stone on which to com-
mence the building. Rotten timber erected on the
firmest foundation will not provide adequate protec-
tion against the lightest gale. Nobody realised this
more fully than Vice-Admiral Keyes, who was de-
termined that every link of the chain should be of
maximum strength commensurate with elasticity and
general handiness. Many were the hours given to the
consideration of the smallest details; without such
work an operation becomes a mere gamble.
CHAPTER V
PLANNING THE OPERATION. MATTERS AFFECTING
THE PLAN. ATTACKS ON THE MOLE
AWAR operation, such as this, passes throughvarious stages before it can be put into execu-tion. It emanates originally from a sugges-
tion. If the suggestion seems to bear further consider-
ation certain individuals are ordered to appreciate
the situation, that is, to thoroughly thrash out all the
arguments for and against and to weigh the chances
and effects of success and failure. Should the results
of such an appreciation be favourable, the investiga-
tion leads to the formation of a Plan.
Plans are based, to a considerable extent, on the
personnel and material believed to be available. In
like manner the calculations as to future requirements
of personnel and material are based on the types of
operations which are likely to be carried out. But it
is conceivable that a projected plan may be found to
involve the unforeseen use of material to the detriment
of other operations already in view. Thus the feasi-
bility of putting a naval plan into operation cannot
be judged unless fairly complete details are given as
to the numbers and types of ships, men, and stores in-
volved. The formulated results of such investigation,
arising out of the original suggestion may be desig-
nated the first edition of the Plan.
The authorities then consider the Plan both from
the view of general outlook and from that of detailed
FORMATION OF A PLAN 65
requirements. Let us suppose that the Plan is consid-
ered to be of value, and that no objections hold good
as to the practicability of execution provided the ships
and men are available. This latter proviso then re-
quires attention. Many questions have to be con-
sidered. Can the ships be diverted from their present
duties .f" What special alterations or additions are
necessary.? Can the dockyard undertake the work.''
If so, to what extent will other work in hand be inter-
rupted? Will the men require special training.? Are
the necessary stores ready at hand \ How long will the
preparations take.? And so on. A hundred and one
points must be carefully enquired into. It is only
after a great deal of investigation, correspondence
with various departments, and conferences for co-
ordinating the results of enquiries, that the details
can be arranged. A plan served up in the form of a
mosaic is of little more use than the works of a chro-
nometer contained in half a dozen different boxes.
In course of time decisions are arrived at and orders
are issued for the preparatory work to be taken in
hand. But it is unlikely that all the proposals con-
tained in the first edition of the plan have been agreed
to. Modifications are almost sure to be necessary.
Perhaps the suggested vessels are required for other
purposes and substitutes must be forthcoming. The
technical experts may decide that different types of
material would lead to improvement. Possibly the
facilities for special training of the personnel are not
available at the moment. The plan must, therefore,
be re-drafted on the basis of the personnel and ma-
terial available, and must take into consideration the
dates by which the various phases of the preparatory
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work can be completed. All this takes time and serves
as a reminder, indeed, that patience is a virtue. The
second edition of the plan is evolved and the next
stage is reached.
But put aside, for a moment, the question of what
material and personnel are available. When a plan,
conveying a general idea, has come under the critical
examination of the Higher Command to the extent
of being "passed" for the commencement of detailed
preparation, it has then to be gradually built up from
the operational point of view. Additions will almost
always be necessary as the investigation proceeds, and
some time will elapse before the plan can be consid-
ered as complete in every particular.
A further duty then devolves upon the operational
staff. They must produce the orders necessary to
give effect to the plan as detailed in its final edition.
This again is no small affair. The writing of orders
is a high art in itself. Orders must not be too cen-
tralized or too cut-and-dried. Ample allowance must
be made for initiative, while realising that mere go-
as-you-please methods are likely to lead to disaster.
It is usually the unexpected that happens in war. A
single set of orders cannot cover every eventuality.
And even if it could, nobody would have either the
time or inclination to wade through such a volumi-
nous document. This is clearly enough exemplified in
legal matters. Laws are framed to cover every pos-
sible case, but as often as not they fail to attain such
success. Even so, how many ordinary folk can be
bothered to wade through a legal document? What
with the alternatives, and saving clauses, such publi-
cations are dull to a degree. The marriage laws are
WRITING OF THE ORDERS e^
typical of this. A man may not marry his grand-
mother. That clause was presumably inserted for the
discomfiture of that unique individual who might
contemplate such a peculiar alliance.
The issue of orders needs careful training and much
experience. Orders must be fool-proof— that is the
guiding axiom. If an order is misunderstood it is ten
chances to one that the fault lies with the man who
gives the order.
If I have sorely tried the patience of the reader it is
because of my endeavour to emphasise the point that
the order "carry on" is not sufficient to put a sugges-
tion into execution in the matter of a few hours. New
situations have to be met by fresh dispositions, and
this fact has come very much to the fore in these days
of strife. v. . ,
The operations on the Flanders coast were the out-
come of some months of hard work— mental as well
as manual. A few details of the plan may now be
worthy of consideration.
On December 3, 191 7, the plan had emanated from
an Admiralty Department under the direction of
Rear-Admiral Keyes, Director of Plans, to give him
his titles at that time. The nature of the operation
and the customary procedure, having regard to the
locality concerned, would entail its execution coming
under the command of the Vice-Admiral at Dover.
The latter apparently desired to modify the plan and
submitted his proposals on December i8th. He sug-
gested the idea that an attack on the Mole, not previ-
ously mentioned in the plan, should accompany the
blocking operations. As a diversion (pardon the an-
ticipation) this idea was eventually embodied after
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exhaustive consideration had shown it to be neces-
sary.
As already stated this particular type of diversion
was somewhat similar to that included in a previous
scheme, referred to on page 17 as having been for-
warded in May, 1917, which at that time was con-
sidered impracticable by the Vice-Admiral at Dover.
The actual method proposed on December i8th by
the latter for giving effect to his idea of a Mole attack
was not followed, for it happened that Rear-Admiral
Keyes took over the Dover Command, with the acting
rank of Vice-Admiral, after his own plan had been
submitted, and nearly four months before it could be
carried out. The coincidence— if it was a coinci-
dence— was extremely advantageous. An operation
can be so much better worked up by an officer who
has handled the plan from its inception. But in the
ordinary course of events such an arrangement is
impracticable. An admiral or general in active em-
ployment in the face of the enemy, as a general rule,
has not sufficient spare time for the formation of plans
in every detail, nor has he a superabundance of staff
officers for the purpose. No words of mine could ever
do justice to Sir Roger Keyes, so I will not make the
attempt. Suffice it to record that every soul in the
enterprise possessed complete confidence in his leader-
ship ; this fact was half the battle won before we even
started.
Admiral Keyes was given an absolutely free hand
by Their Lordships ; all the details, from A to Z, were
worked out under his direction. The "paper scheme"
rapidly developed into practical shape; I will en-
deavour to describe the data and arguments from
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which its final shape was evolved. Before doing so,
however, it may be as well to put on record a fact
that might escape the notice of the reader. The
responsibility of the Officer in Command of an opera-
tion must necessarily be great, but the responsibility
of the Higher Command, in this case the Board of
Admiralty, which has to either sanction or disallow
the execution of proposed operations, is by no means
small. That they sanctioned it in this case and also
chose the right man to carry it out must never be
forgotten.
Having reached a decision as to our object and con-
sidered the obstacles in the way of attainment, let us
now pass on to the manner in which it was proposed
to overcome the various difficulties. We will com-
mence with the most important phase of the opera-
tion, namely, the actual blocking and the nature, re-
quirements, and duties of the blockships.
Reference to the previous description of the locality
and to the principles governing the use of blockships
serves to show that a single vessel of the light-cruiser
class, or above, would suffice as far as dimensions were
concerned. But nothing possesses such a large ele-
ment of chance as war; for that reason it was con-
sidered advisable to provide at least three blockships
at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende.
With regard to the requirements of each blockship,
they may be briefly stated as follows. Firstly, she
must have the ability to proceed under her own steam
to her destination. The task of towing a blockship
into position in the face of enemy opposition is quite
impracticable. Secondly, her draught of water must
not be excessive, having due regard to the depth of
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the channel. Next, she would require a certain degree
of defensive power; it would be rather heartrending,
after all one's efforts at taking a blockship to within a
short distance of her destination, if any small enemy-
craft could approach without hindrance and sink the
ship before her destination was actually reached.
The blockships must also be handy vessels, so that
they would be manageable up to the last moment,
provided they escaped serious damage. It has been
stated previously that these ships must be so fitted
and sunk that their removal would be extremely
difficult. Five old light cruisers which were available,
or rather which could be replaced at their present
duties, were chosen for the purpose. They were
H.M.S. Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant^ and
Sirius; the first three being destined for Zeebrugge
and the others for Ostende.
A few months previously a couple of steamers had
been fitted out for some such operation under another
Vice-Admiral, but it will be seen that, as a result of
detailed investigation of all the obstacles and factors
affecting the problem, the Plan described herein dif-
fered from its predecessors in that respect; in fact the
arguments against the use of merchant vessels were
considered from the outset to be overwhelming.
The work of surmounting such difficulties as escort-
ing the blockships across the seas and locating their
destinations would require the use of other units, and
will, therefore, be described later. Speaking gener-
ally, the actual tasks of reaching their destinations
when located and of sinking themselves in position,
difficult though they were, could best be left to the
pilotage and seamanship of the blockship officers.
THE BLOCKSHIPS FITTING OUT FOR THE ENTERPRISE
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Here again, the author is anxious to lay special em-
phasis on the fact that successful results of the block-
ing operation— such as had never been attained in
history— were absolutely dependent upon the good
work of the blockship personnel ; to them would the
credit be due.
At Ostende, the work of the blockships, with regard
to reaching their destination, was confined to that of
running the gantlet of the shore batteries when once
the entrance had been located, but the latter — i.e.,
the location of the entrance— presented considerable
difficulty.
At Zeebrugge, there would be less difficulty in find-
ing the entrance if the Mole extremity, three-quarters
of a mile to seaward, could be located. But a serious
factor existed here which was absent at Ostende.
Blockships proceeding into Zeebrugge would have
to risk the fire of the Mole batteries during the first
part of the approach. They would then have to steam
in behind those batteries and run the gantlet of the
batteries ashore. Now this was a pretty big propo-
sition.
In the second chapter it was shown that the three-
gun battery situated on the broad portion of the Mole
at its northeastern extremity, taken in conjunction
with the establishment of the barge boom and en-
tanglement nets, rendered it extremely hazardous for
the blockships to round the Mole en route to the canal
entrance ; in fact it was almost a certainty that they
would be sunk by the Mole guns.
Nevertheless, the canal entrance was our objective.
Somehow, by hook or crook, the blockships were in-
tended to reach it. Thus, one of the first local prob-
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lems requiring solution was that of removing,
temporarily or otherwise, the obstacle afforded by the
three-gun Mole battery. Similarly, though perhaps
in a lesser degree, we had also to take into account the
battery of six smaller guns on the lighthouse extension
of the Mole.
Considered in a general manner, there were three
lines of enquiry from which a solution of the problem
might be forthcoming. Firstly, that concerning the
destruction of the guns or their crews, or both, or di-
verting their fire, by means of action from a distance.
Secondly, that of attaining a similar result by action
on the spot. Thirdly, that of rendering the blockships
invisible during their passage. These may be dealt
with briefly. The first method entailed the use of
either gun-fire or poison gas. The outcome of a gun-
fire duel between a ship and a battery has already
been described sufficiently to show that the chances of
destroying the battery guns are exceedingly small.
The use of poison gas has been shown to be inadvis-
able. The third method— that of rendering the
blockships invisible to the battery— would have en-
tailed the use of a smoke screen. If such a screen could
have the effect mentioned it is obvious to the meanest
intellect that it would also have the effect of hiding
their destination from the blockships just at the criti-
cal period when it would be absolutely essential to
see exactly where they were going.
And so no method would suffice, except the second
mentioned above, namely, destroying the guns or their
crews, or both, or diverting their fire, by means of
action on the spot. This entailed an attack on the Mole
itself, carried out by vessels actually berthed along-
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side. The author, although well aware of the unpar-
donable fault of repetition, desires at this stage to lay-
great emphasis on the fact that an attack on the Mole
itself could only be designed as a diversionary measure
calculated to directly assist the blockships past one
of the positions of danger. The reader is requested to
pardon anticipation. Subsequent to the operation,
many of the public appeared to have formed the idea
that the attack on the Mole was the main attack, and
that the use of the blockships was a sort of after-
thought. I shall have more to say about this later.
Just as the three-gun battery provided a serious
obstacle to the passage of blockships round the Mole
end, so also would it prevent the similar passage of
other vessels endeavouring to secure alongside the
berthing wharf on the inner side of the Mole prepara-
tory to attacking the Mole batteries. Thus, if the
Mole was to be stormed, the storming parties must land
on the outer side of the Mole, remembering that the
three-gun battery could not fire to the northward
owing to being twenty feet below the top of the high
outer wall. But the outer wall of the Mole was never
intended for use as a berthing position for vessels, and
probably never had been used by any vessel for such a
purpose— hence the complete absence of all berthing
facilities as described in an earlier chapter. The de-
velopment of the argument concerning this projected
attack had led us to the point where we needed to
consider seriously the practicability of getting any
vessel, or vessels, alongside the outer wall, of securing
there, and of landing men thence for attacking the
Mole batteries.
The depth of water, the construction of the Mole,
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the rate of the tidal current, aad many other matters
required careful examination. The depth was a doubt-
ful matter; but, the operation being timed to take
place near high tide so that the blockships could enter
the canal, there was every likelihood of its being suffi-
cient. Breakwaters when also intended as wharfs are
usually built with their inner sides— i.e., the sides pro-
tected from bad weather— vertical like the face of an
ordinary wall, but with their seaward sides formed of
large blocks of material dropped more or less indis-
criminately, one above the other, so that the wall will
be jagged for the purpose of breaking up the waves in
bad weather. In such cases a ship could not possibly
secure to the seaward side without being severely
damaged, and certainly could not remain there. At
Zeebrugge, however, we had reason to believe that
the seaward side of the Mole was nearly vertical and
that no danger would accrue from jagged blocks of
stone or concrete.
At high tide the tidal current on the Belgian coast
is flowing at its greatest speed— a phenomenon
nearly always found in comparatively narrow waters
— and its rate was expected to be about three and a
half miles per hour, its direction of flow being to the
eastward. So far, then, the matter of reaching a posi-
tion alongside chiefly concerned the art of seaman-
ship ifwe leave the enemy's opposition out of account.
Next we had to consider the problem of securing
alongside and of disembarking the storming parties.
The most simple method of-berthing alongside a wall,
in the case of a sizable vessel, is to place the vessel
roughly in position and then to use tugs to push her
bodily against the wall, afterwards securing the haw-
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sers in the usual manner. This led to the idea of hav-
ing a second vessel to act as tug and of providing
special means to take the place of the ordinary haw-
ser-and-bollard method of securing.
The wall on the outer side, as previously described,
rose to a height of twenty-nine feet above the level of
high water. This height was far above that of the
deck of an average vessel. The fact that the landing
would have to be made on a narrow parapet, high
above the level of the Mole proper, was also hardly
calculated to assist matters. The probable existence
of guns on the parapet itself, so placed as to be able
to rake the decks of a vessel alongside, and the pos-
sible presence of obstructions placed by the Germans
on the outer side of the Mole, had to be taken into
account. It has also been mentioned above that the
use of smoke screens necessitated a wind blowing
towards the shore ; thus the Mole itself could afford no
protection from the wind or sea.
The Austrian military failure on the River Plave,
during the late war, afforded a good example of the
disabilities resulting from insufficient room to de-
bouch a force which has crossed an obstacle into the
enemy's territory. Clearly, it might be very awkward
if the storming parties were unable to descend from
the parapet rapidly enough to forestall any enemy
attempts at concentration near the storming point.
All these considerations led to the choice of H.M.S.
Vindictive for carrying the main portion of the storm-
ing parties.
The attack on the Mole might also provide an op-
portunity for destroying material thereon. Although
this was obviously a secondary consideration it was
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an opportunity not to be missed. The amount of de-
structive work which could be done would depend
upon the circumstances of the moment, but it was
decided to have a special demolition party, provided
with the necessary gear, to accompany the primary
attacking forces.
Clearly enough, it would be somewhat futile if one
only began to consider the work of demolition as soon
as the moment arrived for such work to commence.
With the object of being prepared in all respects care-
ful consideration, therefore, was given to the different
methods of demolition which would be most suitable
under varying circumstances. Following such con-
sideration it would be necessary to train one's demo-
lition parties in this technical pursuit and to provide
a sufficiency of suitable destructive material.
When making preparations for an operation of this,
or similar type, one is apt to allow secondary objects
to loom too large unless great caution is taken to
prevent it. In this particular case, however correct
it might be to fully prepare, down to the smallest
detail, for everything in advance, it was necessary to
bear in mind that deniolition on the Mole could
hardly assist the blockships to seal the canal exit and,
even if successful, could not bring us very great bene-
fit. Thus it was clear that demolition should only be
prepared for and undertaken provided that it did not
hinder the attainment of our main object in the
smallest particular.
H.M.S. Vindictive had to be fitted with a special
deck from which gangways could be extended to
bridge the gulf between the ship and the top of the
twenty-nine-foot wall. For this purpose she was given
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a large number of gangways poised at an angle of
about forty-five degrees from the ship's side. The
idea was that on arriving alongside the Mole, the
gangways would be lowered till they rested on the
top of the wall. The storming parties, at a pre-
arranged signal, should run out along the gangways
and jump down to the parapet pathway four feet
below the wall top. They should then get across the
pathway, over the iron handrails on its inner side,
down to the floor level of the Mole, sixteen feet below,
and then start the work. Now, one cannot expect
men carrying all their accoutrements and parapher-
nalia, such as rifles, machine-guns, flame-throwers,
bombs and grenades, rifle and gun ammunition, and
such-like to jump down a drop of sixteen feet on to a
stone surface. So it was arranged that the advanced
storming parties should carry long storming ladders
to place against the wall on its inner side and thus
facilitate access to the floor level. Seamen were to
land first, both for the purpose just stated and for
securing the ship to the Mole after the Vindictive had
been pushed alongside the Mole by another vessel.
Owing to the absence of bollards for securing haw-
sers, special grappling irons, fitted with double
pronged hooks, with hawsers attached to them and
the ship, were designed for the purpose of hooking on
top of the wall. In reality we proposed using the
methods of the good old days when vessels grappled
each other and indulged in hand-to-hand fighting
between their respective storming parties. The weight
of these grappling irons necessitated the use of special
davits for suspending them in a similar manner to that
used for the gangways. Special weapons, such as
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bomb-mortars and flame-throwers, to be worked
from the ship, were provided for clearing the Mole
immediately abreast the ship prior to sending the
storming parties over the top. The Vindictive also
carried most of her original gun armament for en-
gaging enemy vessels en route, for shelling the six-gun
battery on the lighthouse extension of the Mole, and
for defending herself against attacks, when at the
Mole, from enemy vessels in a seaward direction.
Special howitzers were carried for engaging the shore
batteries after the ship was secured, and rapid-firing
guns were placed in the fighting-top of the foremast
for engaging the batteries on the Mole. The wall
being at least twenty-nine feet above the water, no
gun at a less height could fire over it in a downward
direction. Much other special material— peculiar to
the operation in hand— was required, but space does
not admit of describing it all in detail.
The reader will already have realised that the Vin-
dictive was to be a weird craft indeed— something
very different from the usual run of warships even in
these days.
Now, as regards the storming of the Mole, it would
have been a dangerous policy to put all "our eggs in
one basket." There was no small chance of the Vin-
dictive being mined en route, owing to her heavy
draught, or of being sunk by gun-fire, owing to the
large target which she would present, before reaching
the Mole. It was, therefore, decided to use two other
vessels in addition to the Vindictive.
The ferry steamers Iris and Daffodil were chosen
for carrying a portion of the storming parties to the
attack. There was considerable difficulty in finding
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two vessels suitable to our purpose ; time did not per-
mit of constructing special craft before the projected
date of the operation. It must be remembered that
we could not write round to all the naval and mer-
cantile ports explaining our requirements. An officer,
sent on a tour for the purpose, unostentatiously-
visited the likely places until he found these two
vessels. I often wonder what imaginary yarns he con-
jured up for the purpose of stifling curiosity.
The Iris and Daffodil were both well known to
Liverpool folk, being used for conveying passengers
across the River Mersey many times daily. They
were extremely handy craft, could each carry fifteen
hundred men if required, and drew very little water,
but they possessed two serious disadvantages. Firstly,
their decks were so low as to necessitate the use of
long storming ladders for reaching the parapet.
Secondly, their steaming qualities were compara-
tively poor, judged from the point of view of the
operation for which they were required. Just picture
their ordinary daily employment for a moment.
Waiting alongside one of the piers at Liverpool till
their usual quota of passengers had embarked, they
would make the short trip across the river to the
Birkenhead shore and then wait once more. During
this second period of waiting the steam pressure would
be increased in the boilers in readiness for the next
short voyage across the river. Compare that employ-
ment with a trip of nearly one hundred miles across
the open sea. It will then be evident that the task
allotted to these two ferry vessels was by no means
simple from the engineering point of view alone.
All this, however, was carefully thought out, and
IRIS AND DAFFODIL 8i
it was decided that their advantages outweighed their
disadvantages. Both craft, by nature of tbsir work,
were designed to stand heavy bumping alongside
piers ; their draught was small, and, as already stated,
they were easy to handle. After minor alterations
they proceeded to the port of assembly in charge of
their naval crews and adopted the title H.M.S., much
to the amusement of those of us who made their ac-
quaintance for the first time. It is rumoured that one
of these two vessels arrived at her destination with
her anti-submarine escort in tozv, which thus early
showed that proud spirit to which she so justly proved
her right on St. George's Day, 191 8.
The first duty of the Daffodil on arrival at the Mole
was to be that of pushing the Vindictive bodily along-
side. The former vessel was to place herself at right
angles to the latter, bows against the latter's side, and
to continue pushing until Vindictive, which would
previously have anchored, was secured by means of
the grapnels. Daffodil was then to drop alongside
Vindictive and her parties were to climb over the latter
and up to the Mole. The Iris was to go alongside the
Mole ahead of Vindictive, to anchor, to grapnel the
parapet, and to land her storming parties by means
of ladders against the wall, her decks being too low
to allow the use of large gangways as carried in
Vindictive.
In the event of Vindictive being sunk. Iris and Daf-
fodil were to storm the Mole as best they could and
do everything possible to knock out the three-gun
battery or divert its fire from the blockshlps.
It was believed that the Mole garrison consisted
of about one thousand men. But what of reenforce-
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ments arriving from the shore? Access to the Mole
would entail the crossing of the viaduct by such rein-
forcements. Therefore the viaduct must be destroyed.
Consideration on this point led to a decision to utilise
one or more submarines filled with explosives and to
blow them up under the viaduct, so as to cut the
latter in twain.
This particular phase of the operation had not been
included in the original Plan evolved at the Ad-
miralty. As previously stated the first edition could
not be expected to cover every single investigation of
every point in the problem. The attack on the via-
duct, after a large amount of experimental work or-
dered by Vice-Admiral Keyes, took the following
shape.
Two submarines, each carrying several tons of high
explosive, were to accompany the expedition. They
were each to carry a crew of two oflficers and four men,
who, after securing their craft underneath the via-
duct, were to light the time fuses and then to take to
the boats. Each submarine carried a small motor-
driven dinghey for this latter purpose.
So much, then, for the blockships, storming vessels,
and submarines at present.
CHAPTER VI
THE VESSELS INVOLVED: THEIR DUTIES. THE
RESCUE WORK
IN
addition to the special vessels mentioned in the
preceding chapter, many other vessels and craft
were required to assist in the operation. One can
imagine the amateur reckoning up the probable num-
ber as follows. Three blockships at Zeebrugge and
two at Ostende, three storming ships and two sub-
marines at the former place. That makes ten vessels
of sorts. Allow a few more for other purposes— say,
fifteen altogether. As a matter of fact, there were
one hundred and sixty-two. Let us see why so many
were required.
Take the requirements necessitated by the use of
smoke screens. It has already been stated that the
section of coast on which the Germans had established
heavy gun batteries was twenty-one miles in length.
Smoke screens were required to mask those guns so
that the approach of the blockships and storming ves-
sels should remain undiscovered until the latest pos-
sible moment. This meant that a large number of
craft were necessary for smoke screening alone.
Again, if the smoke screens were to be efficient the
smoke would have to be emitted within a short dis-
tance of the coast; i.e., in comparatively shallow
water. Thus shallow-draught vessels were necessary.
Shallow draught goes hand-in-hand with small di-
mensions. The carrying capacity of small craft is very
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limited ; this constituted an additional reason for em-
ploying large numbers.
Further craft were required for assisting to locate
the destination, for dealing with enemy vessels put-
ting to sea during the attack, for defending our ships
against other enemy vessels already at sea, for as-
sisting to tow some of the smaller units across the
seas, for rescuing the crews of the blockships, and for
various diversionary measures. The latter included
long-range bombardments from the sea and subsidiary
attacks on the Mole, the units required being monitors
and their attendant craft and fast motor boats. Other
diversionary measures, not requiring naval vessels
for their accomplishment, were bombing attacks by
aircraft and bombardments from our shore guns.
The aircraft were intended to attract the attention
of those on duty in an overhead direction, whilst en-
couraging the remainder to keep under cover. The
long-range bombardments would tend to keep the
enemy's larger batteries occupied in expending am-
munition in their endeavour to locate and silence our
guns. Si^bsidiary attacks, carried out by fast motor
craft against the Mole, and against German vessels
berthed at its inner side, were calculated to confuse
the situation as far as the enemy were concerned. It
was arranged that the R.M.A. siege guns on the
northern flank of the Allied army should bombard for
the purpose of simulating a prelude to a land attack.
The reason for the employment of one hundred and
sixty-two vessels, not including aircraft, will now be
somewhat more clear. The various classes comprised
cruisers, submarines, ferry-boats, monitors, destroy-
ers, motor launches, small motor boats of a fast type,
Ci-'jirn roiijjrvjht ~ Imperial War Museum
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and one ordinary ship's steamboat; the latter was to
be used in connection with rescuing the crews of the
submarines.
With the exception of the blockships, storming
vessels, and submarines, the majority of the craft
were drawn from the forces attached to the Dover
Command; these latter, being in full commission al-
ready, did not require new officers and men to be
specially appointed for our purposes. Seven French
torpedo craft and four French motor launches were
included in the operation. The aircraft were drawn
from the 6ist and 65 th Wings of the Royal Air Force.
Space does not admit of describing the work of all
these units in detail, but it may be of interest to men-
tion one or two.
Whenever an operation of this description is afoot,
it is extremely advisable that the personnel destined
to take part in the more hectic part of the fighting
should not only be trained to the last ounce, but
quite fresh on arrival. The individual cannot give of
his best when fatigued— a truism exemplified again
and again during the late war. But ships do not cross
the ocean without any effort on the part of their per-
sonnel. It is not a case of merely turning on a tap,
saying, "hey presto," and going to bed. Far from it.
Engines do not revolve merely for the asking. Large
vessels carry large engineering complements, but al-
ways require about half on duty at a time when at sea.
Small craft may have small engines, but their com-
plements are also small. So, whether the vessel be
large or small, the work below calls for strenuous
duties from the engineering personnel— only those
who have undertaken such duties can realise the im-
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mense effort and the accompanying fatigue which falls
to their lot. Then again the ship cannot navigate her-
self. The steering and the lookout duties both call for
great concentration of attention, especially at night
when steaming without lights in the close company of
other vessels, in the vicinity of shoals, and in enemy
waters. Guns' crews must stand by the guns so as to
be ready at a moment's notice.
Now, this expedition would have to steam many
miles across the seas. How then could the crews be
fresh on arrival? This particular problem was solved
as follows. Arrangements were made to provide each
blockship with a number of men, over and above the
minimum required at the climax of the operation, for
the purpose of handling the vessel and its engines
during the passage overseas whilst those men required
for the "final run" would be resting. Extra officers
could not be spared for this purpose.
The Vindictive^ Irisy and Daffodil were differently
situated in this respect. It was intended— as I shall
explain presently— to bring these three vessels back
on completion of the operation; the total number of
personnel on board need not be kept down to the
barest minimum. In fact, they were each to carry
two complete sets of personnel, namely, those re-
maining in the ship throughout and those landing on
the Mole.
The submarines, motor launches, and fast motor
boats, owing to lack of accommodation, could not
be given extra personnel for the trip across; it was,
therefore, decided to tow all such craft throughout
the greater portion of the passage across the seas.
Even that decision did not relieve the crews of all
RESCUE WORK 87
duty, but gave them some respite, and, what was
equally important, helped to ensure their arrival in
the vicinity of their place of duty.
The rescue work required much thought. Bearing
in mind the main object which had to be attained, it
will be understood that all such questions as rescue
work and retirement, however important from the
point of view of humanity, must be relegated to a
comparatively secondary consideration.
One cannot wage war without " breaking eggs." He
who attempts to do so will seldom accomplish any-
thing worth while. The lives of men are, indeed, a
precious responsibility on the shoulders of their leader,
but his primary duty in action is to obtain the utmost
value from his men rather than to adopt the negative
attitude of merely preventing their lives from being
lost. This does not signify that lives should be thrown
away without a thought. Not one life should be sac-
rificed in the execution of superior order unless the
order is absolutely essential to the success of the work
in hand, or, putting it in another way, unless the life
is given so that others may live. The leader, there-
fore, has a difficult problem to solve. How far is he
justified in risking failure through the natural desire
to preserve life? The armchair critic, who has never
been faced with such responsibility, who can have no
conception of the diff^erent situations which arise in
war, may sneer at the leader who places too great a
store on the lives of his subordinates, or may hurl
accusations of callous indifference at the superior
whose successful operation is accompanied by a long
casualty list. But we can leave any such critic to his
sneers and accusations, knowing, as we do, that he is
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least dangerous to the community in war-time if he
remains in his chair.
Each blockship, as already stated, was to carry the
minimum number of personnel which could bring
success. But the minimum number was large.
During the "final run" to their destinations they
would require the engineering and stokehold parties,
lookouts, guns' crews for self-defence, the navigation
party conning and steering the ship, and complete
spare navigation parties for taking over command in
an emergency. These with a few others, such as sig-
nalmen, brought the total in each ship up to no less
than fifty-three.
In the case of the Merrimac at Santiago, during the
Spanish-American war, Lieutenant Hobson was ac-
companied by only about half a dozen men. At Port
Arthur the Japanese blockships, at each of their at-
tempts, also carried very small crews. But it must not
be forgotten that all those attempts failed.
Now, it was decided to give each blockship a large
lifeboat and some life-saving rafts, and also to arrange
for other craft to proceed to the rescue. The chances
of recovering any of the personnel certainly appeared
to be very remote, especially when one realised that
the rescue would have to be effected practically
underneath the enemy's guns, and even behind their
trench defence system on the coast-line.
The chances of rescue must bear some relation to
the numbers to be rescued. For this reason it was
decided to disembark the oversea passage crews from
each blockship before arriving within the danger
zone.
When the question arose as to which of the motor
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launches should be used for effecting the rescue of the
crews from the blockships, volunteers were asked for.
In spite of the almost incredible difficulties and tre-
mendous risk involved the number of applications for
this dangerous task was most embarrassing. Event-
ually lots were drawn and the winners were greatly
envied by their less fortunate confreres.
The organisation necessary to ensure efficient co-
operation, and co-ordination of effort, was no small
matter. Every vessel, however small, had important
duties to fulfil. At any moment during the operation
success might depend on the action of a single unit
:
it would be difficult to conceive any circumstances
where the value of initiative would be more pro-
nounced. Nothing could be left to chance— any
suggestion of possible failure was unthinkable.
CHAPTER VII
MATTERS AFFECTING THE PASSAGE. THE SUPPORTING
FORCES. THE GERMAN SEA-FORCES. THE .PREPAR-
ATORY WORK
SAFE passage across the seas, especially from the
navigational point of view, provided much food
for thought. The liability of new shoals to form
and of old shoals to move their position, the conse-
quent lack of dependence on the charts, and the ab-
sence of the usual navigational aids have already been
mentioned.
These navigational difficulties, increased by the
low visibility which obtains at night, combined to
form the first of the three main obstacles to be en-
countered in blocking operations of this nature,
namely, the difficulty of locating the destination.
Considerable amusement was caused in naval cir-
cles, subsequent to the operation, when a certain
individual, from another country, published a special
piece of "inside information," to wit, that the method
(Whereby Vindictive reached Zeebrugge Mole was a
great secret, known only to Captain Carpenter and
one other, involving intricate calculations in connec-
tion with astronomical phenomena. I was extremely
interested in this suggestion for it was the first that I
had heard of it. As a matter of fact the safe naviga-
tion was largely the outcome of a very fine piece of
work by two officers specially lent from the Hydro-
graphic Department of the Admiralty.^
^ Captain H. P. Douglas and Lieutenant-Commander F. E. B.
Haselfoot.
OBJECT OF SPECIAL SURVEY 91
The major portion of the area through which the
various forces were to pass was surveyed under great
difficuhies.
The surveying vessels were often forced to remain
within the danger zone of the German batteries, and,
owing to shortness of time, had to utilise every pos-
sible opportunity for fixing positions of buoys, taking
soundings, examining areas where new shoals were
suspected, marking the limits of old shoals, laying
down special marks to assist the passage of the expe-
dition, and to enable the bombarding vessels to take
up their positions with accuracy. Old obstructions
had to be removed and wrecks had to be correctly
charted. The vagaries of the weather rendered the
task all the more difficult, and interference from the
enemy was experienced on more than one occasion.
Incidentally both these officers were on board H.M.S.
Botha when she rammed and sank the German tor-
pedo-boat A-19, which was out with a few others on
one of their very infrequent tip-and-run escapades off
Dunkirk; this was a pleasant interlude for these hard-
worked officers. No country in the world can boast
of such an efficient Hydrographic Department as our
own. Their work in the war passed almost unre-
corded, but none the less appreciated by those of us
"who went down to the sea in ships." No praise
could be too great for the work of the surveyors
employed on our behalf.
It will be readily understood that little reliance
could be placed on large conspicuous buoys laid by
us near the enemy's coast. On discovering such navi-
gational marks the enemy would presumably either
move them a mile or so, for the purpose of interfering
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with our navigation, or else remove them ahogether.
Buoys, to be of any practical use, must be conspicu-
ous, hence the likelihood of their being seen by the
enemy unless placed in position at the last possible
moment. This alternative was actually followed; it
does not require much imagination to realise the diffi-
culties and dangers in placing them in readiness for
the operation and in removing them again on each
occasion when the operation was postponed.
The strong tidal stream in the southern portion of
the North Sea renders navigation rather anxious work
in misty weather, or in darkness, especially as the
normal rate of the current is much influenced by
weather. Naturally, there is less danger of hitting a
shoal which one is endeavouring to avoid, if the ship
is steaming either directly with or against the current
;
the error in such cases is confined to the time at which
any particular position will be reached. But when
steaming across the current a small eccentricity on the
part of the latter may make all the difference between
reaching the desired position and missing it altogether.
The current running parallel to the Belgian coast
attains a speed of about three knots under normal
conditions. Should a three-knot allowance be made
when steaming across the tide there would be a
serious error of position at the end of an hour's run
if the tidal stream happened to be running at the rate
of two and three-quarters or three and one-quarter
knots; it must be realised that a ship cannot discover
the rate of the tidal stream in a given area until she
has completed her passage through it; i.e., until she
has already suffered from its eccentricities.
For the purposes of the particular case under review
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it was necessary for the expedition to arrive at an
exact position, thus tidal calculations and naviga-
tional aids assumed great importance. But they alone
were insufficient to ensure accurate navigation. Com-
passes must be correct, or their errors known, and the
speed of the ship due to its own engines requires to
be carefully gauged. For a given speed of engine the
speed of a ship varies according to her draught and
the state of the ship's hull under water. All these con-
siderations will serve to show the extreme necessity
for working out courses, speeds, and times beforehand
with the utmost accuracy, for repeatedly checking
them to ensure the absence of clerical error, for re-
considering allowances for the vagaries of the ele-
ments, and for correcting the results from day to day
according to the tidal differences due to the ever-
changing phases of the moon. The careful navigator
always follows a similar procedure, but, in ordinary
cases, he knows that a fault in position can probably
be remedied in time to avoid untoward incident. In
our movements, however, there would be small
chance of remedy if the blockships failed to find the
canal entrance, or if the submarines were unable to
locate the viaduct, or if the storming vessels missed
the Mole.
Preparation for the passage across the seas in-
volved yet another matter of considerable impor-
tance. Vast numbers of mines had been laid, both by
ourselves and by the enemy, during the previous three
and a half years, in the areas through which the ex-
pedition must pass before reaching the permanent
German defence mine-fields near the Flanders coast.
Doubtless other mines had dragged with the tide
94 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
across our desired route. Special mine-sweeping work
was, therefore, necessary to render the major portion
of the passage even tolerably safe from mines. The
reader can probably appreciate the difficult nature
of that task with its attendant risks and necessity for
thoroughness.
In addition to the one hundred and sixty-two ves-
sels whose duties have been mentioned, other sup-
porting squadrons were necessary far out at sea. The
possibility of our intentions having become known to
the enemy had to be borne in mind. In such an event
the enemy would, of course, adopt special measures
to ensure giving the expedition a warm reception on
arrival, but a most important eventuality for us to
guard against was that of meeting a superior con-
centrated enemy force already at sea waiting to inter-
cept lis en route. Scouting craft, both aerial and
naval, were therefore required; it was also advisable
that our fighting fleet should be conveniently situated
in case the chance arose of defeating any such counter
to our expedition.
Whenever we employed our small craft to operate
in enemy waters we had to bear in mind a certain
possibility. The enemy on becoming aware of our
movements, or intentions, and perhaps feeling un-
usually courageous, might say, "Here are a number
of small enemy vessels close to our harbours, let us
engage them with the whole strength of our fleet and
thereby achieve a great victory for the Fatherland."
And so, in case the German Fleet left their harbours,
unlikely though it might be, our Grand Fleet was
always "in the ofling" at such times ready to meet
the so-called High Seas Fleet and send them down
to the place where they ought to go.
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The man-in-the-street must have wondered what
the Grand Fleet was doing at sea so often in view
of the fact that the enemy hid themselves almost
throughout the war. The difficulty lay in the fact that
we could not be perfectly certain that the constitution
of German naval valour would continue to include
ninety-nine per cent of discretion. Time after time
the Grand Fleet hoped against hope that they might
meet the enemy. The operations off the Belgian coast
seemed to hold out yet another slender hope; this,
pardon the anticipation, proved to be as forlorn as
usual. The history of the High Seas Fleet, with re-
spect to their oft-repeated desire to try conclusions
with the Grand Fleet, can be briefly narrated. In the
four and a quarter years following the outbreak of
war the High Seas Fleet came out once, and once
only, with the express intention of meeting the Grand
Fleet— and that was to surrender! On the one other
occasion when they met our fleet, incidentally by
accident, they concentrated all their efforts at escape
and then claimed the victory. The German Navy
never had any traditions— now they have one less
!
The reader may well ask what connection these
remarks have with the subject of the blocking opera-
tion. A very close connection indeed.
Napoleon— perhaps the greatest student of war
and certainly one of the greatest generals that the
world has seen— remarked, and repeated again and
again, that in war *'the moral is to the physical as
three is to one." Every great leader understands the
value of morale and every man who has served his
country in war has at least a subconscious realisation
of the moral factor.
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Just consider the moral effect of the German in-
activity. In our men the uppermost feelings towards
the enemy were those of contempt. There is small
need to consider the morale of the High Seas Fleet,
for is it not recorded by their own Admiral, von
Scheer, that the men mutinied at the last because
they believed they were being sent out to fight our
fleet? Take the case of our Dover Patrol force. They
knew that the enemy could choose their own time for
dashing out of the Belgian ports to attack our cross-
channel communications. They knew that the chances
of intercepting such enemy under adverse conditions,
such as during darkness or fog, were very small. Yet
month after month passed by and the enemy surface
craft did next to nothing. Sometimes our advanced
patrols came into touch with enemy patrols. On each
occasion, I believe almost without exception, the
enemy craft turned and ran at utmost speed for home.
In the case of our small motor boats there had been
meetings with those of the enemy within a mile or
two of the latter's bases: here again, there is no re-
corded instance of one, or even two, of their craft
standing up to one of ours. The reader will under-
stand the resultant moral effect. Some day perhaps
we shall hear the romantic story of these adventurous
small craft working from the Dover area—how one of
them coolly steamed in underneath Ostende Pier one
night to repair her engine whilst the German sentries
paraded up and down just overhead, how another
ran in behind Zeebrugge Mole in broad daylight and
fired her torpedoes at German vessels berthed along-
side, and so on. Is it difficult to imagine the feeling of
superiority and confidence possessed by our personnel ?
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The morale of the German naval forces in Flanders
concerned us much more closely than that of the
High Seas Fleet. Under ordinary circumstances we
should have been exceedingly apprehensive of any
German torpedo craft at Zeebrugge or in the vicinity,
especially those at Blankenberghe, but experience had
served to show that they were none too ready to
further the "iiber" portion of "Deutschland iiber
Alles." Thus we were all the more ready to take
risks which may have seemed to be uncommonly close
to the border-line between "justifiable" and the
reverse.
In recounting the preparations which followed nat-
urally upon the main considerations connected with
the problem in hand there has been a certain amount
of unavoidable anticipation.
It has already been explained that the conduct of
the operation fell to the Vice-Admiral commanding
the Dover Patrol, and that a very large number of
vessels of various classes and many specially trained
personnel were required. Thus the fitting out of the
vessels, the preparation of material, and the training
of the personnel also came under the direction of the
Vice-Admiral.
It must not be forgotten that the ordinary work of
the Dover Patrol could not be interrupted even for
one day at this period. The lines of communication
across the Channel, important as they had already
been throughout the war, were now of such vital im-
portance that the Allied situation on the main battle
front depended on the work of the Dover Patrol more
than ever before. During February and March, 191 8,
when the preparations for our enterprise were in full
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swing, and especially during the latter month, the
Germans were concentrating every possible effort to
break down the Allied resistance. Their final great
"push" was in full swing and the Allied troops were
being hard pressed almost to the point of giving way.
British, Colonial, and American reenforcements were
being poured into France by every available route;
guns, ammunition, and stores were passing across the
Channel in an endless stream of shipping. The situa-
tion was critical to a degree. If the Dover Patrol force
had failed at such a time the war might have had a
very different ending. And in the midst of this ter-
ribly anxious period we were forced to request great
additional effort for the purposes which the author is
endeavouring to describe.
One may be pardoned for thinking that the block-
ing operation, with all its complicated requirements,
should have received undivided attention, but such a
thing was impossible. Those were busy days at Dover.
Special material, such as artificial fog apparatus, had
to be constructed and fitted in the craft concerned.
The use of the apparatus had to be practised with a
view to discovering the conditions under which the
best results could be obtained. Neighbouring com-
mands, such as at Portsmouth and The Nore, were
exceedingly helpful in this latter respect. The use of
howitzers, flame projectors, bomb-mortars, grappling
irons, scaling ladders, and many other fighting appli-
ances not usually found in men-o'-war had to be
investigated.
A special factory was established at Dover under
Wing-Commander Brock— of whom I shall have
much to tell— mainly in connection with the devel-
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opments and use of artificial fog, but also to further
the design and production of other material. Sixty
men worked at this factory. Their output, both in
quality and quantity, was most satisfactory in spite
of the many handicaps with which such innovations
have to contend. The difficulty of obtaining special
material, when the output of every large firm in the
country was already earmarked for other purposes,
was not lessened by the fact that our urgent demands
could seldom be supported, owing to the necessity for
secrecy, by explanations as to the purposes in view.
The use of artificial fog in war was by no means
an entirely new idea. The device had already been
utilised by our naval forces off the Belgian coast, and
a quantity of data on the subject was available as a
result of its use in fighting on land. But all forms of
fog screens— and there were many— had hitherto
possessed disadvantages which would militate against
satisfactory results in an enterprise such as we contem-
plated. The main difficulty attached to the smoke
apparatus at Dover was that a very visible flame was
emitted; this would have completely given our pres-
ence away as the smoke was intended to hide our
presence and cover our advance. Some attempts had
been made to surmount this difficulty, but experi-
ments proved the apparatus to be hopelessly unsuited
to our requirements. The reader, however, will not
desire to be introduced to a highly technical treatise
on this subject. Suffice it to say that, as a result of
prolonged experimental work, a new type of fog was
evolved which satisfied all requirements. The trials
were not altogether devoid of humour. It is rumoured
that on one occasion a fog produced in the Dover
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Straits refused to dissipate itself for three days, with
the result that mercantile captains said some very
hard things about the clerk of the weather.
The blockships and Vindictive were fitted out at
Chatham. That dockyard was already being taxed
to its utmost. The situation demanded that every
man should strive to exceed his previous utmost ef-
forts— one of the few points on which our enemies
may congratulate themselves. Secrecy was, of course,
essential. Yet in the case of the ships fitting out at
Chatham the number of men who played an indirect
part in the operation ran Into four figures. The same
thing applied at Portsmouth where the Iris, the Daffo-
dil, and the submarines destined to attack the railway
viaduct at Zeebrugge were fitted out. The director
of Naval Construction, Sir Tennyson D'Eyncourt,
and the Director of Dockyards, Rear-Admiral L. E.
Power, brought all their valuable knowledge, and that
of their respective staffs, to bear on the problem.
Much of the usual formality governing inter-depart-
mental procedure was waived. Paper work was re-
duced to a minimum. The real nature of the opera-
tion was made known to few at that period. The war
had taught men not to ask questions unless the in-
formation was an absolute necessity. Nevertheless
many must have wondered what was afoot; special
steps had to be taken, therefore, to prevent leakage of
information, of which more anon.
CHAPTER VIII
THE PERSONNEL. SECRECY. TRAINING. SOME
PERSONALITIES
NO naval or military training is necessary torealise that the success of any war operation
is mainly dependent upon the personnel.
In these days of machinery and munitions, how-
ever, we are apt to become ultra-materialistic in our
imagination. We read of so many million rounds of
ammunition, so many thousand tons of merchant
shipping, such and such new-fangled weapons. But
the necessity for efficient personnel is, after all, the
crux of the whole matter. What use a ship without
a crew or an aeroplane without a pilot? Truly the
question of personnel is paramount. No belligerent
state ever suffered from a surplus of fighting men in
the midst of a war. How strange it seemed to us in
those critical days that we had ever been content to
rely on an overseas expeditionary force of only 150,000
men.
The ordinary use of warships against the enemy
involves no special requirements of personnel beyond
those which can be foreseen when the ships are origi-
nally designed. Design naturally results from pro-
jected employment whether the design be construc-
tional or instructional. But for the purposes of this
unusual kind of operation special types of officers and
men were required and special training had to be
arranged for. The operation itself— in official par-
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lance— was considered to be hazardous. Success
would depend upon the work of the personnel to an
unusual degree. This fact was early recognised.
It is difficult to define the type of men required.
They should be volunteers as far as that was practi-
cable. They must be "all out for business." In view
of the hazardous nature of their enterprise it was ad-
visable that they should be unmarried.
In the Grand Fleet alone there were many thou-
sands of men spoiling for a fight. Nor was this sur-
prising. During nearly four years of waiting, tuned
up to the last note of efficiency, there had been only
one action in which the major portion of the main
fleet was engaged, and only a few smaller actions in
which opportunities were available for the crews of
our large ships to show their worth. But how many
of the public realised the vastness of its work.?— the
incessant patrolling, the continual sweeps up and
down and across the North Sea, with only a glimpse
of an enemy vessel on the rarest occasions, and that
but a momentary vision of her stern disappearing at
the utmost speed as the vessel fled to her nearest port
of refuge. As a blue-jacket was heard to remark, "It's
always tip and run with devilish little of the tip."
The everlasting practices, manoeuvring, and drills,
designed towards the attainment and upkeep of
efficiency, may have been novel enough for the first
few months, but the novelty soon wore off. Not that
the men ever showed any sign of weariness. It was
more a case of hope deferred.
I was in that fleet for three years and three months
and can speak from experience. One marvelled at the
spirit of the men. They were always ready for "the
GRAND FLEET PERSONNEL 103
day"— hungry for it, praying for it. Even the
theatrical entertainments, which they organised in
their spare time, were brimful of topical allusions to
the absent enemy.
The personnel of the Grand Fleet— I especially
allude to those who had served in the Fleet from the
outbreak of war— were, indeed, spoiling for a fight.
They had read from time to time of the splendid ac-
tions fought by their contemporaries in other theatres
of the war; it was only human that they should feel
extremely envious of these others.
It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of our
main fleet at the outbreak of war was mainly due to
the untiring efforts of its personnel. The work of the
fleet in the years immediately preceding the war had
been exceedingly strenuous; very different from the
sea life of a decade earlier. The days of "hurrah"
cruises, when gunnery practices took second place to
festivities, had long since passed. Manoeuvres, firing
exercises with guns and torpedoes, night attacks and
steam trials at sea were alternated with "rests" in
harbour, where evolutions, drills, and instructions of
all sorts, conferences and war games had kept us
pretty well occupied. Admittedly, then, service in
the main fleet required a high state of efficiency; an
individual who fell short of this requirement was not
wanted. Thus, speaking generally, the personnel of
the main fleet at the outbreak of war were only there
because they were considered to be deserving of a
place on the efficiency roll. Yet many of these very
officers and men had not seen an enemy ship since the
outbreak of war. It is not difficult, therefore, to
imagine their envy of those others to whom oppor-
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tunities had been vouchsafed to prove their worth in
action.
The choice of the personnel for our particular enter-
prise had to be governed, to a certain extent, by those
most readily available. The question thus arose as to
whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet,
Sir David Beatty, would consent to lend any of his
officers and men for the operation. The Vice-Admiral
was anxious that the Grand Fleet should be given a
share in this affair. The Commanders-in-Chief of
the three southern dockyard ports and the Com-
mandants of the Royal Marine Artillery and Light
Infantry were also consulted; many personnel at
these latter establishments would be awaiting draft
in the ordinary course of events and might, therefore,
be more easily spared than those from the Grand
Fleet.
If the German High Seas Fleet had shown any ac-
tivity it is a doubtful matter whether Sir David
Beatty would have allowed his officers and men to
leave the fleet. It must be understood that it was not
merely a case of borrowing these men for a day or
two, but for a period of several weeks, so that they
could be specially trained for their somewhat unusual
duties. Sir David Beatty, however, considered that
the risk of rendering his ships temporarily short-
handed was justified in view of the importance of our
expedition. His chief difficulty lay in the matter of
selection. Owing to the necessity of secrecy he could
not issue an ordinary memorandum to all and sundry
stating our object and asking for volunteers. So each
Flag Officer was requested to produce a certain num-
ber of officers and men from his own particular squad-
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ron. Likely individuals were to be asked if they were
prepared to undertake something "hazardous"; no
further intimation as to the nature of the enterprise
was to be promulgated. Similar methods of selection
were adopted at the naval and marine depots. It is
not difficult to imagine the buzz of excitement which
passed through each ship when rumour suggested that
there was something afoot.
If the nature of the operation had been divulged
and volunteers requested, there would have been
twenty thousand names sent in. That was the Com-
mander-in-Chief's own opinion. But the secret must
be safeguarded. So the selection was made by the
officers— so many men from each ship, seamen,
stokers, and marines. At that stage the selected men
knew nothing except that they were required for
something "hazardous."
Life in the fleet was not altogether free from hazard
in the ordinary course of events. With one's living
space surrounded by the most destructive of high ex-
plosives in close proximity, perhaps a matter of
inches, with the seas either mine-strewn or, in the ab-
sence of mines, containing lurking submarines, with
the ever-present danger of collision between vessels
steaming at high speed without lights on the darkest
night, it cannot be said that naval life in war-time
carries an insignificant insurance premium.
But the coming operation was something different.
It was declared to be "hazardous." If the usual life
at sea as described above carried no such descriptive
title, the word "hazardous" meant much.
Though little enough was known as to the business
ahead, it was sufficient to raise the envy of the great
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majority of men who were not fortunate enough to
be selected. One could well imagine the little knots
of men who gathered together in the evening and dis-
coursed on the injustice of being left behind. The in-
tense interest with which the special training of the
chosen few was watched could almost be felt. For
boat-pulling, physical drill, and route marching, com-
menced immediately, were the order of the day, just
to prepare the men for the more intensive training to
follow.
A good deal of consideration had to be given to the
choice of officers. The question of seniority of the
blockship commanders gave food for thought. Each
of these vessels would also require at least three exec-
utive officers. The chance of the captain being bowled
over early in the proceedings was none too small. So
the conning and steering arrangements and the whole
system of command in each ship was to be triplicated.
Thus each officer must be ready to take over the re-
sponsibility of command at a moment's notice. Simi-
lar considerations affected the choice of officers for the
storming vessels. Still further executive officers were
required for charge of the storming parties. Engineer
officers must be forthcoming for these special vessels.
At first all these officers, just as in the case of the men,
knew nothing of the circumstances under which they
were required, except that it was for a hazardous
business.
The majority of the officers and men for the block-
ships and storming vessels were drawn from the Grand
Fleet ; most of the remainder were obtained from the
naval depots.
When visiting the United States of America at the
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end of 191 8 I was often asked to explain why Amer-
ican naval personnel were not included in the enter-
prise. On more than one occasion there were strong
evidences of disagreeable insinuations having been
circulated through pro-German influences. It was
suggested that relations between the British and
American squadrons in the Grand Fleet left much to
be desired, and that feelings of jealousy had caused
us to decline American assistance for the purposes of
our enterprise. Nothing could be further from the
truth. The American battle squadron was never
referred to as such. They formed the "sixth" battle
squadron of the Grand Fleet. Their ships and ours
constituted one fleet, working for a single end and
guided by common sentiment. For the furtherance
of successful co-operation the Americans had literally
"thrown overboard" everything that could weaken
the combination. Their signalling arrangements, tac-
tical manoeuvring, and special gunnery methods had
all been brought into line with ours. The unselfish-
ness and sacrifice involved can only be fully appreci-
ated by members of our own sea service.
From the day of their arrival the Americans had
been actuated with but one purpose, namely, that of
leaving no stone unturned to enhance their value as
a reenforcement. Admiral Rodman, who commanded
the Sixth Battle Squadron, was ever in close touch
with Admiral Beatty. The genuine friendship be-
tween his squadron and the rest of the fleet will never
be forgotten in our service. There was but one fleet.
But the question of utiHsing their personnel for our
immediate affair was governed by something more
than cordiality and co-operation. Secrecy had to be
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maintained. If we had transferred a few score Amer-
ican officers and men to Chatham, where there were
no American ships, for special training with our own,
curiosity would have been aroused at once, comment
would have followed and, in a very short while, the
secret might have been public property.
Admiral Beatty and Admiral Rodman had dis-
cussed the whole subject and decided that American
assistance was inadvisable for the reason given. I
was also asked if it was true that an American officer
had come over to Zeebrugge in Vindictive as a stow-
away. It was not true.
Admiral Rodman had previously held an important
post in connection with the Panama Canal, and he
let us have the benefit of his experiences with regard
to questions of salvage. Nearly a year later he was
kind enough to attend a large meeting with the author
in New York, where, in no uncertain language, he
nailed the pro-German insinuations to the board.
Amongst the first officers to leave the Grand Fleet
were those destined to command the blockships; the
fitting out of the latter had already commenced.
The usual custom concerning seniority for command
of light cruisers was waived, these officers, whose
ranks varied from a Commander to a Lieutenant of
less than three years' standing, being selected from
those available mainly by virtue of their character and
capability. Those selected to command Iris and
Daffodil were also sent south as early as practicable.
On arrival at Dover they were told the "secret." It
was probably self-control combined with the some-
what artificial reserve arising from good discipline
which enabled them to refrain from giving vent to
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their feelings of elation. One of them told me that he
had the sensation of being released from prison ; the
opportunity of being able to show his worth had come
at last. Each officer read through the "plan" so as
to make himself acquainted with the broad outlines
of the whole enterprise. One of the blockship com-
manders expressed the opinion that the blocking of
Ostende would be "easy meat" compared to the
undertaking at Zeebrugge, and he earnestly requested
that he might command a blockship destined for the
latter place. This request was granted. Incidentally
his opinion was wrong. Subsequently, thanks to his
own splendid efforts, he caused his comparison be-
tween the two places to appear all the more erroneous
by assisting to make the blocking of Zeebrugge seem
relatively simple.
The main ideas governing the preparatory work, as
already stated, had been evolved under the direction
of Admiral Keyes. Many questions, however, of a
more local description remained to be decided on the
spot. The blockship officers, therefore, thoroughly
investigated every detail which bore on their duties
and devised many local improvements, especially in
connection with the handling of the vessels.
They left nothing undone to ensure a successful
issue of their efforts. No other subject held any in-
terest for them in those days. Just how to take their
ships to their allotted positions— that was their one
consideration. The question of being rescued after
their work was completed held a very secondary
place. Perhaps the rescue vessels might be able to do
something towards it. Perhaps not. Anyway, that
mattered nothing in comparison with the crucial
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point. And so they schemed and discussed and or-
ganised and tested. And what a grand reward they
obtained for their labours
!
I should like to mention in passing that the first
blockship officer to come south was Lieutenant Ivor
B. Franks, in whose hands much of the early work
connected with fitting out the blockships was placed,
with splendid results which reflected great credit on
him. He commanded Iphigenia during the first two
attempts made against Zeebrugge, but, most un-
luckily for him, he developed appendicitis just before
the final attempt. It was largely due to his earnest
entreaties that Admiral Keyes gave the command
to the previous second-in-command, who was a
Lieutenant of only one year standing. Once again
Lieutenant Franks, for whom we all felt the greatest
sympathy, had shown the value of his judgment.
During this period the constructive work on the
ships proceeded apace.
The Vindictive rapidly changed her appearance.
Every unessential fitting that could be removed in
the time at our disposal was wafted away. The fore-
mast was cut off just above the fighting-top. The
mainmast was removed altogether and a large portion
of it was fitted horizontally across the deck, extending
several feet over the port side of the ship, as a bump-
kin designed to prevent the port propeller from bump-
ing against the Mole at Zeebrugge.
Special fenders were fitted on the ship's side to
prevent damage to the latter when secured to the
Mole, and a fender of colossal proportions was added
to the port side of the forecastle for the express pur-
pose of bumping the Mole on arrival.
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Other alterations and additions have been described
in Chapter V.
H.M.S. Hindustan^ Captain A. P. Davidson,
D.S.O., was lent as a depot vessel for our officers and
men who had been concentrated at Chatham. There
was then no living accommodation on board Vindic-
tive or in the blockships.
The Vice-Admiral took an early opportunity of as-
sembling all the officers and making the whole plan
known to them collectively. The secret was to be
kept from the men until later, in accordance with the
principle of never divulging a secret to anybody ex-
cept those to whom the information is indispensable.
The personnel specially required for storming the
Mole at Zeebrugge were divided into three main par-
ties, viz. , Seamen storming parties under the command
of Captain Henry C. Halahan, D.S.O., R.N., Marine
storming parties (drawn from the 4th Battalion) un-
der the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N.
Elliot, D.S.O., R.M.L.I. , and a demolition party con-
sisting of both Seamen and Marines under the com-
mand of Lieutenant-Commander Cecil C. Dickin-
son, R.N.
The Marine Infantrymen were put through in-
tensive training at one of the southern depots; this
training was arranged and personally supervised by
Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, whose powers of imagina-
tion and organisation were of a high order and whose
optimism was very encouraging. He was tremen-
dously enthusiastic from the first moment when he
was let into the secret. As second-in-command of the
Naval Forces in Servia he had previously rendered
splendid service and had been awarded the D.S.O.
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After the fall of Belgrade I believe that he had tra-
versed the entire country on foot in his endeavour to
help his force to safety. I remember a lady telling me
that she and her friends had been much interested on
recent nights in watching a large party of Marines
indulging in peculiar antics on a hill opposite her
house ; also that the hill was partly covered with strips
of canvas in a seemingly aimless fashion. I expressed
my astonishment at the strange proceeding. Inci-
dentally the canvas strips were laid out to represent
different portions of Zeebrugge Mole, though, at that
period, the men believed they represented some
enemy position elsewhere.
The Marine Artillerymen, destined to man the
howitzers and some other guns in Vindictive, were
trained at another depot.
The seamen were largely trained at Chatham under
military supervision and advice ; the excellence of this
training received a well-deserved tribute in the official
despatch. The demolition parties were also trained at
Chatham.
Training in night fighting was the main idea. In-
struction in bombing, bayonet fighting, and all types
of trench raiding was given. The men believed that
they were required for some special service in France
;
their enthusiasm was unbounded.
Taking everything into consideration and looking
at the operation of attacking the Mole from a general
point of view, it was not dissimilar to a trench raid
on a large scale. The preparatory bombardment, the
rush "over the top," the probability of encountering
barbed wire, the descent to the main level of the
Mole, the hand-to-hand fighting in the dark, and
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finally the clearing of dug-outs, all combined to liken
that phase of the operation to one of the many night
raids with which the military were so well acquainted
on the western front. The senior officers of the Sea-
men and Marine storming parties had both gained
much experience of such fighting ashore. It was to
be a raid of the first water, a super-raid. The military
officers were most enthusiastic about our men. They
declared that these men could carry any position.
For they were all picked men; and even so some of
them were weeded out as not quite reaching high-
water mark at the game. It was generally conceded
that the Hun, wherever he was to come to close quar-
ters with such antagonists, would have an uncom-
fortable evening.
It has been mentioned above that special personnel
were not required for the large majority of vessels
which were already in full commission and employed
on active duty in the Dover Command. The person-
nel required for the blockships and storming vessels
and for other special purposes amounted to eighty-six
officers and sixteen hundred and ninety-eight men; of
these, seven hundred and fifty, in the aggregate, were
drawn from the Royal Marines.
Having been working in the Plans Department of
the Admiralty when the operation was originally
thought out under Admiral Keyes, my further services
had been lent to him, after he took over the Command
at Dover, in connection with the operational staff
work. Very much to my delight I had then been
offered the billet of navigator of the expedition, and
my duties were to include those of placing Vindictive
alongside the Mole. The Vice-Admiral originally pro-
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posed to direct the operation from on board Vindictive,
but was forced to the conclusion that he could do so
more satisfactorily from a destroyer, thus avoiding
the possibility of being confined to any single position
in the area of the attack. In the Vice-Admiral's ab-
sence Captain Halahan, appointed in command of the
seamen storming parties, became the Senior Execu-
tive Officer in the ship. It was pointed out that that
fact would result in the unusual case of the Senior
Officer on board not being responsible for the handUng
of the ship. Captain Halahan would not even listen
to any suggestion of difficulty arising from such a
situation, and, I am anxious to record this fact, he
proposed that his acting rank of Captain should be
transferred from himself to me, so that the officer
responsible for handling the vessel should also be the
Senior Executive Officer on board in accordance with
the usual service custom; in other words that he
should be made junior to myself. This proposal was
typical of Halahan, who, in my opinion, was one of
the finest fellows that our Service ever knew. His
death brought an irreparable loss to the Navy.
Throughout the greater part of the war he had been
in command of the naval guns on the northern front
and within field-gun range of the enemy for no less
than three years. He had fought in most of the great
battles on that part of the Allied lines. A more effi-
cient, earnest, upright, and altogether large-minded
officer never fought for his country or paid the su-
preme sacrifice more readily. The days which we
spent together working at the details of the enter-
prise, his wonderful enthusiasm, and his certainty of
success are unforgettable. I feel that I could not con-
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tinue this story without recording my unqualified
admiration for this splendid officer.
Needless to say, it was unnecessary to carry his
proposal into effect, for his unselfishness had served
to guarantee that all questions of rank were imma-
terial where the only thing that really mattered was
the attainment of our object.
I regret that my lack of literary ability prevents
my doing justice to such men.
It would be difficult for anybody to speak too
highly of Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock. He was
a rare personality. An inventive genius, than whom
the country had no better, it was his brain that differ-
entiated this blocking enterprise from all previous
attempts in history in one most important particu-
lar. The difficulty of reaching the destination in the
face of a strenuous opposition had hitherto brought
failure, but he provided an antidote in the form of
a satisfactory artificial fog designed to protect the
blockships from the enemy's guns during the critical
period of approach. That in itself was a wonderful
achievement, but his inventive mind was not satisfied
therewith. To him we owed the special flares intended
for turning darkness into light.
A special buoy was wanted— one that would auto-
matically provide its own light on being thrown into
the water. Brock made so little of the problem that
he produced such a buoy, designed, constructed, and
ready for use in less than twenty-four hours. Special
signal lights were required. Brock produced them.
Flame projectors, far exceeding anything hitherto
known, were mooted. Brock produced them also.
No matter what our requirements were Brock was
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undefeated. With a highly scientific brain he pos-
sessed extraordinary knowledge of almost any sub-
ject. He had travelled much and could tell you all
that was worth knowing of any country from Pata-
gonia to Spitzbergen. He was no mean authority on
old prints and books, was also a keen philatelist, and
was blessed with a remarkable memory. Wherever he
went he carried with him a pocket edition of the New
Testament, which was his favourite possession; his
knowledge of the contents was quite unique. And
with it all he was a great shot and an all-round sports-
man. His fine physique was well remembered by
many a Rugby footballer from the days when he
played in the pack of one of the leading club fifteens.
His geniality and humour were hard to beat. But of
all his qualities, optimism perhaps held first place.
At times we, who were far from being pessimistic,
thought his optimism excessive, but it was justified
absolutely with regard to the success of the enterprise.
Sad to relate, the only occasion on which I can re-
member his optimism failing to carry him through
was connected with his own personal safety. He had
telephoned up to Halahan in our oflftce and men-
tioned having broken a looking-glass. "That means
seven years bad luck," said Halahan, in a jocular
spirit. "Never mind," came the instant reply, "it
shows that I'm going to live for another seven years,
anyway."
Both Brock and Halahan had done so much to en-
sure our success, it was indeed sad that they did not
survive long enough to see the results.
My readers will excuse me, I feel sure, for bringing
such personalities to their notice. It is very diflScult
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to continue the story without writing of many others
to whom we owed so much in the preparatory work.
But there will be a chance of mentioning some of
them later on, when we come to the actual description
of the fight.
CHAPTER IX
THE WAITING PERIOD. THE VOLUNTEERING SPIRIT
T last all constructive preparations were
completed; the various ships and small craft
were commissioned and concentrated at their
respective starting-points. The blockships and Vin-
dictive steamed out to the loneliest of anchorages in the
Swin Deep, situated about eight miles south of Clac-
ton, Essex. It was a curious looking squadron that
steamed down the Medway that day, the blockships
with their funnels looming extra large in the absence
of masts and the Vindictive with her gangways pro-
truding into mid-air like almonds in the side of a tipsy
cake. The Hindustan looked respectable enough. She
was mother to us all and her captain was a very toler-
ant and helpful father.
The Iris and Dafodil joined us almost immedi-
ately. The Marines embarked a few days later. They
had been sent to a southern port on the understanding
that they were off to France ; the officers alone knew
the truth. They duly boarded the waiting transport
with stores, ammunition, and baggage, the latter
labelled to a French port. They must have wondered
where they would sleep that night. The transport
duly left harbour and headed for the French coast,
but presently altered course in a most unusual man-
ner. Word was passed round that the course was
peculiar; all crowded on deck in their endeavour to
solve the problem. It was a misty day with the rain
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coming down in torrents ; the land was soon obscured.
The officers chuckled at the general bewilderment,
but held their peace. At last the transport eased
down and finally stopped engines. Out of the mist
loomed the Iris and Daffodily into which vessels the
Marines were transferred.
A second voyage was then commenced, but it was
not of long duration. Other ships presently hove in
sight, and strange craft they appeared. Cruisers with-
out masts and another looking like a home for lost
coal-tips. These were the blockships and Vindictive.
Then appeared a recognisable vessel— the Hindu-
stan. Some of the Marines went to the latter, the
remainder to Vindictive. I can well remember the
astonished look on their faces as these men boarded
my ship. Even the heavy downpour of rain seemed
to be unnoticed. One man remarked as he came on
board, "Well, it's darned good to be aboard a blessed
something, but I'm blowed if I know what she is."
That day and the next were spent in settling down.
On the evening of the second day the men were told
the secret. In Vindictive they all mustered on the
quarter-deck and after bridge. Sunset had long since
been heralded by the time-honoured bugle call. The
evening twilight was fading rapidly. There was a
stillness in the air which seemed to be reflected from
the tense attitude of the assembled men. One could
have heard the proverbial pin drop. It was my duty
to take them into our confidence. After the nature of
the enterprise had been outlined a few sentences were
sufficient to illustrate the task allotted to the Vindic-
tive. It seemed advisable to point out that many
other operations of a hectic nature, besides those of
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the blockships and storming vessels, were to be at-
tempted. I emphasised this by mentioning that if,
during our visit to Zeebrugge Mole, they heard a
thunderous explosion they could say to themselves,
"That's one of them." These words came back to me
afterwards, as I shall relate in due course.
As soon as the business in hand had been promul-
gated it was considered advisable to exert a very rigid
censorship on outgoing mails. Correspondence was
permitted, but strictly on the understanding that the
letters would be retained at one of the mail offices
until the operation had been completed. This regula-
tion was modified later owing to the waiting period
being unexpectedly prolonged. Field post-cards were
then issued and could be posted in the ordinary man-
ner. There were the usual sentences, such as "I am
quite well," "I am not quite well," "I have received
your letter," "I have not received your letter," etc.,
in the style of the French exercise books of one's
youth. Such post-cards were familiar enough amongst
the military, but were a novelty to most of us; they
caused a good deal of amusement, especially when the
sender omitted to delete the sentences which misrep-
resented his feelings towards the intended recipient.
All shore leave was stopped; even cases of serious
illness or accident would have to go to Hindustan,
and remain there, instead of to a shore hospital.
Secrecy was absolutely essential, but not always
easy to ensure. At our anchorage it was compara-
tively simple, but elsewhere we had to depend more
upon trust in our fellow men than rigid regulation.
The secret was well kept, and fortunately so. Surprise
is mainly dependent upon secrecy. For if information
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of an impending attack becomes known there can be
no hope of taking the enemy unawares.
I wonder how many people reaUse the necessity for
keeping rumours to themselves during war. Rumours
must be either true or untrue. If untrue they are not
worth passing on. If true, then untold harm may
result from repetition. Suppose for a moment that
the impending operation at Zeebrugge had become a
topic of general conversation. In due course the in-
formation would have reached our enemies and the
expedition would almost certainly have met with
complete disaster. The lives of many picked officers
and men would have been lost, and the whole affair
would have gone down to history as a fiasco. Under
such circumstances each person who had repeated the
rumour on its way to the enemy would have been
morally guilty of manslaughter— surely that is not
an exaggerated deduction.
Alas, human nature is often weak. There is some
modicum of satisfaction in showing superior knowl-
edge to one's neighbour.
The Japanese, in their war with Russia, set the
world a wonderful example of silence. After losing
a high percentage of their battleship strength not
a word was spoken and the world remained in igno-
rance for many months.
A writer— I think it was Chesterton— once sug-
gested that memorials should be erected in recognition
of negative qualities. If that idea were adopted I
wonder how many tablets would be found to state
that ^^Here Mr. So-and-so heard a rumour and did not
repeat it to his friends."
When dealing, in Chapter VIII, with the question
122 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
of the type of personnel required for an enterprise
of this description, I mentioned that they should be
volunteers as far as that was practicable. The reader
may perhaps consider that the meaning of the word
"volunteer" was being unduly "stretched" if the
men were to be unaware of the real nature of the oper-
ation until they were already trained and actually
standing by to go across. Nevertheless, the men were
volunteers in the true meaning of the word. Let me
explain. It was of great importance that no officer or
man should take part in the enterprise unless he was
"for it," heart and soul. So, as soon as the secret had
been made known and the men were thoroughly
aware of all the difficulties and risks involved, it was
given out that any officers or men who wished to with-
draw could do so. It was fully recognised that they
might have private reasons for wishing to avoid risks
of an unusually high degree. We were not concerned
with the nature of such private reasons and we wished
to make certain that no pressure was brought to bear
for the sake of influencing their decision. They were,
therefore, informed that any individual who desired
to withdraw should merely give in his name and re-
main behind. They were further told that no reasons
would be asked and, to make doubly certain, that no
reasons or explanations of any description would be
allowed under any circumstances whatever. That was
fair enough. Not a single officer or man withdrew.
In Vindictive there were several men, of non-com-
batant rating, who, in the ordinary course of events,
were destined to be left behind when the expedition
started. They comprised cooks, stewards, canteen-
servers, and the like. Some of them were not even
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naval men, but merely there as representatives of, or
workers for, the firm which provided the canteen.
They naturally knew the secret and they openly ex-
pressed their desire to remain in the ship so as not to
miss the fun. We decided to consider such requests.
Extra men would come in handy for dealing with the
wounded as well as for assisting with the commissa-
riat. Eventually it was decreed that those who volun-
teered to come over with us should give in their names.
As far as I can remember every one of them volun-
teered. It must be realised that these were not fight-
ing men; their sole training had been that of the camp
follower. Small chance of meeting the enemy in hand-
to-hand combat would come their way. The work of
tending wounded between decks— we already had
our full quota of stretcher bearers for working in more
exposed positions— and that of providing the neces-
sary sustenance carries little glory or excitement.
Nevertheless, these men volunteered and they after-
wards rendered splendid service.
^Take another case. When the Vindictive was fitting
out at Chatham there was an officer on board, remain-
ing from the previous commission, for temporary
duty. He knew nothing definite of the coming opera-
tion, but evidently thought a good deal. His method
of volunteering was to remark: "I don't know, sir,
what the old ship is going to do, but it looks like dirty
work and I should like to be there." It was vulgar,
but expressive. That officer remained with us, and
afterwards covered himself with glory.
In the blockships there were also incidents which
served to illustrate this thirst for dangerous employ-
ment.
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Owing to the difficulties of rescue work, as has al-
ready been explained, it was decided to send each
blockship to her final destination with the smallest
possible number of crew; the number in each case
amounted to fifty-three. Thirty-four extra men,
however, were required for getting each ship to the
edge of the danger zone, whilst the fifty-three on
whom the final run depended were resting. That
meant that in each ship thirty-four men, who knew
all about the coming event, who had experienced
much hard work and considerable discomfort, were to
be disembarked just when the fight was about to
begin. One can imagine their feelings, but questions
of individual disappointment could not be allowed to
affect the plan of action. The disembarkation of these
"surplus" crews was to be carried out with the aid
of small craft specially detailed for the purpose. In
the Intrepid one day there was a minor edition of a
mutiny. Several men demanded to see their captain.
The latter ordered them to state their business.
"Well, sir," said the spokesman, "me and my mates
understands as how some of the crew have got to
leave the ship on the way across to Zeebruggy. The
'jaunty'^ says it's us lot and we ain't a-goin' to
leave."
Their captain explained the situation. He pointed
out that there would be too many for one rescue boat
and that overloading might lead to the loss of every-
body. But the men were inclined to be adamant.
Finally their captain decided to take a spare gun's
crew and ordered the "mutineers " to draw lots for the
honour. The sequel is worth recording even if it
^ Master-at-arms.
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necessitates anticipating the main story. When this
particular blockship stopped during the oversea voy-
age, the craft detailed to take off her surplus crew
failed to appear alongside— she had broken down.
So the whole crew went to Zeebrugge and, extraor-
dinary to relate, every soul of them was rescued.
This voluntary spirit was very heartening to all
concerned. I have only mentioned a few specific
cases, but there were many others of a similar descrip-
tion. It is no exaggeration to say that once the men
knew the secret they were more than mere volunteers
— they were determined to come across with us.
It must not be assumed that all was in readiness as
soon as the ships, having been duly fitted out, had
assembled at the Swin and embarked their person-
nel. Much remained to be done. Steam trials, gun-
nery practices, adjustment of compasses, and tests
of all the special material were indulged in. Handling
the ships from both the main and auxiliary conning
positions, testing communications, manipulating the
grappling irons and Mole gangways, drilling the guns'
crews and ammunition parties, training the stretcher
parties, and giving instruction in first-aid also helped
to keep us fully occupied. 1
Of course it was impossible to practise sinking
blockships or taking storming vessels alongside break-
waters. Breakwaters are only to be found in such
public places as Dover, Portland, etc. ; it would have
been inadvisable to publish our intentions in such a
manner. Thus, as far as these special vessels were
concerned, the seamanship difficulties could not be
lessened by proper realistic practice. The suggestion
that we might use Hindustan as the Mole did not
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appeal to us much, especially as the Vindictive was
originally built for ramming and consequently had a
very large ram; we had no desire to start badly by
sinking one of our own battleships. t '.
The life on board Vindictive^ uncomfortable as it
was owing to our numbers greatly exceeding the
normal complement, was not altogether devoid of
humour. As one walked round the ship there would
be a blood-curdling yell and a party of men with fixed
bayonets would charge round a corner and hurl them-
selves upon an imaginary foe. The steel helmets, gas
masks, and respirators gave these men a weird ap-
pearance, such as one is unaccustomed to see on board
ship. Some carried knob-kerries— loaded ash sticks;
others grenades, flame projectors, or machine-guns.
There was no half-heartedness about the men.
Clearly enough they meant business ; we had no mis-
givings about the result. Those days were busy in-
deed. When work had finished for the day oppor-
tunities for sports arose, and there were occasional
concerts in the evenings. The tugs-of-war evoked
much friendly rivalry between the various sea regi-
ments— the seamen, stokers. Marine Light Infantry,
and Marine Artillery. One afternoon a boxing tourna-
ment took place and the fighting augured well for the
near future. \ r
One day, two oflBcers from a blockship paid a call
on the Vindictive. Visiting cards were not required;
we were obviously At Home. But we were quite
mystified when one of the ofl[icers produced a small
chunk of iron and remarked that he had brought it
on board in case we ran short of ammunition. He
then explained that, during the passage from his
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vessel, some description of explosive missile had burst
within a few yards of his dinghey, and the piece pro-
duced had fallen into the boat. Incidentally he ac-
cused Vindictive of firing the missile, but we pleaded
not guilty or alternatively, as the lawyers say, as-
serted that he had no right to cross the firing line!
Apparently it was a portion of a bomb of sorts fired
from one of the ships, fortunately without any other
result than to cause considerable merriment to the
occupants of the dinghey. Such an incident in the
ordinary course of events would have led to very per-
tinent enquiries, but we were too much preoccupied
with the business in hand to worry about such trifles.
The thoughts uppermost in our minds concerned
the chances of favourable weather conditions. The
barometers came in for an amount of tapping which
was not calculated to improve the instruments. We
all became weather prophets those days. Many and
varied were the daily forecasts.
One night we rolled unpleasantly in a heavy gale
and soon after midnight a small vessel was seen firing
distress signals. This provided an excellent oppor-
tunity for testing our illuminating rockets, by the
aid of which we observed a tug struggling to grapple
a lighter which was dragging its anchors. The worst
aspect of heavy weather was the consequent expend-
iture of fuel which we could ill spare. Thanks to the
Captain of Hindustan our period of waiting was made
as comfortable as we could have hoped. He was inde-
fatigable in arranging diversions for our amusement
and in keeping us informed of the latest war news.
Each day brought more serious reports from the bat-
tle front in France and made us all the more anxious
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to give the enemy a nasty shock whilst cheering up
our own troops. During the late evenings most of us
sought for quiet corners where we could write letters,
I think we all found those letters were very difficult,
but one's feelings at such a time are of too private
a nature to bear analysis.
Captain Halahan used to discuss every point of
the coming enterprise with me; his insight and keen-
ness were most marked. We often talked far on into
the night and always came to the conclusion that
however difficult the operation might be for our
forces we would not be in the German's shoes for any-
thing. We had a plasticine model of the Mole chiefly
constructed from the data obtainable from aerial
photographs. Colonel Elliot, commanding the Ma-
rine storming parties, and his officers often joined us.
We all reaUsed the difficulty of berthing the storming
vessels at exactly the desired position alongside the
Mole and endeavoured to make the storming plan as
elastic as possible. The primary consideration— as
far as that phase of the operation was concerned —
appeared to be that the ships should secure to the
Mole somewhere. The mere presence of the ships, com-
bined with all the attendant noise and fireworks,
would create a diversion of no mean order. The
actual landing on the Mole and the occurrences that
followed would increase the diversion which had al-
ready commenced. With regard to Vindictive we
originally aimed at securing her alongside the Mole,
heading to the westward, with her stern seventy
yards westward of the three-gun battery. It was
realised that there might be considerable difficulty in
recognising one's exact position alongside the outer
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wall relative to objects on the Mole itself. Eventu-
ally, as will be described later, the ship secured to
the westward of the designed position, but, though
the actual fighting on the Mole was affected, the main
object of the diversion was attained.
The blockship officers paid us many visits and we
were all very cheery. No less than four old shipmates
had come down from my late ship in the Grand
Fleet— H.M.S. Emperor of India. It was a curious
fact that all five of us were in the thick of the affair
and all survived. One commanded the Intrepid with
another as one of his officers. One commanded the
Daffodil. One was on board Iris. Their services will
be mentioned later.
One night we had an Emperor of India dinner on
board the Intrepid. A storeroom of sorts did duty for
a mess and I think the sub-lieutenant cooked the
dinner. There was no serious talk that evening and
I don't think we forgot to drink confusion to the
enemy. When we broke up the party we little knew
that we should be conveying that confusion within
twenty-four hours.
I have described our life at the Swin in some detail,
but what of the other one hundred and fifty-four craft
which were not with us .? They were busily preparing
too, but, for the most part, were actively engaged in
their ordinary Dover Patrol duties at the same time.
Little peace can have come their way. The aircraft,
too, were very actively employed. Day after day
they brought us back photographs of Ostende and
Zeebrugge, taken at great risk with a fine contempt
for danger. If we wanted the details of any portion
of the Mole it was forthcoming, in the shape of an
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aerial photograph, in a few hours. This work was
carried out by the 6ist Wing of the Royal Air Force,
Special cameras were used for this purpose ; I believe
that they had been designed by the previous Vice-
Admiral at Dover. We studied those photographs
with the aid of stereoscopes and magnifying glasses
by the hour. But photography was not the only thing
required of the aircraft. They had to prepare for the
bombing attacks which would provide further diver-
sions; preparation required much observational work
both by day and by night. The aircraft detailed for
the bombing attacks were drawn from the 65th Wing
of the Royal Air Force. These flyers were fine fellows
and no less determined to make the affair successful
than the rest of us.
Many of the smaller craft were commanded by
officers of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve. I have mentioned elsewhere that
the whole success of the operation might, at a critical
period, depend upon the action of a single unit. In-
structions leaving a high degree of initiative to the
recipient were, therefore, necessary. Clear apprecia-
tions followed by rapid decisions were required. The
Vice-Admiral emphasised that point most strongly.
He trusted his men, whether Reserve or Volunteer or
otherwise. His trust was not misplaced; all these
officers commanding the small craft behaved most
admirably, exactly as was expected by those who
knew their worth.
1
CHAPTER X
METEOROLOGICAL AND TIDAL CONDITIONS.
VISIBILITY
"^HE periods during which the conditions
would be favourable for our enterprise de-
pended upon various factors. The extent to
which we could make use of any particular date dur-
ing one of those periods depended, in turn, upon
meteorological conditions.
It has been shown elsewhere that, for the purpose
of utilising the artificial fog, we required a wind blow-
ing more or less toward the Belgian coast from sea-
ward. It was also necessary for the wind to be light
so that the small craft would not be hampered by
rough seas. Light winds are often accompanied by
fog, especially in the North Sea, and fog would be a
serious obstacle. Rain would be detrimental to the
use of aircraft.
The depths in the entrances to the canals at Zee-
brugge and Ostende were such that the blockships
could only navigate during the period around high
water. It was, therefore, necessary for the vessels to
arrive at about that state of the tide.
Again, it was essential to carry out the operation
during the night for reasons already mentioned. In
this respect, however, the word operation must not
be used too loosely; the periods of approach to the
objectives and of retirement therefrom must both
be included in that term. The approach had to be
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undiscovered till the latest possible moment. That
necessitated darkness throughout the approach, which
latter may be considered as comprising the passage
during the last twenty miles of the oversea voyage.
Obviously the greater part of the whole passage con-
ducted during darkness the less would be the chance
of losing the element of surprise.
Likewise the retirement must be made before day-
light if the concentration of the shore batteries was
to be avoided. I have already stated that the German
guns could make things very uncomfortable for ships
up to a maximum distance of fifteen to twenty miles,
provided that the ships could be seen. The retiring
forces should, therefore, be outside that range before
there was sufficient daylight to see so far; the latter
state of visibihty would obtain at least half an hour
before sunrise. Allowing a speed of about ten knots
for retirement, this meant that the ships must leave
the coast about two and a half hours before sunrise
after completing the operation. The attack itself was
expected to continue for about one and a half hours.
The reader does not require to be an advanced math-
ematician to realise that the attack must commence
not later than about four hours before sunrise, that is,
during the middle portion of the night. Of course, the
attack was the all-important matter; any question
of safe retirement must be a secondary consideration.
Nevertheless, the question of retirement, similarly to
that of rescuing the blockships' crews, had to be taken
into account.
From the foregoing it will be seen that the attack
should be preceded and followed by a considerable
period of darkness, and should more or less coincide
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with the time of high tide. The latter only occurs
about every twelve hours and takes place roughly
fifty minutes later each day. The number of consecu-
tive days on which high tide would occur in the mid-
dle portion of the night was, therefore, very limited.
With regard to visibility, as far as naval operations
are concerned, strong moonlight is almost as disad-
vantageous as daylight. Half the nights per month
may be termed moonlight nights in that respect.
The state of the moon on any particular night is
known beforehand, the state of the clouds affecting
moonlight may change from hour to hour.
Just one more calculation. In mid-April the period
sunset to sunrise is about eleven hours in length.
Allowing two hours for the approach-passage through
the danger zone, one and a half hours for the attack,
and two hours for the retirement (to be completed
half an hour before sunrise), it follows that the maxi-
mum number of after-sunset hours available for the
open sea passage would amount to five. That was the
best possible condition for us, but could only be uti-
lised if high water occurred about four hours before
sunrise. If high tide occurred any later our time of
arrival would necessarily be later and our retirement
could not be completed before daylight. If high tide
occurred any earlier our time of arrival must be
earlier, in which case there would be less dark hours
available for our open sea passage on the way across.
The length of the open sea passage would be approxi-
mately six hours. Thus even on the most favourable
date, some of the open sea passage would have to be
made in broad daylight. Six days before that (the
tide being five hours earlier) the whole of the open sea
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passage would have to be made in daylight, only the
approach-passage, i.e., the last two hours of the whole
trip, taking place after sunset.
A rather complicated set of conditions, astronom-
ical, tidal, and meteorological, was thus required.
It was almost too much to expect that everything
would be favourable during the possible period; it is
practically certain that a commander who refused to
move until all conditions were exactly as desired
would never accomplish anything. Nevertheless we
sincerely hoped that fortune would be kind to us.
The men were kept informed of the chances as
forecast from the current weather conditions; their
eagerness for favourable predictions was manifest.
There is much advantage to be gained by a com-
mander taking his men into his confidence. In this
particular case the men realised that leakage of in-
formation would entail disaster; that was sufficient
to ensure that the confidence would be respected ; the
rigorous censorship was there to make doubly certain.
It is always more irksome for those who wait in ig-
norance than for those who know the reasons for
delay. So after prayers each morning the latest fore-
cast was divulged, other items of interest were made
known, and the keenness of the men was maintained.
CHAPTER XI
THE ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS. THE TIME FACTOR
THE work of drafting, reproducing, and dis-tributing the necessary orders and instruc-
tions to the large number of craft concerned
was not so simple as it may sound. The amount of
instructions required in an operation of this sort can
only be appreciated by those who have had experience
of staff work during war. The command to "carry
on" is only applicable when the means have been
provided and the manner of its use has been made
known.
To mention a few of the items: Separate orders
for the oversea voyage were required for each squad-
ron destined to make the passage independently of
the remainder. Others were needed for the voyage
of the main force, others to cover the aerial attacks
and the long-range bombardments. The supporting
squadrons must have their instructions. Still further
orders were designed to deal with the period of "ap-
proach." Then there were those for the main attack
on the Mole, for the demolition work, for the destruc-
tion of the railway viaduct, and for the proceedings
of the artificial-fog craft ; also those for the blockships
and the rescue work. The retirement required its own
share. Even now we have not mentioned those de-
signed to meet possible eventualities, such as en-
countering enemy vessels en route, or returning to
harbour if postponement of the enterprise was nee-
essary.
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Having decided where and how things should be
done, the remaining question was when they should
take place. The operation with its various phases and
diversions could not be carried out on the go-as-you-
please principle. Every item needed to be carefully
fitted in to suit the remainder. The timing of each
event was of paramount importance. A long-range
bombardment or an aerial attack, if delayed, might
destroy our own vessels. The blowing up of the via-
duct was calculated to render hors de combat all human
beings within a certain distance— our own men on
the Mole must not be endangered by it. It would be
useless for the blockships to arrive before the fire of
the Mole batteries had been suitably diverted. Aerial
bombers flying at a hundred miles per hour could not
accompany the ships steaming at about one-tenth of
that speed. The line of fire from the bombarding
vessels could not very well coincide with our approach
course, hence the necessity for the monitors to take
up independent positions. And so on. How could a
satisfactory synchronisation of events be arranged?
— that was the problem.
There were only two methods to consider: firstly,
that of centralised command by signal ; secondly, that
of working in accordance with a prearranged time
table.
The former method was obviously impracticable.
Signals passed by either the wireless or visual method,
during the approach, would make our presence known
to the enemy and thus preclude all chance of taking
the latter by surprise. After the attack had com-
menced signals would be impracticable for obvious
reasons, chief amongst them being the deafening noise
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and the presence of artificial fog. So direction by
signal could be ruled out.
Recourse was had to the time-table method. A
table was made out showing the exact times (by
clock) that the main force was to pass through various
positions and to arrive at the several destinations.
All other movements were to synchronise according
to plan. The time table naturally varied for each day
according to the projected time of arrival of the block-
ships, this, in turn, depending on the time of high tide.
But that was not all. It was necessary to guard
against unexpected delays due to accident, and
against vagaries of the tidal stream. Every unit
should know, at a late stage of the oversea trip, if the
blockships were likely to be late or early, and the
probable difference between actual and projected
time involved.
We would not be satisfied with the degree of punc-
tuality usually associated with certain railways. A
few minutes out, one way or the other, might be
serious; an error of half an hour would probably be
disastrous. But the oversea passage involved a jour-
ney of approximately a hundred miles for the block-
ships and storming vessels, though rather less for the
Dover contingents. That fact, combined with the
usual unwieldiness of a fleet comprising over one
hundred and fifty vessels, was not likely to render
punctuality very easy of attainment. The disadvan-
tages of daylight made it inadvisable to leave our
bases extra early for the sake of having plenty of time
to spare. Careful calculations were necessary and the
resulting time table was circulated to all concerned.
Before leaving this consideration of the timing
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question it may be of interest to mention that the
storming vessels were to be twenty minutes ahead of
the Zeebrugge blockships on arrival in the vicinity of
the Mole. In that twenty minutes we were to get
alongside and land the storming parties; the latter
were to take the necessary steps to put the batteries
out of action as far as the safety of the blockships was
concerned. At the expiration of the twenty minutes
the blockships were to pass round the end of the Mole
and make their dash for the canal entrance. The
reader may wonder why twenty minutes was the
chosen interval. Too long a time might allow the
German defences to recover from the initial surprise
;
too short a time might not enable the storming ves-
sels to complete their work before the blockships were
seen by the enemy. Twenty minutes, short though it
was, was chosen as a compromise.
All this operational staff work was carried out at
Dover under the direction of the Vice-Admiral, who,
as previously stated, was already overloaded with
duties and responsibilities arising from the work of
the Dover Patrol.
The office accommodation was hardly palatial; the
building might certainly have been satisfactory as a
small apartment house in pre-war days, but, as the
Admiral's office of our busiest naval command outside
the Grand Fleet, it was not quite up to standard.
The small staff were pretty busy for a few weeks.
Meals were either bolted down or missed. The night
hours did not bring over-much sleep.
Visits to the Grand Fleet were also necessary; one
grudged the hours spent in the train. Conferences
and discussions, visits to the ships fitting out at the
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dockyards, inspection of special material, trials of the
artificial fog, and the above-mentioned expenditure
of stationery helped to keep one occupied. Occa-
sional aerial trips assisted to clear away the cobwebs
from one's brain; they constituted a first-class tonic.
We had no printing-press. All orders had to be
typed and reproduced by a duplicating machine.
Secrecy was as essential in this work as elsewhere;
information had to be confined to the minimum num-
ber of persons. The ordinary office staff had all the
Dover Patrol work to attend to; that was as heavy as
it was unceasing. It was a new experience to turn the
handle of the duplicator, and, in shirt-sleeve garb, to
chp up the pages. We obtained the assistance of a
civilian clerk from the Admiralty, and I vow that in-
dividual discovered the real meaning of "overtime";
incidentally he was a very rapid and accurate worker
and helped us enormously.
At last the office work was more or less completed.
Improvements were thought out from time to time
and had to be embodied, even up to the eleventh
hour. That was natural enough, seeing that we had
very little previous experience to guide us in the de-
tailed planning of the Mole attack and blockship
work. It was a great relief when the paper work was
finished; those of us who had other business in hand
could then turn our attention to preparations of a
more material nature, much of which has already
been described.
CHAPTER XII
THE FIRST ATTEMPT. THE RETURN TO HARBOUR
THE first period, during which the tidal and
astronomical conditions would be favourable,
approached. The period was limited to about
half a dozen days for the reasons stated in a previous
chapter. The weather looked ominous; none of us
were very hopeful of an early start. Those last few
days of waiting were rather trying. So many things
might happen to prevent the operation from taking
place. Some of us were inclined to be apprehensive,
not of the result if we once came to grips with the
enemy, but of the operation being cancelled, or of its
being indefinitely postponed, which generally means
the same thing. Another great attack on the Belgian
coast had previously been planned and prepared, but
had never come off. I hesitate to think of the effect
on the general morale of the personnel if our enter-
prise had suffered the same fate. Disappointment
is hard enough to bear at any time, but on such an
occasion as this it would have just about broken one's
heart.
On the eve of the first day of the first period our
anxiety about the weather was tremendous. The
wind blew hard that night. The morning had nearly
dawned before some of us could make ourselves realise
that looking at the weather would not do any good.
We endeavoured not to offend it by saying unkind
words. We touched wood many times when we gave
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vent to our hopes bred of optimism. Patience is a
virtue indeed. But the first day was obviously un-
favourable, so we commenced to wait for the second.
At last there was a decided improvement. A state
of readiness was ordered. The wind had fallen very
light and we were as hopeful as we were anxious to be
"up and doing." The order to raise steam was next
received and followed shortly after by the order to
"carry on" as previously laid down in the time table.
All was bustle then. Unnecessary baggage was tran-
shipped to a harbour vessel against the day when some
of us might require it. In due course the final arrange-
ments were made and we shortened in our cables.
Then we weighed anchors and started off. The offi-
cers and men of Hindustan cheered us vigorously;
answering cheers were given as we steamed close past
her. Vindictive and the blockships all cheered each
other, enthusiasm was in the air. Thank goodness we
were off at last. Thank goodness, also, that nothing
had occurred to prevent our showing what we could
do. Those were the thoughts uppermost in our minds.
Iris and Dafodil were sent on ahead so that Vin-
dictive could take them in tow when we were clear
of the shoals. It will be remembered that Iris and
Daffodil did not possess a high degree of steaming
power, either in the way of speed or reliability.
It had, therefore, been decided that Vindictive
should tow both these vessels across the sea until in
the near vicinity of Zeebrugge Mole ; that would help
to ensure their arrival. I read afterwards in one ac-
count of this affair that Iris and Daffodil towed
Vindictive into action!
The squadron formed into " line ahead " in the order
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Vindictive, Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant, and
Sirius. The wind was blowing rather weakly, but
from a favourable direction. The sea was very calm
and, altogether, conditions appeared to be most prom-
ising. There were no glum faces in our little commu-
nity just then. As soon as we had cleared the shoals
we all stopped for a few minutes while Vindictive took
Iris and Daffodil in tow; that accomplished, we set
course for Rendezvous A, where we had to meet the
Vice-Admiral and the remaining vessels from Dover.
During our passage through the various channels
between sandbanks we passed a large number of
homeward-bound merchant ships. The contrast be-
tween them and our vessels was not merely confined
to the matter of appearance.
Each of these merchant ships was just completing
a successful operation, namely, that of bringing neces-
sities of life to this country after running the gantlet
of the enemy submarines and mines. On the other
hand, we were just setting out for the purpose of re-
ducing such risks in the future. One could not help
realising the fact that these mercantile mariners had
risked their lives over and over again without osten-
tation, with small hope of glory, with practically no
reward. Fine fellows indeed ! What a debt of grati-
tude we all owed them ! Some of them, doubtless, had
been torpedoed three and four times, losing all their
effects each time, but here they were again with yet
another voyage to their credit. We overtook a few
vessels outward bound with their troubles to come.
Some of these ships were neutrals. We wondered
what they thought of us and how they would describe
us when they arrived at their destinations. We could
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reckon on the enemy having agents at all the neutral
ports with their "ears well trimmed to the wind"
when in the presence of neutral mariners from British
ports. We also wondered if these neutrals could fail
to recognise the difference between British and Ger-
man treatment of merchantmen at sea, and whether
such recognition would not make them chary of talk-
ing too much.
Presently we sighted a large number of small craft.
They seemed to be dashing up from every direction,
at first in an apparently aimless fashion, but presently
one recognised the method in their madness. At
schedule time we stopped, heading towards our goal.
The crowd soon sorted themselves out.
The Vice-Admiral with his flag flying in the de-
stroyer Warwick took up a position of advantage.
Destroyers and blockships took small motor craft
in tow. Other vessels acted as tugs for the submarines.
Motor launches, puffing for all the world as if they
lacked training, thus acting an untruth, assembled
according to their ultimate duties. Somebody re-
marked that we resembled a sea-circus, there were so
many turns taking place simultaneously. One hardly
knew which to admire most. The destroyers throb-
bing with latent energy, some of them shouting
through their safety valves that they were in a hurry
to get to business. The motor launches, pretending
the sea was rough and often rolling heavily in their
pretence, producing a similar impression to that of a
certain famous automobile which, though cheap,
always "gets there" even if some parts are missing
at the end of the journey. The C.M.B.'s (which, be-
ing interpreted, signifies Coastal Motor Boats, though
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the word "coastal" hardly seems appropriate) were
tearing through the water and almost leaping into
the other element as if to emulate the flying-fish.
Perhaps the word "crowd" was most suited to the
appearance of this heterogeneous collection of craft,
but they were very different from a crowd in their
behaviour.
Punctually at the scheduled hour the signal was
hoisted to proceed. The expedition, making its debut
as such, set course for the eastward. Enthusiasm was
at its highest pitch. Final preparations were then the
order of the day. In Vindictive emergency rations and
field dressings were distributed. Small arms were
inspected, ammunition was stowed ready for use.
Demolition charges were placed in a handy position
for rapid removal to the Mole, gangways were triced
up, bombs were fused, howitzers and flame-throwers
were prepared. Hoses were flaked down for fire bri-
gade uses, fire extinguishers were provided in spe-
cially dangerous corners, duplicate charts were
placed in the conning tower. To guard against the
eventuality of all the navigating personnel being
rendered hors de combat during the fight or the charts
being destroyed, the retirement courses were painted
up on the armour inside the conning tower. A year
later I found this painting untouched, although the
ship had been in the Germans' hands (after being sunk
by us at Ostende in May, 191 8) for many months—
I wondered if they understood its signification. All
the other craft in company were equally busy.
We passed through further rendezvous, B and C
and D, etc., carefully checking our progress at each
so as to ensure working to the time table.
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The bombarding and supporting squadrons had
proceeded independently. We were accompanied by
aircraft during the dayhght hours of our passage;
their special duty was that of scouting for German
aircraft and preventing those that might have seen
us from giving any warning of our approach.
The wind gradually became very fitful and made us
rather apprehensive of its changing to an unsuitable
direction. Surely we were not to be robbed of our
long-awaited opportunity at the eleventh hour. Day-
light faded into twilight and the latter gave way to
darkness. It was a clear night, but as black as india
ink. Presently a distant flash of light was seen away
to starboard. Then another and another. A compass
bearing laid from our charted position gave evidence
of something happening at Ostende. Then searchlight
beams were seen searching the heavens in an uneasy
manner. What could it mean? A hurried glance at
the time table explained everything.
Our aircraft had opened the ball. The booming of
guns was heard quite plainly and the glare of the
flashes was distinctly visible. Zeebrugge then joined
in the game. In a little while we could make out the
trail of the "flaming onions," rushing heavenwards,
hanging stationary for a few seconds, and then slowly
falling in their curiously serpentine manner, for all
the world like colossal snakes writhing in their death
agony. The firing became more intense and we were
more anxious than ever to get to work. It was obvious
enough that our aircraft— the 65th Wing of the Royal
Air Force from Dunkerque— were setting about
the enemy in determined fashion. Our turn was to
come shortly, according to plan. Alas, "the best laid
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schemes of mice and men gang aft agley." We had
stopped to disembark the surplus blockship crews—
if they could be found, and to slip the small craft from
their towing hawsers in readiness to penetrate the
danger zone. The wind seemed to have died away for
a moment and then commenced to blow from a
southerly direction.
Seldom has an admiral been faced with such a dif-
ficult situation. A decision had to be given, and
quickly. The nature of the operation admitted of no
delay. The wind at the moment was hopelessly un-
favourable for our use of artificial fog. The latter was
essential. It would mean sheer slaughter if there were
no cover from the shore batteries during the approach.
On the other hand, the wind might change again.
Here was the whole expedition within a short distance
of our objectives. The major part of the passage had
been completed in spite of all the difficulties and prac-
tically without incident. The aerial attack had com-
menced. The monitors were shortly to send their
messages of destruction hurtling on their way to the
enemy. We had been seen by all sorts of neutral ves-
sels. Most of the conditions were favourable— the
wind alone was seriously against us. Another chance
might never come. He who risks nothing attains noth-
ing. Discretion is the better part of valour. What
was it to be?
In all the pages of naval history I cannot remember
having come across any occasion where a more diffi-
cult decision had to be made. After Teneriffe Nelson
had reahsed his mistake of allowing impetuosity to
influence sound reasoning to the extent of attacking
when the conditions were unfavourable. Not only
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was that first attack a failure, but it had foredoomed
the second attempt to failure also. The Vice-Admiral
avoided the same mistake— he ordered the operation
to be cancelled for that night. Much has been writ-
ten of the attack which eventually took place. Refer-
ences to the Nelson touch have not been unknown.
But this latter comparison, as I have shown, was
curiously inapt if intended to cover the whole direc-
tion of the enterprise.
There was no time for feelings of disappointment.
We had to return at utmost speed so as to be ready
to start again next day if the conditions allowed. Our
bases lay many miles to the westward, but we were
heading in an easterly direction. "Course West" was
signalled immediately. Vindictive held the honoured
post of "Guide of the Fleet." Complete instructions
had been laid down for turning round at night. It
must be remembered that we had seventy-seven craft
in close, very close, company. We duly turned round,
hoping that all craft had received the signal. Our
hopes were not entirely realised. In a few moments
the close company became too close for comfort.
Small craft shaved across our bows so narrowly that
they left the impression of having gone through us.
Shouts were heard, mingled with the puffing and
spluttering of internal-combustion engines. We won-
dered which particular vessel we should sink first.
But out of chaos came some semblance of order and
presently we were homeward bound without any very
serious casualties.
Away in the distance there were occasional gun and
searchlight flashes, but the monitors had received the
cancellation news in time to preserve their silence.
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During the turn to the westward one of the small
craft, in imminent danger of collision, had momen-
tarily switched on her navigation lights. Others fol-
lowed suit until our force resembled Brighton Es-
planade indulging in a Venetian fete as viewed from
the sea. "Out Lights" was immediately ordered and
passed from one craft to another by megaphone or
flash-lamp; darkness reigned once more as we sped
homeward. Although we had shown a blaze of lights,
the enemy patrols, we heard afterwards, failed to see
us ; this was scarcely a token of their efficiency.
So it was a case of " if at first you don't succeed,
try, try again." This abortive attempt was by no
means without value. We had rehearsed the concen-
tration and the oversea passage of the main force
;
the other vessels had practised reaching their various
destinations; the aircraft had carried out their at-
tack; the routes and navigational aids had been
severely tested. Naturally enough much valuable ex-
perience had been gained and, after all, no harm had
resulted provided that the enemy remained ignorant
of our efforts and intentions. But certain incidents
had occurred to increase our reliance on the small
craft. During the turn to the westward disentangle-
ment without serious accident was only achieved as a
result of fine seamanship and initiative on the part of
those in command ; these qualities had thus been evi-
denced under most realistic and difficult conditions.
We felt that, if they could deal successfully with such
a situation as thaty they could be relied upon to tackle
any situation, however difficult or unexpected.
A couple of incidents that occurred may illustrate
the point. During the turning manoeuvre one of the
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coastal motor boats received a heavy blow In the
bows from another craft. A hole resulted and the
water commenced to pour through it. She would
probably have sunk in a minute or two but for the
resource of her commanding officer. He ordered one
of the men to sit in the hole. This reduced the inflow
of water, but can hardly have been a comfortable pro-
ceeding for the individual concerned. The boat was
then worked up to high speed. The reader probably
knows that the bow of one of these fast motor boats
gradually raises itself as speed is increased until the
fore part of the boat is completely clear of the water.
In this case the hole was above the sea when twenty-
seven knots had been attained. The man who had
found a new use for his anatomy then withdrew him-
self. Whether the commanding officer of the boat
desired to remain with the guide of the fleet out of
sheer friendship or whether he was uncertain of his
geographical position, I know not. But he evidently
decided to remain in company. Vindictive was steam-
ing at a modest ten knots or so; the motor boat could
not afford to proceed at less than twenty-seven knots
;
so he steamed round and round the remaining
seventy-six vessels until daylight, when he was de-
tached to his base.
Another coastal motor boat, soon after leaving
Dover on the outward trip, developed some defect
which put the engines out of action. The young officer
in command obtained the services of a trawler to tow
him back to Dover, where, on arrival, he had the mat-
ter put right. All that took time. He started off again
about five hours late. Now, the occupants of this boat
had no intention of missing the affair for which they
A BELATED MOTOR BOAT 151
had prepared so long. They decided to get to Zee-
brugge as soon as possible— at full speed they might
yet be in time. So at full speed they went, straight
as a die for their goal, right across nets, mines, and
shoals. The sixty miles were covered in less than two
hours. The aerial attack was in full swing. Search-
light beams were passing dangerously near them, the
heavens were filled with bursting shell and flaming
onions. Suddenly out of the darkness loomed some
black shapes— "Houses ahead!" shouted somebody.
"Hard-a-starboard and stop her!" As she turned
round to seaward they made out the town of Blanken-
berghe ; they had escaped running ashore by the nar-
rowest of margins.
On they went again for Zeebrugge Mole. Things
were quieter now. That was strange in itself. What
had happened to the long-range bombardment .? Where
were the smoke screens and why was nothing happen-
ing at the Mole? Our ships must be much overdue.
Whatever could it mean? Presently some strange
craft were seen and a moment later the motor boat
was under fire. So she sheered off and the command-
ing officer did some hard thinking. There was only one
possible explanation— the operation must have been
postponed. So the next item on her programme was
to return to Dover. It wouldn't do to be late getting
back, so away they went— hell for leather— straight
across everything once more. And they arrived back
at Dover, after having completed the whole voyage
both ways, before their confreres who were with the
main force
!
At dawn we had completed most of the open-sea
passage on the return journey. The force split up—
the various units deconcentrated.
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Vindictive and her old friends returned to her home
of the last few weeks. The Hindustanis enthusiasm
of the day before gave place to curiosity. The former
positions in the anchorage were reoccupied. Coaling
was then the order of the day; not a moment was to
be wasted; with luck we might start again before
nightfall.
But it was not to be. The conditions were hopeless
and perhaps that was all for the best. We needed
some rest. As soon as everything was in readiness for
the second attempt, we piped down and then, for the
first time, we had a chance to talk things over.
It would be untrue to say that we were not dis-
appointed. The fear of indefinite postponement was
now much stronger. But everybody realised to the
full that the chances of success under adverse condi-
tions were practically nil. Discussion paved the way
to many suggestions of improvement— at any rate,
we intended to derive what benefit we could from the
abortive attempt.
CHAPTER XIII
THE SECOND ATTEMPT AND RETURN. PREPARING FOR
THE THIRD ATTEMPT. REWRITING THE ORDERS.
GERMAN OPTIMISM
I
WILL not weary the reader with a repetition of
our life at the Swin— the second edition differed
little from the first. There were still chances of a
new start during the present period. The weather,
however, was most unkind. We summoned up all the
patience that we could muster. The news from the
battle front in France was becoming increasingly
serious. We felt that somehow or other, we didn't
quite know how, a successful operation on our part
might help to stem the German advance. If only we
could get started
!
At last our second chance came. The wind had
changed back to a northerly direction. The "stand-
by" order was received. "Carry on" followed. Once
again we started off, as enthusiastic as ever; if our
previous determination had not increased it was be-
cause no increase was possible.
Hindustan cheered us out again, and, in our inmost
thoughts, we thanked them. Soon after we had cleared
the Swin anchorage a destroyer hove in sight and
signalled that she had a letter for Vindictive. We or-
dered her to stop a couple of miles ahead of us and
transfer the letter by boat. Commander Brock came
on board with it ; we had thought he had been pre-
vented from joining us. "We must push in to-night,"
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that was the tenor of the letter. The message was
passed round the ship and down the Hne of blockships.
It reflected our own feelings— "We must push in
to-night." Once again we passed many merchant
vessels with their crews crowded on deck to view the
unusual spectacle which we made. The wind had
gradually increased in strength, an uncomfortable sea
was rising. The prospects appeared none too rosy for
the small craft. Some twenty miles had been covered
when the almost inevitable became a certainty— the
operation was once more postponed.
The open sea had become so rough as to render the
use of small craft quite impracticable. There was
nothing for it, back we had to go once more.
Little enough was said on the subject this time;
we were learning to hide disappointment. The reac-
tion from all our hopeful optimism caused us to won-
der if any other chance would be offered us. Surely
this enterprise was not to be stillborn after all the
signs of life that it had shown. It is advisable, per-
haps, not to analyse our thoughts too fully, but they
tended to breed fatalism. We tried to look upon the
turn of events as a "rub of the green"; we endeav-
oured to appear unruffled.
The men were wonderful; their behaviour was be-
yond praise. If there was any discontent it was care-
fully hidden. The Vice-Admiral visited us at the
earliest opportunity and explained the situation to
the officers and men. That gracious act was enor-
mously appreciated ; we all felt, more than ever, that
if he could not bring off this operation nobody would
ever do so.
The first period of favourable tides was over. The
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next period would not commence yet awhile. Drills
and practices were restarted. A second battleship
was sent to the Swin to relieve the congestion in the
Hindustan. Vindictive, Iris, and Dafodil had no ac-
commodation for the Marine storming parties, which
had to be transferred to the Hindustan and her sister
depot. The waiting period was not wasted.
Opportunity now offered for embodying in the in-
structions the various suggestions for improvements.
Each was fully discussed and considered from all
points of view. Even further experiments with the
artificial fog were carried out. It was then decided to
rewrite all the previous instructions which required
modification as a result of the experience gained dur-
ing the two attempts. This was a welcome change
from the confined life on board. The Admiralty clerk
reappeared at the Admiral's office.
A most important discussion was held concerning
the chances of the secret having leaked out. At first
sight one might have thought that the operation ought
to be cancelled altogether, for had we not been seen,
and almost certainly reported, by a large number of
neutral vessels ? Such an eventuality was by no means
outside the pale of probability, and we also had to
reckon with the chances of having been seen by
German aircraft and submarines. Nevertheless, this
obstacle to our future success was imaginary rather
than real. To begin with, what value would have been
placed on such reports.? It would naturally depend
upon the source of the information.
Submarines or aircraft might have been mistaken;
anyhow, their reports could hardly provide conclusive
evidence of our intentions. Information received by
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the Germans from neutral sources might have been
specially intended to mislead. The probable effect of
such latter "intelligence" depends to a certain extent
on the psychology of the recipient. The Germans
were past-masters at chicanery; the first inclination
of such individuals is to disbelieve others ; a prevari-
cator always labours under that disadvantage.
There could, therefore, be no certainty that our two
abortive attempts had given birth to a new obstacle.
History relates many failures resulting from the
imagination of difficulties which had no real existence
in fact. One of the best examples, curiously enough,
was connected with the Walcheren expedition, where
the imaginary difficulties had loomed large, only a few
miles to the eastward of Zeebrugge. It is no exaggera-
tion to state that if we had allowed our imagination
to create half the obstacles which might have existed
we should never have decided upon the enterprise at
all.
The drafting, typing, duplication, and distribution
of the new editions of instructions were completed in
two or three days. The dates of the next period were
worked out and a new time table issued.
It has already been shown that the chances of being
discovered en route largely depended upon the number
of daylight hours which would be involved in the
passage of the expedition. Daylight, in itself, does
not necessarily imply a high degree of visibility. If
the weather were sufficiently misty to reduce visi-
bility, without militating against safe navigation,
daylight would not be so disadvantageous. In making
out the period, therefore, we included an extra day at
its commencement for use if misty weather obtained
;
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should that day be clear it would be inadvisable to
attempt the enterprise. That decision was strictly
in accordance with the principles on which the enter-
prise was based. But principles are intended as
guides; it is a false idea that they may never be de-
parted from. In an operation of this description, de-
pending upon a rather delicate combination of cir-
cumstances and conditions, it was necessary to con-
sider just how far we should be justified in ignoring
one unsuitable condition if all others were favourable.
Once more we sunmioned up all the patience that
we could muster.
The First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes,
accompanied by Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, who had re-,
lieved Lord Jellicoe as First Sea Lord, paid a visit to
Vindictive and some of the blockships ; it is probable
that they were exceedingly struck at the optimism of
all concerned.
An incident, illustrating the spirit of the men, may
be worth recording. It came to my ears that certain
of the engine-room personnel did not propose to re-
main below whilst the ship was alongside the Mole;
as they put it "they intended to land on the Mole for
a run round." Of course, that would never do, so the
ship's company were informed that, however much
their spirits might actuate their intentions, any man
who left his post during the action would be summa-
rily dealt with. They knew what that meant. Shortly
afterwards some stokers requested to interview their
officer. The interview was somewhat as follows:
"Me and my mates, sir, understand that we ain't
allowed to leave the stokehold and have a go at the
Hun," said their spokesman. "Of course not," inter-
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posed the officer; "you would be deserting your post
in action." "Well, sir," continued the stoker, "we
wants to know if we may guard the prisoners in the
stokehold." The request was not granted; it spelt too
much discomfort for the prisoners.
Soon the first possible date drew near.
In view of the eventual results it may be of interest
to recall the fact that on April 19th (three days before
we actually started) Admiral von Capelle, Secre-
tary for the German Navy, made a speech in which he
said: "Even the greatest pessimist must say that the
position of our opponents is deteriorating rapidly,
and that any doubt regarding the final success of the
U-boat war is unjustified."
I wonder if von Capelle remained an optimist much
longer.
Another German of high culture and position had
previously said, "Questions of right or wrong, justi-
fication or no justification, do not concern us. The
chief thing is that we are the stronger, and that if
anyone questions this fact we should smite him on the
mouth till he grows wiser."
Well, we did question the fact, and not only ques-
tioned it, but we put it to the test.
PART 11
*'Oiie crowded hour of glorious life
is worth an age without a name'*
FOREWORD
ABRIEF introduction to Part II of this bookmay assist the reader. The previous chaptershave dealt with the general idea of the
operation, the more important details of the plan, and
the preparatory work involved.
We are now approaching the actual events which
occurred during the operation itself as carried out at
the third attempt.
For reasons stated in Part I, Chapter III, I do not
propose to deal further with the enterprise at Ostende;
the preparatory work for the blocking of that place
has been fairly well covered in the foregoing pages.
As a matter of historical interest a list of all vessels
employed in the simultaneous operations at Zee-
brugge and Ostende is given in the Appendix. Doubt-
less the Ostende story will be told in due course by
one of those who took part in the operations at that
place.
Unless the reader's mind has clearly grasped our
intentions as portrayed in the Zeebrugge plan it may
be difficult to understand the connection between the
actual events which occurred. The more important
details of the plan have already been described, but
chiefly under the consideration of each separate phase
of the enterprise, or of the duties of each class of ves-
sel, rather than as related items of one complete
operation. It may be advisable, therefore, to describe
briefly the various phases, in their proper sequence.
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showing the relation between them, even if this in-
volves some repetition ; thus the way will be paved to
a detailed narrative of the several events which oc-
curred, and the reader, whilst following any particular
item, will be enabled to keep the whole picture in
view.
Briefly, then, the main points of the plan for the
blocking of Zeebrugge were as follows
:
The expedition was to cross the seas during the
afternoon and evening, stopping for a few minutes
about twenty miles from its destination for the pur-
pose of disembarking the surplus crews of the block-
ships. At about this time the first of the diversions,
in the form of aerial attacks, were to commence, to be
shortly followed by the opening of the long-range
bombardments. Meanwhile the expedition, working
to a prearranged time table, was to approach the
coast.
At given intervals during the approach small craft
were to be detached to carry out the duties of smoke
screening, of diversionary attacks, of locating the
destination, and of dealing with enemy vessels which
might emerge from their harbours or which were
already at sea.
Immediately following the long-range bombard-
ment, the storming vessels, having located the Mole,
were to proceed alongside the high outer wall and
land their storming parties over it to attack the Mole
batteries— this constituting the main diversion of
the enterprise. A few minutes later, the submarines,
having steamed into place beneath the railway via-
duct, were to blow up the railway. Twenty minutes
after the storming vessels were due to arrive along-
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side, the blockshlps were to pass round the end of the
Mole and were to make their dash for the canal en-
trance, running the gantlet of the shore batteries,
whilst the Mole attack was in full swing. On arriving
in the canal the blockers were to turn and sink their
ships across the navigable channel. Rescue craft
were to follow the blockships for the purpose of rescu-
ing the crews of the latter. Meanwhile, the various
diversions, the smoke screening, and the work of the
inshore supports, were to be continued sufficiently
long to enhance the chances of the rescue. After an
hour or so from the commencement of the attack on
the Mole all forces were to withdraw.
The foregoing brief summary serves to indicate
that at any given moment after the approach had
once commenced there would be many different events
taking place simultaneously.
For instance, early in the proceedings there would
be a combined aerial attack and long-range bom-
bardment whilst the main expedition, under cover
of darkness, was silently approaching over the mine-
fields, momentarily expectant of discovery by the
enemy's patrol vessels.
Later— say, ten minutes after the storming ves-
sels had arrived at the Mole— the storming parties
from Vindictive y Iris, and Daffodil would be attacking
the northeastern end of the Mole; Vindictive^s how-
itzers would be bombarding the shore batteries;
small craft would be bombing the central part of the
Mole; submarines would be blowing up the railway
viaduct ; the submarine's crews would be pulling away
for dear life; other small craft would be laying their
smoke screens close off the enemy's batteries and
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attacking German vessels on the inner side of the
Mole; the blockships would be nearing the Mole in
preparation for their final dash; patrol vessels, in
support, would be guarding the attackers from enemy-
craft; star shell and search-lights would be illuminat-
ing the darkness; the booming of heavy guns, the
yapping of quick-firers, and the crashing of shell
would provide a fitting accompaniment.
The enterprise was to be decidedly intensive. If
all went well the defence should certainly be mysti-
fied and not a little worried by the time the blockships
arrived in the picture.
Thus, and thus only, should we be following out
the maxim of Stonewall Jackson, "Always mystify,
mislead, and surprise the enemy."
The enterprise divides itself naturally into three
main phases, namely, the Approach, the Attack, and
the Retirement; as far as practicable Part II will de-
scribe each of these phases in turn, whilst dealing
more or less separately with the work of each class
of vessel.
CHAPTER I
THE START. THE OVERSEA PASSAGE
THE break of dawn on April 22, 191 8, the
first of the seven days of our tabulated period,
found many anxious individuals on deck
discussing the chances. There was an almost entire
absence of wind ; the sea was consequently as smooth
as the proverbial mill-pond. The general feeling
amongst us was that of straining-at-the-leash. We
had suffered two major disappointments during the
previous period, but we instinctively felt that we had
now arrived at a period of maximum anxiety— we
knew that the coming week would settle the matter
once and for all. Presently light airs from the north-
ward began to catspaw the glassy surface and to in-
crease in frequency and strength until they settled
down to a real northerly breeze. Our hopes ran high,
but the matter of visibility still claimed our atten-
tion. There was the usual early morning mist; this
was quickly dispelled when the sun rose above the
horizon. It soon became evident that our hopes for
misty weather were to be denied us. By 8 a.m. the
visibility was extreme, as they say in meteorological
circles; one's horizontal range of vision from ship-
board was only limited by one's height of eye above
the level of the sea. This condition, to say the least
of it, was disconcerting.
It would be high tide at Zeebrugge and Ostende
soon after midnight. Arrival at such an hour would
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entail making much of the oversea passage in broad
daylight, and this, as previously mentioned, would in
turn lead to grave risk of being seen by the German
patrols, whether the latter were in the air, on the sea
surface, or submerged keeping periscope watch. Al-
though this disadvantage might even lose us the ele-
ment of surprise on which we had concentrated so
much effort, any postponement of our departure until
the morrow would entail a reduction of our avail-
able perixDd by one-seventh. The armchair critic who
knows nought of such matters cannot easily conceive
either the difficulty of arriving at such decisions, or
the weight of responsibility which lies on the shoulders
of the man by whom the decision must be given.
Early in the forenoon it was evident that all con-
ditions except visibility were in favour of starting our
third attempt. Our hopes ran high in spite of the
fact that previous experience had shown us how
fickle the weather could be. Somehow we felt that
our chance had come at last.
We were in telephonic communication with Dover
via a lighthouse in the vicinity of our anchorage.
Perhaps the word "communication" rather exag-
gerates the actual facts of the case. The line appar-
ently passed through a certain holiday resort whose
telephone exchange was below par and whose opera-
tive, in the kindness of her heart, generally managed
to connect at least four persons simultaneously on
our particular line. The resulting cross talk, further
confused by the eternal argument between the tidal
stream and the telephone cable, and our impatience
at any and every interruption, with its resultant
increase of knowledge of the vernacular to the light-
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house crew, were hardly conducive to easy conversa-
tion on important matters. "Harold" was particularly
exasperating that morning. Having fixed "Mabel"
for lunch in a couple of hours, he apparently thought
it necessary to 'phone her details of his past.
To the Vice-Admiral at Dover fell the responsibility
of deciding whether we should start or not. After a
discussion on the telephone the die was cast— we
were ordered to "proceed in execution of previous
orders." The order was passed to the ships and the
requisite preparations were put in hand immediately.
We raised steam without delay. Baggage, final let-
ters, and all unnecessary paraphernalia were disem-
barked. Once again determination and expectancy
had expanded into enthusiasm. The time for "ac-
tion" had arrived.
I do not think we had any feelings of anxiety now
except with regard to the weather. Surely nothing
would prevent the culmination of all our hopes at
this eleventh hour. No suggestion of failure ever
occurred to us. Our confidence in the face of the many
obstacles, when considered in cold blood months after-
wards, may have seemed to be almost an imperti-
nence. Everybody knew exactly what was expected
of him. There was no actual excitement except
that inseparable from intense enthusiasm. Last-
minute orders or signals were not required, everything
worked just as smoothly as if we had been merely
starting off on a picnic.
Engines were reported "ready" shortly after lunch.
Just before weighing anchor I had gone below to don
my sea-boots and other appropriate "togs"; on re-
appearing on deck I found several ofiicers grouped for
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a final snapshot and was requested to join them.
Alas, that was indeed the last photograph for several
of them. The cheering which had taken place on
both the previous attempts was indulged in once
again as the ships proceeded to sea and was only
eclipsed by the cheers which welcomed the survivors
to Dover on the following day.
Of the earlier part of the oversea trip little need be
written. Vindictive took Iris and Daffodil in tow and
was closely followed by the blockships. In due course
the Dover forces were sighted; the combined force,
accompanied by aeroplanes, formed on Vindictive,
which was "Guide of the Fleet."
The fast motor boats and the two submarines were
taken in tow, and the Vice-Admiral, with his flag
flying in the Destroyer Warwick, directed the whole
movements and gave the signal to proceed as soon as
all were formed up. The visibility had already de-
creased and sufficient clouds were massing overhead
to revive our anxieties about the weather. Light
squadrons which had preceded us for the various
duties of "supporting" or "bombarding," etc., had
not reported any enemy patrol craft.
On board each ship eleventh-hour preparations
were being made— such as rigging stations for at-
tending the wounded, distributing first-aid packages,
passing hoses along in case of fire, fusing bombs and
shell, testing electric circuits, providing candle lamps
in case of electrical failures, grouping ammunition
round the guns, donning clean underclothing as a
guard against septic wounds, darkening ship to pre-
vent any warning of our approach, placing spare
charts in alternative positions, testing smoke-screen
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR ROGER J. B. KEYES
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apparatus and flame-throwers, and many other such
things
.
Before darkness set in a signal was received from
the Vice-Admiral reading "St. George for England."
It was reported to me as being a personal signal to
myself, but I subsequently ascertained that it was in-
tended as a general signal to be passed down the line
of ships. It was made in the semaphore code from
Warwick and has often been misquoted as a signal
hoisted with alphabetical flags.
One garbled version described the signal as having
been "flashed to all ships just before reaching the
Mole." This story of a flash-light having been used
just when the ships were endeavouring to take the
enemy by surprise under cover of darkness is really
too fantastic to pass uncontradicted. Believing it to
be a private signal, a reply was determined upon.
The reply ^ to the Admiral's signal, judged by the
ordinary standards, was somewhat impertinent, but
impertinence was in the air that afternoon. Inciden-
tally my signalman substituted the word "darned"
for "damned" and, when corrected, spelt the word
"dammed" as a compromise.
Our prearranged time table had laid down the exact
minute at which we were to pass through certain let-
tered positions, the latter being marked by buoys
placed by the surveying oflScers mentioned previously.
Position G was to be the parting of the ways, namely
the position at which the forces destined for the
inshore attacks on Zeebrugge and Ostende should
separate en route for their respective destinations.
That position was so chosen that the forces should
* May we give the Dragon's tail a damned good twist.
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arrive at their destinations simultaneously, making
due allowance for direction and strength of the tidal
stream and for actual ship-speed through the water.
This idea of simultaneous operations at the two places
was not the only important factor for consideration;
it was also necessary that all other phases of the at-
tack, such as long-range bombardments and aerial
attacks, should synchronise with the movements of
the blockships. It was, therefore, necessary to either
work exactly to schedule as laid down in the time
table or else inform all units of any change in the zero
time ; the latter being the minute at which Vindictive
should pass through position G. This in turn neces-
sitated forecasting the zero time as a result of the
observed times of passing the previous positions. We
had left position A a few minutes ahead of time and
passed through position D with barely a minute in
hand. "No alteration of zero time" was therefore
communicated to all units.
After passing position D the whole assembly of
vessels stopped for a few minutes for the triple pur-
pose of disembarking surplus blockship crews, as-
certaining the exact direction of wind (this informa-
tion being required for the use of the smoke screens),
and reforming into "approach order" after casting
off the tow of the submarines and small craft. It was
then pitch dark, the moon being entirely obscured
by clouds. It has been stated elsewhere that the
Intrepid did not disembark any of her surplus crews.
The small vessel detailed to take these men failed to
appear owing to a breakdown ; this must have pleased
the Intrepid^s surplus crew who, it will be remem-
bered, had shown a strong disinclination to leave their
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ship. To some extent Thetis and Iphigenia were
similarly placed; history relates that when the small
vessels arrived alongside many members of the surplus
crews could not be found, so anxious were they to
complete the operation which they had begun so well.
No time was lost in reforming the squadron and
we started off again for position G. At about this time
all conditions of wind and sea were still favourable,
but slight rain had begun to fall and to reduce the
already very limited visibility. The rain thus pro-
vided the first of the incidents which could not be
foreseen.
The result of the rain was twofold. Firstly, it
somewhat delayed the commencement of the long-
range bombardment on Zeebrugge owing to the re-
duction in visibility rendering the monitor's position
doubtful. Secondly, and far more important, it acted
very adversely against the use of aircraft. The diffi-
culty and danger of flying in wet weather is too well
known to need enlargement here, but the difficulty
of locating the positions which were to be bombed
was enormously increased. As related elsewhere our
aerial bombers had made a magnificent attack on the
occasion of our first attempt and they had become
none the less determined to render a good account of
themselves when the operation finally took place.
Imagine their intense disappointment. It was not
difficult for those who knew the splendid work of our
Air Force to realise that they would stop at nothing
to achieve their object. In spite of all the difficulties
it is impossible to conceive of greater determination
than was shown, but the rain rendered the attack
impossible. The losses amongst these very gallant
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airmen amounted to a high percentage of those who
started on their errand.
At position G the Ostende blockships parted com-
pany; inwardly we wished them the best of luck.
The main portion of the oversea passage having
been completed, the "Approach" now commenced.
CHAPTER II
THE APPROACH
AFTER zero time the remaining units kept in
close company until such times as each, ac-
cording to their respective instructions, was
deputed to proceed independently to carry out its
particular duty.
The force was preceded by the Vice-Admiral in
Warwick with some half a dozen other craft in com-
pany ready to fall upon and destroy any enemy patrol
vessels which might be encountered. We were now
steaming through the German mined areas and were
hoping against hope that no mines would be touched
to the main detriment of the element of surprise. If
any mine had exploded the enemy could not have
failed to have their suspicions aroused. The rain
gradually increased and the wind became more fitful.
Hot soup was distributed to the men in Vindictive
2it about 10.30 P.M. and a "tot" of rum was served
out about an hour later to those who desired it.
About fifty minutes before midnight the hawser
with which Vindictive was towing Iris and Daffodil
suddenly parted. It was then too late to retake these
vessels in tow and, indeed, it would have been a diffi-
cult and dangerous task in the rain and inky darkness
with so many vessels in close company, to say nothing
of the loss of time and the obstacle to accurate navi-
gation. Speed had to be somewhat eased temporarily
to allow Vindictive to drop back to her original posi-
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tion relative to the other vessels. In accordance with
the plan the blockships eased speed for the purpose
of arriving at the Mole some twenty minutes after
Vindictive.
We were momentarily expecting to meet the Ger-
man patrol vessels and to be discovered from the
shore. Suddenly a light-buoy was seen. A hurried
bearing laid down on the chart agreed exactly with
the reported position of a buoy off Blankenberghe.
Incidentally a captured prisoner had recently stated
that this buoy had been withdrawn or moved else-
where, but we had promulgated its original position
to all concerned because we suspected that this par-
ticular individual was a disciple of Ananias. This
agreement between our position by "dead-reckoning"
and that of the buoy was decidedly heartening, for
we had obtained no "fix" for several miles and were
running through a cross tidal stream of doubtful
strength.
The difficulties attached to forecasting the move-
ments of tidal streams were borne out in the case of
the bombarding monitors, H.M.S. Erebus and Terror.
In addition to being somewhat hampered by the low
visibility resulting from the rain, these vessels, on
arrival at their firing positions, discovered that the
tidal stream was flowing in exactly the opposite direc-
tion to that anticipated; this, in turn, caused some
delay in opening fire, but, as events subsequently
showed, the delay was of no great consequence. The
bombardment was carried out without any further
hitch. The Germans do not appear to have been able
to locate the monitors until the firing was nearly com-
pleted. The few German shell which burst in the
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vicinity of the firing ships were doubtless directed by
some means of sound-ranging and direction-finding.
On finishing the bombardment the monitors took up
their positions for covering the subsequent retirement
of the attacking forces.
It may be stated here that, barring the impossl-
bihty of aerial attack, the delay in commencing the
long-range bombardment, and the parting of the
towing hawser, there was no hitch of any kind suffi-
cient to alter the general idea of the enterprise.
Everything was carried out to schedule time.
Soon after passing the Blankenberghe light-buoy
the enemy appeared to suspect that something more
than a bombardment was afoot. Star shell were fired
to seaward and searchlights were switched on. That
was exactly what we had hoped for. If only they
would continue to illuminate the atmosphere our
navigational diflficulties would be enormously reduced.
The star shell were extraordinary. They burst with a
loud report just overhead and lit up our surroundings
to the maximum of the then visibility. Much to our
surprise no enemy vessels were encountered or even
seen; presumably the enemy set the greater depend-
ence on their mines.
To the southward, that is, between us and the
shore, our smoke-screeners had laid down a "pea-
soup " fog. Nothing was to be seen in that direction
except the glare of searchlights and of gun flashes,
the latter being presumably directed against the fast
motor boats which had run into the anchorage behind
the Mole for the purpose of torpedoing vessels secured
alongside. At this stage the wind died away com-
pletely and the rain was heavier than ever.
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In Vindictive we took up our action stations. Our
battery guns had been instructed not to open fire
until it was certain that our individual presence had
been discovered. The guns in the fighting-top on our
foremast were in readiness to engage. Rocket men
had been stationed to fire illuminating flares for the
purpose of locating the Mole. The storming parties
were under cover awaiting the order to storm the
Mole. The cable party were in the forecastle standing
by to drop anchor at the foot of the high wall. Other
parties with wire hawsers were stationed to assist the
Daffodil in her important task of pushing Vindictive
bodily alongside. Crews were standing by the bomb-
mortars and flame-throwers for clearing the Mole
before sending the stormers over the wall. The En-
gineering and Stokehold personnel were at their sta-
tions below for giving immediate response to all re-
quirements from the conning positions. The first
lieutenant— Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Roso-
man, R.N.— was in the conning tower, from where
the ship was being steered by the quartermaster, in
readiness to take over the handling of the ship im-
mediately I was rendered hors de combat. It was a de-
cidedly tense period, but there were others to follow.
At a given moment by watch-time Vindictive al-
tered course towards the Mole— or rather towards
the position where it was hoped to find the Mole.
Almost immediately we ran into the smoke screen.
The wind had now changed to an off-shore direction,
diametrically opposite to that on which the screening
plans had been based. I thought at the time that this
smoke screen was the thickest on record— that
opinion was changed later.
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The visibility at this time can hardly have amounted
to a yard— the forecastle was invisible from the
bridge. The firing of star shells and guns, and the
flashing of searchlights became more frequent. Vin-
dictive was being conned from the flame-thrower hut
on the port end of the conning-tower platform. This
position was especially suitable in that it plumbed
over the ship's side and thus provided a very good
outlook for berthing at the Mole. There was a curi-
ous absence of excitement. Even the continued repe-
tition of the question, "Are you all right, sir.^"' from
my first lieutenant— a prearranged idea to ensure
a quick change over of command— became monot-
onous. Nothing had yet been seen of the Mole from
Vindictive. This comparatively quiet period was not
of long duration.
CHAPTER III
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATTACK
AFEW seconds before the schedule time forthe last alteration of course— designed totake us alongside the outer wall— the smoke
screen, which had been drifting northwards before the
new wind, suddenly cleared. Barely three hundred
yards distant, dead ahead of us, appeared a long low
dark object which was immediately recognised as the
Mole itself with the lighthouse at its extremity. We
had turned up heading direct for the six-gun battery
exactly as arranged in the plan. Those who know
aught of navigation will realise how far this was a
fluke — probably the various errors in compass di-
rection, allowance for tide, etc., had exactly cancelled
one another. Course was altered immediately to the
southwestward and speed was increased to the ut-
most.
The Mole battery opened fire at once; our own
guns, under the direction of Commander E. O. B. S.
Osborne, replied with the utmost promptitude. The
estimated distance at which we passed the Mole
battery was two hundred and fifty yards off the
eastern gun, gradually lessening to fifty yards off the
western gun. It was truly a wonderful sight. The
noise was terrific and the flashes of the Mole guns
seemed to be within arm's length. Of course it was,
to all intents and purposes, impossible for the M-ole
guns to miss their target. They literally poured pro-
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jectiles into us. In about five minutes we had reached
the Mole, but not before the ship had suffered a great
amount of damage to both materiel and personnel.
Looked at from the view of a naval officer it was
little short of criminal, on the part of the Mole bat-
tery, that the ship was allowed to reach her destina-
tion. Everything was in favour of the defence as soon
as we had been sighted. Owing to the change of wind
our special arrangements for covering the battery
with smoke had failed in spite of the magnificent work
of our small smoke vessels which, unsupported and
regardless of risk, had laid the screen close to the foot
of the wall, that is to say, right under the muzzles of
the guns. From the moment when we were first
sighted until arriving alongside the Mole the battery
guns had a clear target, illuminated by star shell, of a
size equal to half the length of the lighthouse exten-
sion itself.
To my mind the chief reasons for our successful
running of the gantlet were twofold, firstly, the fact
that we were so close, and secondly, the splendid
manner in which our guns' crews stuck to their work.
With regard to the former, a longer range would have
entailed more deliberate firing, and this in turn would
have given time for more deliberate choice of point of
aim. A few projectiles penetrating the engine or boiler
rooms, or holing us at the water-line, would have
settled the matter. The range being so short one can
conjecture that the German gunners, realising that
they could not miss, pumped ammunition into us at
the utmost speed of which their guns were capable
without regard to the particular damage which they
were likely to cause. Their loss of serenity, due in the
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first place to the novel circumstances of the case,
must have been considerably augmented by the fact
that our own projectiles were hitting the wall near the
gun muzzles— it was too much to hope that we
should actually obtain any hits on the guns them-
selves.
The petty officer at one of our six-inch guns, when
asked afterwards what ranges he fired at, said that
he reckoned he opened fire at about two hundred
yards and he continued till close to the Mole. "How
close.?" he was asked. "Reckoning from the gun
muzzle," he replied, " I should say it was about three
feet!"
One can picture the situation as seen from the Mole
itself. A hostile vessel suddenly looming out of the
fog at point-blank range, the intense excitement
which resulted, the commencement of fire, the burst-
ing of shell on the wall, the ardent desire to hit some-
thing as rapidly and as often as possible, the natural
inclination to fire at the nearest object, namely, that
part of the vessel on their own level, and the realisa-
tion that in a few moments the guns would no longer
bear on the target. One can imagine the thoughts that
were uppermost in their minds, "Hit her, smash her,
pump it in, curse those guns of hers, don't lose a
second of time, blow her to bits!" One cannot blame
those gunners. To use a war-time expression, "They
had the wind up." We had counted on that, we had
concentrated all our efforts at "putting the wind up."
Yet if anybody had seriously suggested that a ship
could steam close past a shore battery in these modem
days of gunnery he would have been laughed to scorn.
Yet it was easy. The reason is not far to seek.
GUN-FIRE FROM THE MOLE i8i
Those who worship materiel have followed a false
god. The crux of all fighting lies with the personnel—
a fact borne out again and again on this particular
night just as throughout past history. If the German
gunners had been superhuman this tale would not
have been told, but human nature, reckoned with by
the attackers, was on our side; the initiative was ours.
The material damage was very great, but, though
it may sound paradoxical, of not much importance.
The upper works and upper deck of the ship received
the brunt of it. The most serious matter was the
damage to our gangways. Several were shot away and
many others damaged beyond further usefulness and,
so far as could be observed at the time, only four were
left us for the work in hand. Two heavy shell pene-
trated the ship's side below the upper deck. One passed
in just beneath the foremost flame-thrower hut and
burst on impact. The other came through within a
few feet of the first and wrecked everything in its
vicinity. Two other heavy shell came through the
screen door to the forecastle and placed one of the
howitzer guns out of action. The funnels, ventilators,
bridges, chart-house, and all such were riddled through
and through.
The damage to the personnel was exceedingly
serious. Orders had been given that the storming par-
ties should remain below, under cover, until the ship
arrived alongside. The number of personnel in ex-
posed positions was to be limited mainly to those
manning the guns, rocket apparatus, and flame-
throwers. The senior oflficers of the storming parties,
however, stationed themselves in the most handy
position for leading and directing the assault, with
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the result that they were exposed to the full blast of
the hurricane fire from the Mole battery. Military
officers had always acted in a similar manner what-
ever their instructions might be. One cannot help
feeling that in any fighting service, where discipline
is based on leadership rather than on mere driving
force, officers will do the same thing. Captain Hala-
han, commanding the naval storming forces, who had
repeatedly told me this was to be his last fight, was
shot down and killed at the outset. Commander Ed-
wards, standing near him on the gangway deck, was
also shot down and completely incapacitated. Colonel
Elliot, commanding the Marine storming forces, and
his second-in-command. Major Cordner, were killed
on the bridge, where they had taken up a commanding
position in full view of the gangway deck. Many
others were killed or wounded. The death of so many
brave men was a terrible blow. Nobody knew better
than they the tremendous risk attached to their
actions— the pity of it was that they should not have
lived to see the success for which they were so largely
responsible.
At one minute past midnight the ship actually
arrived alongside the Mole, one minute late on
schedule time, having steamed alongside at sixteen
knots speed. The engines were immediately reversed
at full speed and the ship bumped the Mole ver}^
gently on the specially constructed fender fitted on
the port bow.
The conning position in the flame-thrower hut was
well chosen, our heads being about five feet above the
top of the Mole wall. We had previously devoted
many hours to studying photographs of the Mole
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with the idea of recognising objects thereon. Our
aerial confreres had photographed every portion of
the Mole from almost every conceivable angle with
both ordinary and stereoscopic cameras. We had also
had picture post-cards and other illustrations at our
disposal. Though none of us had ever actually seen
the Mole itself we felt pretty sure of being able to
recognise any portion of it immediately. In that we
were over-confident. The smoke, the intermittent
glare and flashes, the alternating darkness and the
unceasing rain, added to the disturbance of one's at-
tention caused by the noise and the explosion of shell,
rendered observation somewhat difficult. As far as
we could see we were to the westward of our desired
position. The engines were, therefore, kept at full
speed astern and the ship, aided by the three-knot
tide running to the eastward, rapidly drifted in that
direction. When sufficient sternway had been gath-
ered the engines were put to full speed ahead to check
her. A low building was then observed on the Mole
abreast the ship, but it was not recognised immedi-
ately as the northeastern shed (No. 3), which we had
expected to appear much larger. The distance in the
uncertain light was also very deceptive, the building
in question appearing to be situated within a few feet
of the outer wall, whereas it must have been at least
forty-five yards away.
But time was pressing. Our main diversion had
certainly commenced, but at all costs we must have
it fully developed before the blockships arrived at
twenty minutes past midnight. The order was there-
fore given to let go the starboard anchor. A voice
tube, for this purpose, led from the flame-thrower hut
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to the cable deck. The order was certainly not given
sotto voce. But the noise at this time was terrific. I
could not be certain whether the order was received
as no answer was heard in reply. Certainly the an-
chor was not let go. Meanwhile the engines were
ordered at full speed astern and full speed ahead al-
ternately to keep the ship in position ; the manner in
which these orders were carried out by the engine-
room staff, under the command of Engineer Lieu-
tenant-Commander Bury, was admirable. No reply
being forthcoming to questions as to the delay in
anchoring, Rosoman left the conning tower and went
below to investigate. The din had now reached a
crescendo. Every gun that would bear appeared to
be focused on our upper works, which were being hit
every few seconds. Our guns in the fighting-top were
pouring out a continuous hail of fire in reply. One
could aptly say that we could hardly hear ourselves
think.
At last I had news from the cable deck— this was
a great relief as I feared that the two heavy shell
which burst between decks had killed all the anchor-
ing party. The starboard anchor had jammed some-
where. It had been previously lowered to the water's
edge and nothing was holding the cable, but it refused
to budge. The port anchor was, therefore, dropped
at the foot of the wall and the ship allowed to drop
astern until a hundred yards of cable had been
veered. The cable was then secured.
The ship immediately swung bodily out from the
Mole. With the helm to starboard she swung in
again, but with her bows so tight against the Mole,
and her stern so far out, that the foremost gangways
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just failed to reach the top of the wall. With the helm
amidships the ship lay parallel to the wall, but no
gangways would reach. With the helm to port the
ship again swung away from the Mole. This was an
exceedingly trying situation. Everything now de-
pended upon the Dafodil (Lieutenant H. G. Camp-
bell).
It will be remembered that, as a result of the tow-
ing hawser having parted, and in consequence of our
increase of speed when running alongside, the Iris
and Daffodil had been left behind. We knew that
whatever happened we could absolutely depend on
Gibbs ^ and Campbell making short work of any sur-
mountable difficulty, and our trust was not misplaced.
They must have cut off a considerable corner to have
arrived as early as they did. The Iris steamed past us
at her utmost speed, which was very slow, and went
alongside the Mole about a hundred yards ahead of
Vindictive exactly as laid down in the Plan. Of her
more anon.
After we had been struggling against our difficulties
alongside for about five minutes Dafodil suddenly
appeared steaming straight for our foremast in a di-
rection perpendicular to the Mole. Campbell pushed
her nose against us, hawsers were passed to his vessel,
and he shoved us bodily alongside the Mole, exactly
in accordance with the Plan. Really he might have
been an old stager at tug-master's work, pursuing his
vocation in one of our own harbours, judging by the
cool manner in which he carried out his instructions
to the letter.
Immediately the two foremost gangways reached
* Commander Valentine F. Gibbs.
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the wall they were lowered until they rested on it.
No other gangways were then available. The order
was at once passed to "Storm the Mole."
Owing to the light wind of the preceding day we
had not expected to find any swell against the wall.
The scend of the sea, however, was so heavy and so
confused, as each wave rebounded, that the ship was
rolling considerably. Every time she rolled over to
port there was a heavy jarring bump which was
probably caused by the bilge on the port side of the
ship crashing down on the step of the Mole some few
feet below the surface. The whole ship was shaking
violently at each bump and rolling so heavily that we
were greatly apprehensive of sustaining vital damage
below the water-line.
The Stokes gun batteries had already been bombing
the Mole abreast the ship. The flame-throwers should
also have helped to clear the way for our storming
parties. The order had been given to switch on the
foremost flame-thrower. Unfortunately the pipe lead-
ing from the containers to the hut had been severed
somewhere below by a shell explosion. This was not
noticed before the order was obeyed, with the result
that many gallons of highly inflammable oil were
squirted over the decks. One hesitates to think what
would have happened if this oil had become ignited.
Incidentally the actual nozzle of this flame-thrower
was shot away just after the order to switch on had
been given by the officer in charge, Lieutenant A. L.
Eastlake, attached R.E., who held the proud position
of being the sole representative of the military on
board the attacking vessels. Eastlake was the only
other occupant of the hut and I don't think he will
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easily forget the brief period that we experienced in
that decidedly uncomfortable erection. Sparks were
flying about inside, but somehow, at the time, one
did not connect that pyrotechnic display with the
fact that they emanated from the medley of missiles
passing through it. Curiously enough neither of us
was hit, but our clothing sadly needed repair— an
experience which was common enough in shore fight-
ing, but unusual afloat where the missiles are gener-
ally rather too large to pass through one's headgear
without removing one's head en route.
The other flame-thrower fared no better. Com-
mander Brock was in charge. He lit the ignition ap-
paratus and passed down the order to "switch on."
The whole outfit of oil ran its course, but unfortu-
nately at the very commencement the ignition appa-
ratus was shot away, with the result that the instru-
ment was converted into an oil thrower instead of
emitting a flame.
Lieutenant-Commander B. F. Adams, leading a
party of seamen, stormed the Mole immediately the
gangways were placed. The only two gangways
which could reach the Mole were, to say the least of
it, very unsteady platforms. Their inboard ends were
rising and falling several feet as the ship rolled; the
outer ends were see-sawing and sliding backwards and
forwards on the top of the wall. My own personal im-
pression at the time was that these gangways were
alternately lifting off and resting on the wall, but
apparently that was not so. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the run across these narrow gangways with
a thirty-foot drop beneath to certain death was not
altogether inviting.
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The first act of the advance party, in accordance
with the instructions, was to secure the ship to the
wall by means of the grappling anchors. A great
struggle to do this was undertaken. The foremost
grappling anchors only just reached the Mole. Some
men sat on the top of the wall and endeavoured to
pull the grapnels over the top as they were lowered
from the ship. These grapnels, by virtue of the use
for which they were designed, were heavy. That
fact, combined with the continuous rolling of the ship,
made it exceedingly difficult to control them. Roso-
man and a party of men on board joined in the strug-
gle, but a heavy lurch of the ship broke up the davit
on which the foremost grappling iron was slung and
the latter fell between the ship and the wall.
Adams' party were followed out in great style by
the remainder of the seamen storming parties led by
their surviving officers, and then by the Marines. I
propose to tell later of what occurred on the Mole
itself in so far as I have been able to gather from the
parties concerned.
As soon as it was clear that the grappling anchors
had failed us owing to the heavy swell there was no
other alternative than to order Dafodil to carry on
pushing throughout the proceedings.
A curious incident which has never been explained
occurred just previously. Some individual in Vin-
dictive had hailed Daffodil and called to them to shove
off. "By whose orders.?" came the response shouted
by Campbell from DaffodiPs bridge. "Captain Hala-
han's orders," was the reply. As a matter of fact poor
gallant Halahan had been killed some ten minutes
earlier. "I take my orders from Captain Carpenter,"
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shouted Campbell. "He's dead," was shouted back.
"I don't believe it," responded Campbell, and inci-
dentally he was right, though I have not the faintest
idea what he based his belief on. As Mark Twain
would have said, " the report of my death was much
exaggerated." The incident was certainly curious,
but of course (this for the benefit of those who, during
the war, saw spies and traitors at every corner) there
can only be the explanation that some poor wounded
fellow must have been delirious.
Campbell had been shot in the face, but such a
trifle as that did not appear to have worried him, and
he continued to push the Vindictive alongside from the
moment of his arrival until the whole hour and five
minutes had elapsed before we left the Mole. Origi-
nally the Daffodil had been detailed to secure alongside
Vindictive as soon as the latter was secured to the
Mole and then to dis-embark her demolition parties
for their work on the Mole. That part of the plan
could not be carried out, however, though several
of his parties climbed over her bows into Vindictive
on their way to accomplish it.
The demolition charges had been stowed outside
the conning tower ready for use ; on the passage across
we had come to the conclusion that this was a case of
risking the success of the whole landing for the fur-
therance of a secondary object, and the charges had
therefore been removed to a safer position. This
change of arrangement was indeed fortunate, for the
deck on both sides of the conning tower became a
regular shambles during the final approach. Yeoman
of Signals John Buckley, who had volunteered to
take up a position outside the conning tower in readi-
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ness to fire illuminating rockets had remained at his
post until killed. We found him there at the foot of
his rocket tube in the morning, a splendid fellow who
had been as helpful in the work of preparation as he
was unflinching in the face of almost certain death.
All the signalmen except one had been either killed or
completely disabled, and almost every soul on the
conning-tower platform had made the supreme sac-
rifice.
On the order being given to storm the Mole the
storming parties had rushed up every available ladder
to the gangway deck. At the top of the foremost lad-
der the men, in their eagerness to get at the enemy,
were stumbling over a body. I had bent down to drag
it clear when one of the men shouted: "That's Mr.
Walker, sir, he 's had his arm shot off." Immediately
Walker, who was still conscious, heard this he waved
his remaining hand to me and wished me the best
of luck. This officer. Lieutenant H. T. C. Walker,
survived.
The high wall, towering above our upper deck, was
now protecting the hull of the ship from gun-fire ; no
vital damage could be sustained in that way so long
as we remained alongside. The chief source of danger
from which vital damage might accrue before we had
completed our work at the Mole was that of the fast
German motor boats stationed at Blankenberghe.
The latter harbour was barely five minutes' steaming
distance away, and, as the enemy would now be fully
cognisant of our position, we might reasonably expect
a horde of these craft to come to the attack with
torpedo. It does not require much naval knowledge
to realise that the diflaculty of avoiding torpedo fire
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under such circumstances would be wellnigh insuper-
able. Where a torpedo craft of that description can
suddenly rush in from the outer darkness a large ves-
sel has to depend upon remaining unseen; but of
course such tactics were now impossible, and, still
further, a torpedo could not be avoided even if seen
coming towards the ship. That we were not attacked
in that manner was mainly due to the work of certain
of our smaller craft specially detailed to deal with the
Blankenberghe force; former experience of the latter
also led us to believe that the German personnel in
those boats had no stomach for a fight.
Our guns in the fighting-top were directing a mur-
derous fire into their special targets. Chief amongst
those were the heavy gun battery at the end of the
broad part of the Mole and the lighter battery on the
lighthouse extension. In neither case could the ene-
my's guns bear on the ship, and we had the advantage
of taking the former battery from the rear and giving
the latter a taste of enfilading fire from its western
flank. But there was another target of importance.
Immediately abreast the ship a German destroyer
was berthed alongside the inner wharf of the Mole
only eighty yards distant from the ship. We had an
uninterrupted view of the greater part of her between
the two northern sheds, her bridges showing well
above the ground-level of the Mole. Our guns in the
fighting-top, in charge of Lieutenant Charles N. B.
Rigby, R.M.A., riddled that destroyer through and
through. We could see the projectiles hitting the
Mole floor whenever the gun was temporarily de-
pressed, and then shower upon shower of sparks as
they tore through the destroyer's upperworks. The
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vessel appeared to have sunk, as very little of her
upper deck could be seen, although we had such an
elevated view-point, but now I think it possible that
the wall protected her vitals and that she escaped
complete destruction from our gun-fire.
There seems little doubt that our fighting-top was
now coming In for the attention of most of the enemy
guns. Presently a tremendous crash overhead fol-
lowed by a cessation of our fire indicated that a heavy
shell had made havoc with poor Rigby and his crew
of eight men. As a matter of fact, that shell had
wrecked the whole fighting-top, killed all the per-
sonnel except two gunners who were both severely
wounded, and dismounted one of the guns. The only
survivor who was not completely disabled — Sergeant
Finch, R.M.A. — struggled out from the shambles
somehow and, without a thought for his own wounds,
examined the remaining gun, found it was still intact,
and continued the fight single-handed. He continued
to serve this gun and again did great execution until
a second shell completely destroyed the remains of
the top and put Finch completely out of action. The
splendid work of Lieutenant Rigby and his guns'
crews had been invaluable, and one cannot but at-
tribute the complete success of our diversion very
largely to these gallant men. Rigby himself had set a
wonderful example; all who knew him had never
doubted that he would do so. Finch survived and
was afterwards voted the Victoria Cross by the men
of the Royal Marines.
As soon as the ship had been securely anchored the
howitzer guns manned by the R.M.A., in charge
of Captain Reginald Dallas-Brooks, R.M.A., com-
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menced to bombard the targets specially assigned to
them. The German batteries on the mainland were
shelling our position at the Mole for all they were
worth, but their efforts must have been hampered by
the continuous fire of our howitzers. The presence of
such weapons on board ship was, to say the least of it,
most unusual. Findictive^s nature had undergone an
unusual change as soon as she was secured to the
Mole. Our position was known to within a few yards.
Both direction and range of the enemy's batteries
had been worked out beforehand for any position
alongside the wall. We were, therefore, in the novel
situation of being able to drop heavy howitzer shell
upon the enemy's batteries less than a mile away, a
decided change from ordinary battleship target prac-
tice where ranges of ten to fifteen miles were the order
of the day.
The y.S-inch howitzer gun on the forecastle could
not be used. A heavy shell had burst amongst the
original gun's crew and had killed or disabled them all.
A second crew was sent from one of the naval six-inch
guns in the battery and was just being detailed to
work the howitzer when another shell killed, or dis-
abled, all but two men. Soon after opening fire the
midship 7.5-inch howitzer was damaged by another
shell which killed some of the crew, but the remainder
repaired the gun under great difficulty and managed
to resume the firing later on. The eleven-inch how-
itzer on the quarter-deck was extremely well han-
dled. This gun fired at a steady rate throughout the
proceedings in spite of the darkness, the fumes, the
difficulty of manhandling such large projectiles in a
cramped-up space and the battering that the ship was
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receiving around them. The behaviour of the R.M.A.
throughout was fine; they worked with a will which
may have been equalled elsewhere, but which has cer-
tainly never been surpassed ; the example set by Cap-
tain Brooks was altogether splendid.
Mention must be made of the pyrotechnic party,
as we called them. Having located and reached the
Mole ourselves, an early duty was that of indicating
its extremity to the approaching blockships. For this
purpose a rocket station was rigged up in my cabin
below. The rocket apparatus protruded through a
port in the stern of the ship and had been placed at an
angle calculated to carry the rocket behind the light-
house before bursting, so that the lighthouse would
show clearly against an illuminated background. One
of the party was told off for this position, instructed
as to the object to be attained, and ordered to carry
on according to his own judgment. I believe this man
had never previously served afloat and had never been
in action, but, like the rest of them, he did his bit
without the slightest hesitation and, judging by re-
sults, with one hundred per cent efficiency. Others of
the pyrotechnic brigade landed with the storming
parties and worked the portable flame-throwers, spe-
cial flares, etc., before finally attending the smoke-
making apparatus and assisting with the wounded.
Lieutenant Graham S. Hewett, R.N.V.R., was in
command of the pyrotechnic party.
A few minutes after the storming of the Mole had
commenced a terrific explosion was seen away to the
westward, and we guessed that the submarine party
had attacked the viaduct. A seaman was standing
near me at the time and brought back to me an old
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remark of mine, referred to on page 120, when he
asked, "Was that it, sir?" The explosion presented
a wonderful spectacle. The flames shot up to a great
height — one mentally considered it at least a mile.
Curiously enough the noise of the explosion could not
be distinguished. The experiences of the submarines
will be related presently.
At about 12.15 A.M. the blockships were expected
to be close to the Mole, and a momentary glimpse of
them was obtained as they passed close to the light-
house on their way to the canal entrance. So far so
good. We saw nothing more of the blockships and
received no further news of them until the operation
had been completed. Nevertheless, no news was good
news under the circumstances and we felt quite con-
fident that the blockships had not been seriously
hampered by the German Mole defences. Our pri-
mary object was, therefore, attained; the diversion
had been of sufficient magnitude.
Our further tasks were firstly that of continuing the
diversion until the crews of the blockships had had
a reasonable chance of being rescued subsequent to
sinking their vessels in the canal, secondly of re-
embarking our storming parties and withdrawing to
seaward, and thirdly of carrying out demolition work
on the Mole during our stay alongside. It will be no-
ticed that these three tasks are not mentioned in their
proper sequence of event but in their order of impor-
tance. It is obviously true that demolition work might
be of assistance from the point of view of diversion,
but not to a great extent when one realises that the
enemy were already so animated with a desire to
destroy our ship that they would hardly care one way
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or the other what our particular action on the Mole
might be. The presence of the ship was the main di-
version and so, at all costs, the ship must be kept
alongside until the diversion was no longer required
and until our storming parties had returned.
At about half an hour after midnight the full force
of the diversion had been developed. Although the
ship was still being hit continuously and the inferno
showed no signs of abatement one can say that the
conditions had become stabilised. As far as we could
gather we could not augment our efforts, but could
only carry on for the time being. So we carried on.
Being somewhat anxious as to the state of things
between decks I took the opportunity of a hurried
visit below. On my way down from the bridge I met
Lieutenant E. Hilton-Young, R.N.V.R., our parlia-
mentary representative. He was attired in his shirt-
sleeves and minus any head-gear. His right arm was
bandaged. I remember that he was breaking all the
accepted rules of the drill-book by smoking a large
cigar as he performed his prearranged duties of super-
vising the foremost six-inch guns and his self-ap-
pointed duty of cheering everybody up. On enquiry
he informed me that he had "got one in the arm."
I heard afterwards that even when he had collapsed,
he refused to have his wound attended to, and had
to be taken below by force. Eventually his right arm
had to be amputated, but with his unfailing resource
he did not let many hours pass by before commencing
to educate himself in the art of left-handed writing.
Every available space on the mess deck was occu-
pied by casualties. Those who could do so were sitting
on the mess stools awaiting their turn for medical
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attention. Many were stretched at full length on the
deck, the majority being severely wounded. Some
had already collapsed and were in a state of coma; I
fear that many had already passed away. It was a sad
spectacle indeed. Somehow, amidst all the crashing
and smashing on deck, one had not realised the sac-
rifice that was taking place.
During a fight at sea the personnel below know
little or nothing of how things are going. This espe-
cially applies to the stokehold and engine-room per-
sonnel, who are, indeed, in an unenviable position.
It applies, also, to the wounded who have been car-
ried below. It is not difficult to imagine their feelings,
especially when one considers how rapidly a vessel
may sink after sustaining a vital injury. One does
not need to be an advanced psychologist to under-
stand the importance of keeping those stationed be-
tween decks supplied with information as to what is
occurring on deck. So I shouted out something about
everything going splendidly, the Mole being stormed,
the viaduct being blown up and the blockships having
passed in. The cheer that went up will live long in my
memory. Those who could stand crowded round and
forgot their wounds. Some of those on the deck en-
deavoured to sit up to ascertain the news. I did not
then know that I had been reported as killed. The
crowd almost barred my way in their excitement, and
the question which caught my ear more than any
other was, " Have we won, sir .? Hiave we won ? " just
as if the whole affair had been a football match.
The medical officers and their assistants, under
the direction of Staff-Surgeon McCutcheon, were
working at the highest pressure. The wounded were
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literally pouring down every available ladder in a
constant stream. Dressing stations had been impro-
vised at intervals along the deck. The ward-room and
the sick bay being the two main stations. Everything
humanly possible was being done to render first-aid
and to alleviate suffering. There was no lack of ready
helpers. All those of the latter who could do so were
bringing the wounded down. Many of the less se-
verely wounded were attending to those others who
were badly hit. A Marine with his own head band-
aged up was supporting in his arms an officer who
was unconscious with a terrible wound in the head,
and only relaxed his hold when the officer died. The
work of McCutcheon and his confreres was beyond
all praise; untiring energy, consummate care, and
withal real brotherly bearing characterised their
actions.
The news of the blockships spread quickly, and one
heard every now and then renewed outbursts of cheer-
ing. The news had reached the stokehold and did
much to relieve the tension amongst the personnel in
that part of the ship. A few pieces of shell had fallen
into the engine room, but no damage had been done.
A return to the lower bridge showed little apparent
change in the situation. Shell were still hitting us
every few seconds and many casualties were being
caused by flying splinters. Large pieces of the funnels
and ventilators were being torn out and hurled in all
directions— one wondered how much more of this
battering the ship could stand. The exact nature of
the various missiles and the direction from whence
they came were of course unknown to us. It was
afterwards suggested that the shore guns to the west-
ANXIETY FOR THE DAFFODIL 199
ward of Blankenberghe were doing much of the mis-
chief. Certainly our position, tangential to the Mole,
brought such a thing into the realm of possibility, but
it would seem doubtful whether those German bat-
teries, from which we were probably invisible, would
risk hitting their own guns on the Mole from that
flanking direction. However, all our guns which could
fire at the enemy were fully occupied in accordance
with the prearranged plan, so there was no particular
object in ascertaining the position of new targets.
Our chief anxiety at this period was the safety of
Daffodil, which seemed to bear a charmed life. Fin-
dictive^s hull was amply protected by the wall itself,
but Daffodil was far more exposed. As already men-
tioned the loss oi Daffodil would almost certainly have
entailed the loss of the whole of the storming parties
on the Mole.
CHAPTER IV
THE FIGHT ON THE MOLE. H.M.S. IRIS
AS soon as the two foremost gangways reachedthe wall a party ofseamen led by Lieutenant-
Commander Adams had commenced the
storming of the Mole. Lieutenant-Commander A. L.
Harrison, the senior officer of the seamen storming
parties, had been wounded in the head and was too
dazed to land on the Mole until later. Commander
Brock, having completed his duties in the aft flame-
thrower hut, also stormed the Mole.
Adams and a handful of men made their way along
the parapet to the left and found an observation hut
situated on it close by. This was bombed, but no oc-
cupants were found inside. Brock is believed to have
gone inside this hut for the purpose of examining its
interior; there is no authentic evidence that he was
ever seen again. Adams stationed some of his men to
guard a ladder leading from the parapet to the floor
of the Mole and then returned to find us struggling
with the grappling anchors as already described.
Adams then reconnoitred again to the eastward and
located a German machine-gun firing at the parapet
from the trench system on the floor of the Mole.
Barbed wire surrounded this trench, which interposed
between Vindictive and the three-gun battery at the
end of the broad part of the Mole. The seamen were
then detailed to bomb the trench position, but in do-
ing so they suffered many casualties from machine-
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gun fire. The position on the parapet was almost
entirely exposed to gun-fire from the Mole itself, the
lookout station affording the only cover. The Ger-
man vessels berthed at the inner side of the Mole had
also joined in the fight.
The terrific noise, the darkness, the bursting of
shell, and the hail of machine-gun bullets rendered it
exceedingly difficult for any one individual to make
such observations as would lead to a connected ac-
count of the fighting on the Mole itself.
Just before arriving alongside the Mole, Lieutenant-
Commander Harrison, in supreme command of the
seamen storming parties after Commander Halahan's
death, was struck on the head by a fragment of a
shell; he was knocked senseless and sustained a broken
jaw. On recovering consciousness he proceeded over
one of the gangways to the parapet, where he took
over command of the party detailed to attack the
Mole batteries to the eastward, Lieutenant-Com-
mander Adams going back to obtain reenforcements.
Gathering together a handful of his men, Harrison
led a charge along the parapet itself in the face of
heavy machine-gun fire. He was killed at the head
of his men, all but two ofwhom were also killed, these
two being wounded.
Harrison's charge down that narrow gangway of
death was a worthy finale to the large number of
charges which, as a forward of the first rank, he had
led down many a Rugby football ground. He had
"played the game" to the end. To quote the final
words in the official notification of his posthumous
award of the Victoria Cross— "Lieutenant-Com-
mander Harrison, although already severely wounded
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and undoubtedly in great pain, displayed indomitable
resolution and courage of the highest order in pressing
his attack, knowing as he did that any delay in silenc-
ing the guns might jeopardise the main object of the
expedition, i.e., the blocking of the Zeebrugge-Bruges
Canal."
With Harrison's death the Navy lost an officer who
was as popular and as keen as he had been invaluable
to the success of this particular operation, especially
in the preparatory work.
Able-Seaman McKenzie, one of the survivors of
Harrison's party, finding himself alone, did good exe-
cution with his Lewis gun in spite of being wounded
in several places; he eventually returned to Vin-
dictive after accounting for a number of the enemy.
The Marines, now commanded by Major B. G.
Weller, R.M.L.L, had followed the seamen over the
gangways.
The prearranged details of the operations on the
Mole had to be somewhat modified owing to the fact
that Vindictive was further to the westward than
originally intended. The reason for the latter has
already been given, but a further word may not be
out of place. The responsibility for the actual i>osi-
tion of the ship was entirely my own; the error in
position was, therefore, my own also. When the at-
tack was originally planned the intention had been to
endeavour to place the ship with her stern seventy
yards from the western gun of the battery on the
lighthouse extension. Actually Vindictive^s gangways
rested on the Mole nearly three hundred yards to the
westward. One can only conjecture what would have
happened, under the circumstances of the failure of
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the smoke screen owing to the change of wind, if the
ship had proceeded past the six-gun battery at a speed
sufficiently slow for berthing so close to the battery
itself. Whether the ship would ever have reached the
Mole, or whether there would have been any storm-
ing parties left on arrival alongside, can only be
guessed. It certainly looks as if our mistake in posi-
tion was as providential as it was unintentional.
Lieutenant F. T. V. Cooke, who afterwards greatly
distinguished himself, led out the first party of Ma-
rines and silenced a party of Germans who were ob-
served firing at the parapet from a position near No. 2
shed. Another party under Lieutenant Lamplough
then established a strong point near No. 3 shed for the
purpose of dealing with any enemy approaching from
the westward. His party also attacked and bombed
a German destroyer berthed at the inner side of the
Mole.
Another party was ordered to the eastward to reen-
force the seamen. As soon as the position was more
clear the main party of the Marine force, under Cap-
tain E. Bamford, commenced an assault on the Ger-
man positions covering the Mole battery.
It is not possible to say how many of the storming
parties reached the Mole— the loss of officers and
men and the resulting temporary disorganisation
naturally prevented the collection of definite informa-
tion. Suffice it to say that a large number stormed the
Mole in furtherance of our diversion, and that the
latter was undoubtedly successful in that we attained
our primary object of assisting the blockships to pass
an all-important obstacle in the Mole batteries.
Before passing on to other phases of the operation a
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general idea of the difficulties faced by the storming
parties may be of interest, together with a brief ac-
count of the manner in which these difficulties were
surmounted.
From the time of our arrival the Mole abreast the
ship was subjected to extremely heavy fire. Pre-
sumably the shore guns, including the Kaiser Wilhelm
battery with its twelve-inch guns and the Goeben
battery (9.4-inch guns) situated almost within point-
blank range, were shelling the Mole for all they were
worth, regardless of damage to their own property or
of danger to their own personnel. That, of course,
would be a correct action, the repulse of the enemy
always being of first importance.
The parapet on the high wall was almost entirely
destitute of cover. The difficulty of placing the scal-
ing ladders from the parapet to the floor-level of the
Mole and of descending them whilst carrying such
paraphernalia as rifles, bombs, flame-throwers, Lewis
guns, etc., can easily be imagined. The difficulty
would certainly not be lessened by the fact that the
men would have their backs to any enemy who might
be awaiting them on the Mole itself. The fighting
amidst entirely strange surroundings in the face of
properly organised strong points held by the enemy
would not be easy. Add to that the certain losses and
consequent disorganisation entailed during the as-
sault, the difficulty of recognising friend from foe at
night, and the blinding glare of star shell or search-
lights alternating with momentary periods of inky
darkness.
Undoubtedly the assault would be difficult enough.
But what of the retirement ? The bodies of any men
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who were killed or disabled on the Mole could only
be re-embarked by way of the vertical ladders against
the wall. It would be bad enough to descend them in
the first place, but a herculean task to carry a body
twenty feet up a vertical ladder under incessant shell
and machine-gun fire. Yet— and I think this fact
sums up the splendid gallantry of these men— of the
large number of men who stormed the Mole, many of
whom were killed or completely disabled, the total
number left on the Mole after the retirement, includ-
ing both dead and wounded, amounted to little more
than a dozen.
Daffodil^ as already described, was prevented from
landing her demolition parties in the prearranged
manner, but some of them, led by Sub-Lieutenant
F. E. Chevallier, had climbed into Vindictive and
made their way to the Mole. Lieutenant C. C. Dickin-
son, commanding the demolition parties, and a party
of his men on board Vindictive had landed at the com-
mencement of the assault. They placed a couple of
ladders, descended them, and then proceeded across
the Mole, killing some Germans who were apparently
making for the ladders. Demolition charges were
placed in position, but not actually exploded owing
to the presence of our own men in the vicinity. There
is little doubt that the demolition parties would have
been able to carry out considerable destructive work
if more time had been available. Whatever the results
of their efforts it is certain that Dickinson, Chevallier,
and their men did all that was possible under the cir-
cumstances.
Iris had reached the Mole and dropped her anchor
at the foot of the wall, about 12.15 a.m., her position
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being roughly one hundred yards ahead, i.e., to the
westward, of Vindictive. The heavy swell was tossing
her about like a cork, with the result that the use of
the parapet anchors was extremely difficult. After
several failures to get these parapet anchors hooked
to the top of the wall Lieutenant Claude E. K. Hawk-
ings, one of the officers of the storming party, or-
dered some men to hold up one of the scaling ladders.
They could not actually lean it against the wall; the
rough nature of the latter and the surging of the ship
would have combined to break the ladder immedi-
ately. The ladder was, therefore, merely sloping
towards the wall without any support at its upper
end. Hawkings ran up it and leaped to the top of the
Mole, the ladder being smashed to pieces a moment
later. He sat astride the wall for the purpose of fixing
an anchor and appears to have been immediately
attacked by some enemy on the parapet itself. He
was seen defending himself with his revolver before
he was actually killed. It was terribly sad that his
great act should have cost him his life.
Lieutenant-Commander George N. Bradford, who
was actually in command of the storming party in
Iris and whose duties did not include that of securing
the ship, climbed up the ship's derrick, which carried
a large parapet anchor and which was rigged out over
the Mole side of the ship. The derrick itselfwas crash-
ing on the Mole with each movement of the ship,
which, in turn, was rolling and pitching heavily; a
more perilous climb can scarcely be imagined. Wait-
ing his opportunity, Bradford chose the right moment
and jumped to the wall, taking the anchor with him.
He placed the latter in position, but almost imme-
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diately was riddled with machine-gun bullets and fell
into the sea between Iris and the Mole. Gallant at-
tempts were made to rescue his body, but owing to
the darkness and the rush of the strong tidal stream
he was swept away beyond recovery.
Nothing could have been finer than Bradford's
efforts to secure the ship. He had been a splendid
fighter in the "ring"; it was against his nature to give
in as long as there was the remotest chance of winning
through ; his death brought us the great loss of a great
gentleman. Really, one cannot conceive greater brav-
ery than was shown by these two officers, who have
set an example which will surely never be forgotten.
The anchor placed by Bradford had either slipped
or been shot away, with the result that Iris suddenly
surged out from the Mole. It was then obvious that
the difficulty of securing to the Mole was insuper-
able, so Commander Gibbs very rightly decided to
land his men across Vindictive. He therefore ordered
the cable to be slipped and then steamed round the
stern of Dafodil and came alongside Vindictive. This
change of plan, necessitated by the unfavourable
state of the sea, showed a highly creditable degree of
initiative. It must be realised that these movements
and proceedings of Iris had occupied over half an
hour; it was about 12.55 a.m. before Iris was secured
to Vindictive. By that time the order for the retire-
ment had been given. A few men scrambled out of
Iris, but that ship was almost immediately ordered
to shove off. She therefore left Vindictive and shaped
course to the northward. She had barely turned when
she came under a heavy fire from some enemy bat-
teries. Two large shell and several small shell hit her,
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and were closely followed by three more large shell.
The lookout house at the port extremity of the bridge
was destroyed and a serious fire was caused on the
upper deck.
Valentine Gibbs, who had remained on the bridge
throughout the operation, was mortally wounded. I
had known "Val," as we had always called him, since
he was a boy of thirteen. Even at that age he had
shown himself to be absolutely fearless. Later in life
he had risen rapidly in his profession and would as-
suredly have been marked out for high command in
due course. In peace days he had won the great race
on the Cresta Run at St. Moritz, in war he had volun-
teered for every dangerous operation for which he had
the remotest chance of selection. At last his oppor-
tunity had come and he lived for nought else than
to put Iris alongside Zeebrugge Mole. I was told
afterwards that in his short periods of consciousness
after being wounded he asked and repeated but one
question, "How are things going.?" and he continued
to ask how things were going until he died. I cannot
write more of "Val"— words and phrases fail to do
him justice.
The havoc in Iris was serious. From Vindictive she
appeared to have been sunk, for she suddenly dis-
appeared in a cloud of smoke and flame.
Major C. E. E. Eagles, D.S.O., in command of the
Marine storming parties in Iris, was killed, and many
of his men were killed and wounded at this period.
Artificial smoke was emitted and a small motor boat
also laid a smoke screen to shoreward of Iris— this
probably accounted for her sudden disappearance
from view.
LIEUT. GEORGE N.
BRADFORD, R.N.
LIEUT. CLAUDE E. K.
HAWKINGS, R.N.
LIEUT. RICHARD D.
SANDFORD, R.N.
COMMANDER VALENTINE
F. GIBBS, R.N.
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The navigating officer had been seriously wounded.
Lieutenant Oscar Henderson took command. Petty
Officer Smith was illuminating the compass with a
torch in one hand and steering with the other. Able-
Seaman F. E. Blake, having extinguished the fire on
the bridge, employed himself in throwing overboard
live bombs which were lying amongst the burning
debris on the upper deck.
Iris had not received her share of good fortune.
Nevertheless, although she actually failed to land her
storming parties, there is every probability that her
proceedings assisted to enhance the success of the di-
version at the Mole and thereby materially assisted
towards the safe passage of the blockships, i.e., the
attainment of our object.
CHAPTER V
THE ATTACK ON THE RAILWAY VIADUCT
IN
the previous chapter I mentioned that the ex-
plosion of the submarine took place shortly after
the storming of the Mole had commenced.
The immediate purpose in destroying the railway
viaduct connecting the Mole to the mainland was
twofold : firstly, that of preventing the Germans from
sending reenforcements across to the help of the Mole
garrison; secondly, that of augmenting the main di-
version. There were, however, ulterior objects also.
Firstly, the destruction in itself would be a valuable
part of the general work of demolition designed to
reduce the efficiency of the Mole as a naval and aerial
base ; secondly, the loss of the railway would deny to
the enemy the use of the Mole as a place of embarka-
tion for military purposes. If deprived of railway
communication the Mole would lose a high percentage
of its special war value.
Two old submarines, C i, commanded by Lieu-
tenant Aubrey C. Newbold, and C 3, commanded by
Lieutenant Richard D. Sandford, were chosen for the
purpose— each carrying a volunteer crew of one
officer and four men in addition to the officer in com-
mand.
The submarines were provided with special control
apparatus so that the personnel, after having set the
apparatus to guide the vessel to its destination, could
abandon their craft before reaching the viaduct itself.
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For the purpose of abandonment each submarine
was given motor-driven skiffs and special ladders.
The latter might enable the crews to climb up the
viaduct and escape before the explosion took place,
the motor skiffs being supplied for escaping to sea-
ward if that was found to be feasible.
Each submarine carried a heavy cargo of high ex-
plosive. This latter was fitted with time fuses and
special instruments so that there would be sufficient
delay between the ignition of the fuse and the final
explosion. At a prearranged minute after passing
position G, the submarines were to have slipped from
their towing hawsers and then to have made the best
of their way to the viaduct. Unfortunately C i was
so much delayed by the parting of a hawser that she
could not continue her voyage to the viaduct without
running the risk of hampering C 3. The latter, exactly
in accordance with the Plan, slipped from tow and
proceeded under her own engines on the prearranged
courses. At midnight the submarine appears to have
been sighted in the light of a star shell. Searchlights
immediately picked her up and some firing was seen
in their direction. Artificial smoke was immediately
made use of, but the wind, having then commenced
to blow towards the north, was found to be unfavour-
able. The firing was only of short duration and the
artificial smoke was switched off. A few minutes later
the viaduct showed up clearly against a glare in the
background and course was altered to ensure strik-
ing exactly at right angles. Sandford disdained to use
the control apparatus to take his submarine into her
position.
The vessel was run under the viaduct, at a speed
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of nearly ten knots, immediately between two of the
vertical piles. She charged against the horizontal and
diagonal girders with such force as to penetrate the
framework of the viaduct as far as her own conning
tower, whilst being lifted bodily about a couple of
feet on the frames. Firmly wedged under the railway
in a position about fifty yards from the northern end
of the viaduct the first part of the operation was
completed. It is difficult to account for the small op-
position offered to her approach by the enemy. Pos-
sibly they mistook her for a friend. Another sugges-
tion is that they thought she was endeavouring to
pass under the viaduct en route to the canal, and
that, knowing this was impossible, they hoped to cap-
ture her intact. That suggestion sounds extremely
unlikely. Possibly the diversion caused by our efforts
at the other end of the Mole had distracted the at-
tention of the defence commanders; the men may
have feared to take unexpected measures on their own
responsibility. Whatever the reason for the lack of
enemy opposition, there was certainly no lack of diffi-
culty. The darkness, suddenly giving way to the
blinding glare of searchlights, the navigational diffi-
culties, and the necessary care in handling such an
awkward vessel combined to make their arrival a
very fine feat. But finer was to follow.
Several of the enemy had appeared on the viaduct
and commenced to fire on her with machine-guns from
close range ; the latter cannot have amounted to many
feet! The crew lowered a motor skiff and Sandford
ordered them to abandon ship. He then fired the time
fuse and jumped into the boat. Their purpose was
now to steam away to the westward at utmost speed
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This aerial photograph shows the break in the viaduct planked over b>'
the Germans. Three German seaplanes are rising to attack the
photographer's plane
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so as to get well clear before the explosion took place.
Unfortunately the skiff's engine was useless— the
propeller had been broken! Oars had been provided
for such an emergency and the crew pulled away from
the viaduct for dear life. As soon as the boat was clear
of the viaduct itself, the firing became intense, both
from the viaduct and from the shore. The German
searchlights were directed on to the boat.
Many miracles occurred that night, but none more
extraordinary than the escape of this little boat with
its two officers and four men. Presently Sandford
himself and his petty officer were severely wounded
;
the stoker was also wounded. The boat was hit again
and again, but fortunately the motor pump was
working and the water could be rapidly ejected. Sand-
ford was again wounded.
The skiff had managed to struggle about three
hundred yards from the viaduct, when there was a
deafening roar as submarine C 3, the viaduct above
her, the railway on the viaduct, and the Germans on
the railway were hurled to destruction. It must have
been a wonderful moment for Sandford and his crew.
The enemy searchlights were immediately extin-
guished and the firing died away. A few minutes later
a picket boat— the ordinary type of steamboat car-
ried by all large men-of-war— emerged from the
darkness and hailed the skiff. The occupants of the
latter were assisted into the picket boat, which then
proceeded seawards and placed them on board the
destroyer Phcebe.
The picket boat, under the charge of Lieutenant-
Commander F. H. Sandford, R.N., brother of the
commander of the submarine, had been detailed for
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this rescue work. She had made a great part of the
overseas journey under her own steam and had ar-
rived in the nick of time to effect the rescue. Sandford
— the Lieutenant-Commander— had been largely
responsible for working out the details of the attack
on the viaduct in addition to the preparations for the
demolition work on the Mole. His handling of the
picket boat— incidentally she returned the whole
way home again under her own steam — was ex-
cellent.
Submarine C i saw what was probably the glare of
the explosion caused by C 3, but could not be certain
whether the latter had reached her destination or not.
They therefore waited until they considered ample
time had passed for C 3 to have arrived at the viaduct
if all had gone well. C i then approached the Mole
en route towards the viaduct and sighted Vindictive
retiring to the northward. This appeared to signify
that the forces were retiring and that the operation
had either been completed or had been found im-
practicable owing to the change of wind. Lieutenant
Newbold, therefore, had to decide as to whether he
should continue for the sake of augmenting the de-
struction caused by C 3 or whether he should haul off
so as to be available for any further services required.
It was a difficult decision to make. He chose the lat-
ter and earned the Vice-Admiral's commendation for
doing so.
Those of us who were au fait with the details of all
phases of the operation little thought we should ever
see these heroic attackers of the viaduct again. The
chances against manoeuvring a submarine into the
viaduct were very considerable, the chances of any
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of the personnel being rescued were apparently nil.
Nobody knew that better than the personnel con-
cerned. The use of the control apparatus would have
greatly increased their chances of being rescued, but
they refused to consider preservation of life until the
success of their undertaking had been assured. They
cannot have expected to return. Yet there was no
dearth of volunteers. The personnel had been selected
in much the same way as those from the Grand Fleet.
If the secret could have been made known beforehand
and volunteers asked for in the ordinary way we
should probably have had the whole submarine service
begging to be allowed to take part.
The execution of this most difficult submarine
operation was beyond all praise; it was, indeed, a mir-
acle that the crew of C 3 lived to witness the unquali-
fied success of their efforts. Before the night was
ended these gallant lives were again in jeopardy.
We heard afterwards that a German cyclist corps
was hurriedly sent to reenforce the Mole garrison,
and, not knowing that the viaduct had been de-
stroyed, they were precipitated into the sea and thus
infringed the Gadarene copyright.
CHAPTER VI
THE SMOKE SCREENING. SUBSIDIARY ATTACKS
THE author is particularly anxious that eachphase of the operation and the work of each
class of vessel should be clearly understood,
so that the reader may fully appreciate the work of
the blockships, the latter forming the crux of the
whole operation. It will be convenient, therefore, to
describe in this chapter the proceedings of those
small craft whose work was not carried out in actual
company of the blockships themselves.
The general idea of the smoke screens has already
been described. A large number of small craft, in-
cluding coastal motor boats, motor launches, and
destroyers, were required for the purpose.
At given intervals after the force had passed
through position G the several units left the force
to carry out their various duties. The latter com-
prised laying screens shoreward of the main line of
advance, further screens to cover the shore batteries
on each side of Zeebrugge, others close off Blanken-
berghe for the purpose of hampering the German
motor boats at that place, and a screen close off the
German battery on the lighthouse extension of the
Mole. The earlier screens were so efficient that they
undoubtedly prevented the enemy from discovering
our presence until we were close to our objective.
When the wind changed, however, the ideal screening
arrangements were no longer possible. Such an event-
uality had been allowed for, and, in accordance with
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their instructions, the screening craft, regardless of the
great danger, ran inshore close to the German bat-
teries and did their utmost to ensure the attainment
of our object.
The coastal motor boat (C.M.B.) detailed for
"fogging" Blankenberghe was C.M.B. 16, Lieutenant
D. E. J. MacVean, R.N.V.R. Owing to temporary
difficulties with the engines, and uncertaint};^ of posi-
tion due to drifting while carrying out repairs, this
boat accompanied Vindictive to the Mole, which was
first seen thirty yards away. MacVean then pro-
ceeded to Blankenberghe harbour. On arrival near
the entrance he came under fire of a four-gun bat-
tery, but placed his smoke floats close to the entrance
piers and kept renewing them at intervals until the
whole operation had ceased, when he returned to
harbour. This piece ofwork was typical of the C.M.B.
flotilla, which, most ably commanded by Lieutenant
A. P. Welman, R.N., estabhshed a new naval tradi-
tion.
Welman, himself in command of C.M.B. 23B,
found it necessary to undertake the duties of another
C.M.B. in addition to his own, owing to a difficulty
in communicating a modification in the orders. He
was personally responsible for a very important part
of the screening, namely, that close off the Mole
batteries. In spite of the concentrated fire from the
latter, and the difficulties due to the change of wind,
this gallant officer, who had always allotted himself
the most dangerous tasks, with the able assistance of
two other C.M.B.'s, maintained a fog screen which
must have been an important factor in our success.
C.M.B. 22B steamed close in under the Mole battery
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and laid smoke floats within a few yards of the guns.
It is remarkable that these coastal motor boats should
have escaped. A single shell would be sufficient to
send such a frail craft to the bottom.
Before Vindictive^s arrival at the Mole two coastal
motor boats had left the force for the purpose of at-
tacking German vessels inside the Mole. They soon
lost sight of one another in the fog and became
separated. C.M.B. 7, Sub-Lieutenant L. R. Blake,
R.N.R., first sighted the Mole about one hundred and
fifty yards away and steamed close round the light-
house at high speed. Having located the defence
booms of barges and nets he followed down the line
of the latter until close inshore and then stopped for
the purpose of selecting a target. Observing an enemy
destroyer alongside the Mole he steamed straight
towards her at high speed and fired his torpedo at her.
He then stopped to observe the result. The torpedo
was seen to explode near the forebridge of the de-
stroyer, but the conditions of visibility rendered it
impossible to ascertain the definite result. During this
time he was being heavily fired at by machine-guns
on the Mole and by the shore batteries to the east-
ward of the canal. Small enemy vessels suddenly
appeared and engaged him, and he was further fired at
from a dredger which had a machine-gun. C.M.B. 7
had other duties to fulfil in connection with smoke
screening. Whilst proceeding at high speed for that
purpose she collided with an unlighted buoy, which
made a large hole in her bows. Speed was increased
to lift the bows clear of the water. It soon became
apparent that the damage which she had sustained
precluded all further chance of being usefully em-
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ployed, so course was set for home. An engine defect
oft Ostende necessitated stopping; this, in turn,
brought them into imminent danger of sinking.
Eventually one of our destroyers took her in tow and
brought her safely to Dover.
The other,CM. B. 5, Sub-Lieutenant C. Outhwaite,
R.N.V.R., had found herself within fifty yards of the
Mole and had immediately altered course to pass
round the lighthouse. She then sighted a German
torpedo-boat destroyer steering to the northeastward
and at once increased to utmost speed with the object
of attacking her. C.M.B. 5 was evidently seen in the
light of star shell and the German switched on her
searchlight and opened fire. As soon as the motor
boat was sufficiently close she fired a torpedo, which
struck the destroyer in the fore part of the vessel. By
this time some guns on the Mole had taken up the
firing. Under concentrated fire from two directions
the motor boat was forced to haul off, and was unable
to witness the fate of the destroyer or to search for
survivors. This motor boat then proceeded to the
eastward and rendered useful assistance to the smoke-
screening vessels operating in that direction.
Three other coastal motor boats, Nos. 25, 26, and
21, had been detailed for yet another form of attack
on the Mole, namely, that of dropping Stokes bombs
on its western portion around the seaplane base.
These three craft obtained many hits on the Mole
from a range of only fifty yards, one of them actually
remaining stopped opposite the seaplane sheds and
pumping her bombs over the outer wall just as if there
had been no enemy in existence.
C.M.B. 32 waited until the blockships had passed
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the Mole en route to the canal, and then, as soon as
the moment appeared to be favourable, she dashed
in at utmost speed and fired a torpedo at a German
vessel berthed alongside the Mole. The torpedo was
heard to explode, but the visibility prevented the
actual result from being observed. This attack was
carried out under extremely heavy machine-gun fire.
The work of the other coastal motor boats, in con-
nection with the blockships' movements, will be
described later.
Eleven torpedo-boat destroyers took part in the
inshore operations ; many others were utilised as sup-
ports to seaward and as escorts to the bombarding
monitors. The destroyer flotilla was commanded by
Captain Wilfred Tomkinson, under whose direction
their work of preparation had been carried out; he
accompanied the Vice-Admiral in H.M.S. Warwick.
Of the eleven destroyers, H.M.S. Warwick , flying
the Vice-Admiral's Flag, had a roving commission so
that the Vice-Admiral could direct the whole opera-
tion and render assistance where necessary. The most
favourable position from which to direct events was
in the vicinity of the Mole lighthouse.
Two other destroyers, Phcebe, Lieutenant-Com-
mander Hubert E. Gore-Langton, and North Star,
Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth C. Helyar, were
also detailed to operate near the lighthouse. These
two vessels experienced a very anxious time. At the
commencement of the attack they patrolled in com-
pany with Warwick, Commander V. L. A. Campbell,
firstly with the object of preventing torpedo at-
tacks by enemy vessels from being directed against the
storming vessels at the Mole, and secondly for the
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purpose of assisting the smoke screening if required.
Just before the Mole was reached at the commence-
ment of the attack these three destroyers, which had
been stationed ahead of the main force during the
approach, eased down to allow Vindictive to pass,
and then commenced their patrol. They passed just
inside an area of very heavy barrage fire and they
frequently came under fire from the Mole. The smoke
screens made it very difficult for them to keep touch
either with the movements of other vessels or with
each other. Very soon the Phoebe and North Star be-
came separated from the Warwick; the latter con-
tinued her patrol until the attack was virtually at an
end.
North Star, on becoming separated from the others,
proceeded towards her patrol area, but had great
difficulty in ascertaining her position owing to the
smoke. Suddenly an enemy vessel was encountered
and the track of a torpedo was clearly seen in the
glare of the enemy's searchlight. North Star returned
the compliment, but it is probable that her torpedo
missed similarly to that fired by the enemy vessel;
the latter was lost sight of almost immediately. Con-
tinuing her efforts to locate the Mole, she found her-
self close inshore to the eastward of the Mole. After
putting her helm hard-over, some ships were seen right
ahead, and were recognised as the blockships making
their final run to the canal. The Mole was then seen
to the northward and a torpedo was fired at a vessel
alongside it. At this moment North Star was lit up
by a searchlight and the German batteries opened a
heavy fire upon her. She passed close to the Mole and
fired three more torpedoes at vessels alongside it, but
222 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
the conditions of visibility once more prevented the
resuhs from being observed. When passing the Hght-
house North Star received several hits in the engine-
room and boiler-rooms and was completely disabled.
Her fate will be recounted presently.
H.M.S. Phcebe, after becoming separated from War-
wick, commenced to patrol off the lighthouse in ac-
cordance with her instructions. Presently she fell in
with the steamboat which had rescued the crew of
Submarine C 3 . The latter, who were in urgent need
of medical attention, were transferred to Phcebe, which
vessel then continued her patrol as before. Later on
North Star was sighted in a crippled state and Phcebe
at once went to her assistance.
North Star was still being illuminated by search-
lights and heavily fired at. Phcebe laid out a smoke
screen to hide her and then took her in tow— a most
difficult operation under the circumstances. Unfor-
tunately the tow parted and the smoke screen drifted
away before the wind. Once again heavy fire was
directed at these vessels and they were being fre-
quently hit. Phcebe again took North Star in tow, but
the towing wires were cut by shell explosions ; to make
matters worse, the Phcebe^s steam siren was hit and
commenced to fill the air with its discordant shrieking,
thus assisting the enemy to locate them. Phcebe next
endeavoured to push North Star bodily away from
the batteries, but this proved to be impossible. The
only other thing to be done was to save North Star's
crew and to sink her to prevent capture. Phcebe, there-
fore, laid out another protective smoke screen and
lowered her boat for the rescue work. Helyar in North
Star very reluctantly had to order "abandon ship,"
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and this was carried out by means of her boats and
rafts. One boat unfortunately capsized, but the others
were picked up and the whaler from Phcsbe made sev-
eral trips for survivors.
But Phcebe had not given up hope. She laid out
yet another smoke screen and made another attempt
to take North Star in tow, going alongside her for the
purpose. Helyar and some of his crew had remained
on board North Star and passed the wires to Phcebe.
The North Star was still being hit repeatedly by shell
and commenced to list over as a result of the damage.
Phoebe then persuaded Helyar to leave his ship and
took him on board after embarking the remainder of
the crew.
On going astern to avoid the searchlights, another
man was seen on board North Star. Phcebe at once
returned alongside and ordered the man to jump
across. During all this time Phoebe herself had been
repeatedly hit, resulting in several casualties, but
Gore-Langton considered that he ought to sink North
Star before leaving her. His ship then came in for
increased fire from the German batteries, and as a
result of the smoke, was unable to locate North Star
again— probably she had sunk ^ already as she had
certainly been in a sinking condition when Lieutenant-
Commander Helyar left her. For forty-five minutes
the struggle to save North Star had been carried out
within point-blank range of the German batteries,
which had kept up an incessant fire almost through-
out. Phoebe herself had received considerable damage
and it seems almost a miracle that she survived the
* The wreck of North Star was afterwards located on the bottom to
the northeastward of the lighthouse.
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ordeal. Anything finer than the conduct of the com-
manders of these two vessels, and of their ships' com-
panies, cannot be conceived. Yet it was only typical
of the destroyer service as a whole, this latter obser-
vation being perhaps the best commendation of all.
The gallant crew of Submarine C 3, previously
transferred to Phoebe from the picket boat, had seen
more than their share of the fighting.
The remaining destroyers, Whirlwind^ Myngs,
Trident, Mansfield, Velox, Morris, Moorsom, and
Melpomene, all carried out their patrolling duties
close to the northward of Zeebrugge without any
incidents that require special mention here.
Captain R. Collins, R.N., in charge of the motor
launches, was on board M.L. 558, commanded by
Lieutenant-Commander Chappell, R.N.V.R. This
motor launch rendered useful work in assisting the
blockships to find the Mole before the latter vessels
had penetrated the smoke screen, and also directed
the picket boat towards the viaduct en route to rescue
the crew of the submarine. Considering the dangerous
locality in which M.L. 558 was operating, she was
fortunate in being hit by only one shell.
M.L. 424, commanded by Lieutenant O. Robinson,
R.N.V.R., was less fortunate. Soon after passing
through the smoke screen she was badly hit— her
captain and two men being killed and another man
wounded. The second-in-command. Lieutenant J. W.
Robinson, R.N.V.R., finding the launch was com-
pletely disabled, decided to abandon her. Having got
the crew into the dinghey, he set fire to his boat and
left her in flames; the occupants of the dinghey were
picked up by M.L. 128.
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M.L. no, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander
Young, R.N.V.R., was also unfortunate. She was
struck and badly damaged by several shell, which
killed her commanding officer and a petty officer,
another officer and two men being wounded. The
second-in-command, Lieutenant G. Bowen, ordered
the crew to abandon the vessel in the dinghey. This
was done after the launch had been sunk to prevent
any possibility of its capture by the enemy. The sur-
vivors were picked up by M.L. 308.
The motor launches detailed for smoke-screening
did splendid work, as did all the launches which took
part in the operation. Some detailed stories of the
remaining launches will be given presently.
CHAPTER VII
THE WORK OF THE BLOCKSHIPS
THE blockships had eased down soon afterpassing through position G so as to drop
astern of Vindictive sufficiently far to enable
that vessel and her consorts to create the necessary
diversion. The conning and steering positions in each
ship were triplicated and fully manned so that, in the
event of one position being destroyed, the handling
of the ship could immediately be taken over by an-
other party. Guns' crews were standing by their guns
ready to defend their vessels against attacks by enemy
craft or to retaliate against the batteries in the hope
of reducing the latter's fire.
At about midnight heavy firing was heard close
at hand, but nothing could be seen owing to the dense
smoke screen which was then drifting slowly to sea-
ward. During the first quarter of an hour after mid-
night the blockships passed through an area which
was apparently being barraged with shell fire. They
were steaming in the order Thetis, Commander Ralph
S. Sneyd, Intrepid, Lieutenant Stuart S. Bonham-
Carter, and Iphigenia, Lieutenant Edward W. Bill-
yard-Leake.
At twenty minutes past midnight the Mole was
sighted right ahead in the glare of the rockets fired
from Vindictive; the blockships had just been hailed
by M.L. 558, who gave the direction of the light-
house.
Thetis increased to full speed and, passing round
r^
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the end of the Mole, steered for the extremity of the
barge boom. A fairly heavy fire was being directed
at her by such guns of the Mole-extension battery as
were still in action; as far as could be seen, nothing
was fired by the three-gun heavy battery at the end
of the broad part of the Mole. The ship's guns opened
fire at the lighthouse, which was believed to be used
as a signalling and observation station, and at the
southernmost barge; the latter was sunk. At this
stage Thetis was caught by the strong east-going tidal
stream and was set towards the boom of entanglement
nets. The ship passed over the latter between the
two northern buoys and tore the nets away with her
momentum. The piers at the entrance to the canal
were then sighted, but the propellers were so badly
fouled by the nets that the engines were brought to a
stop.
It must have been at about this moment that the
enemy first realised the true nature of the enterprise.
The attacks on the Mole, the blowing up of the via-
duct, the explosions of torpedoes on the inside of the
Mole, the smoke, the rapid changes of visibility, and
the terrific noise on all sides had combined to leave
the enemy in a hopeless state of stupefaction as to our
real intentions. We heard afterwards that they be-
lieved a forced landing on the coast was in progress.
The impossibility of using one's defensive measures
to the best advantage when the initiative lies in the
hands of the attackers has already been referred to.
Suffice it to say that the enemy do not appear to have
discovered the real purpose of our operations until
too late to make the best use of their defensive
measures.
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Thetis now came under extremely heavy fire both
from the direction of the Mole and from shore bat-
teries near the canal. Her six-inch gun on the fore-
castle was replying to the shore batteries. She ap-
peared to have grounded about three hundred yards
from the canal entrance. Thetis now appeared to be
settling down. All chances of struggling into the
canal entrance appeared to be hopeless. She had been
hit again and again and was on fire in several places.
She had taken the brunt of the firing whilst her two
consorts were following comparatively undamaged.
She could do little more now than assist Intrepid and
Iphigenia to reach their objectives. Prearranged
signals, therefore, were made to these other two ships
guiding them to the canal. It must be remembered
that it was now half an hour after midnight. Intrepid
and Iphigenia, in that order, passed close to Thetis.
Thanks to the latter's signals they were able to locate
the entrance piers; the further movements of those
two vessels will be described in a moment.
As soon as Iphigenia was clear Captain Sneyd in
Thetis ordered the artificial smoke to be turned on,
and had almost decided to abandon ship when En-
gineer Lieutenant-Commander Boddie succeeded in
getting the starboard engine to go ahead.
The ship moved slowly forward for a short dis-
tance, but was apparently dragging her stern along
the bottom. As far as could be seen she was not only
in the dredged channel leading to the canal, but was
lying across it. The ship was undoubtedly in a
sinking condition, so her captain decided to blow the
bottom out of her in accordance with the Plan.
The blockships had each been fitted with explosive
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charges inside the bottom of the ship. These charges
had been connected electrically to a firing arrange-
ment which could be operated from alternative posi-
tions in the ship. The petty officer in charge of the
foremost firing keys had been killed and they could
not be found owing to the fumes from bursting shell
and those from the artificial smoke. The firing keys
at the other end of the ship were, therefore, pressed
after the crew had been ordered on deck. The charges
immediately exploded. The bottom of the ship was
blown out; in a few moments the vessel had sunk.
The upper deck was now just under water. The ship's
company abandoned the ship, which was still under
incessant fire, in the only remaining boat and pulled
away to the northward, where M.L. 526, which had
followed the blockships, picked them up. The Thetis''
boat was the cutter. It had been badly holed by shell
fire and was crowded to its full capacity. Some of the
crew were wounded; Sneyd and his second-in-com-
mand had been wounded and gassed. The proceed-
ings of M.L. 526, which also rescued some of the crew
from another blockship, will be described later.
Intrepid had experienced a certain amount of shell
fire when approaching the Mole, having apparently
passed through an area which was being barraged
by the enemy. She passed the Mole without difficulty
and navigated between the obstruction booms. The
jinking of the southernmost barge and the tearing
away of the entanglement nets by Thetis, with the
resultant widening of the unobstructed channel, had
greatly reduced the chance of Intrepid getting into
trouble at this point. During the final run to the
canal she had escaped serious damage from gun-fire
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because nearly all the German guns were concen-
trating either on Thetis or on the forces attacking
the Mole. Having located the entrance pier, pass-
ing close to Thetis en route ^ Intrepid entered the canal
and proceeded up the latter until just inland of the
coast-line. Having reached the exact position as
signed to her, Lieutenant Bonham-Carter at once
commenced to turn his ship across the channel. As
soon as he found she could be turned no further— it
must be remembered that the navigable channel at
that position was exceedingly narrow— he decided
to blow the bottom out of the ship. The crew had
been previously ordered to take to the boats, but
Engineer Sub-Lieutenant Meikle and three ratings
had not been able to leave the engine-room when the
charges exploded. Fortunately these four individuals
escaped destruction. The ship sank immediately.
One cutter full of men pulled out to seaward and
was picked up by M.L. 526, which has already been
mentioned as saving the crew of Thetis. Another
cutter pulled out to sea, actually past the Mole, and
was picked up by the destroyer Whirlwind. Lieu-
tenant Bonham-Carter, Lieutenant Cory-Wright his
second-in-command, Sub-Lieutenant Babb the navi-
gator, and four petty officers were the last party to
leave the sunken vessel. They launched a raft and
proceeded to paddle it towards M.L. 282, which had
followed the blockships into the canal. Whilst on the
raft this party had a very trying experience. The
Germans had a machine-gun on the shore within a
few yards. This gun and many others had been pour-
ing a hot fire into the ship. A lifebuoy light had
been inadvertently left on the raft and automatically
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lit up on reaching the water. This gave away their
movements. Every effort was made to extinguish the
light; they even sat on it, but could not either obscure
or destroy it for some time. The machine-gun bullets
were cutting up the water all round them, and it was
extraordinary that none of the party was killed. It is
difficult to imagine any more awkward situation. By
dint of great efforts they managed to reach the motor
launch and all got into her in safety.
Iphigenia had followed Intrepid and had rounded
the Mole with much the same experience as the latter
ship. Having dropped somewhat astern she increased
to full speed and made for the canal. By this time so
many star shell were being fired and so many search-
lights being used that there was not much difficulty
in locating the entrance piers; she was also assisted
by the signals from Thetis. Passing close to the latter,
Iphigenia was twice hit by shell, one of which cut a
steam pipe, with the result that the forepart of the
ship was enveloped in steam. In addition to that she
shortly afterwards ran into thick smoke and tempo-
rarily lost sight of the entrance.
Suddenly the western pier loomed up close ahead.
Lieutenant Billyard-Leake ordered "full speed
astern." The ship ran between a dredger and a barge;
on going ahead again she pushed the barge up the
canal. There appeared to be a gap between the bow
of the Intrepid and the eastern bank of the canal, so
Iphigenia was steered to close it. Turning his ship by
going alternately ahead and astern, Billyard-Leake
managed to get her round well across the channel and
then grounded with his bows on the eastern side. He
ordered the crew to abandon ship and exploded his
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charges. Exactly as had occurred in the other two
ships, the bottom was blown out and the ship sank at
once. The upper deck was still above water.
The entire crew, officers and men, got away in a
single cutter, the other boat having been severely
damaged. M.L. 282 was then seen close ahead of
the ship. The cutter pulled up to her and most of
the crew managed to get on board. The remainder
turned the cutter and again pulled to the launch. All
except about three men, ofwhom one had been killed,
climbed into the launch at the second attempt. The
cutter herself was secured to the bows of the launch,
which, having just picked up the raft party from
Intrepid, was still heading up the canal. The launch
went astern and backed out of the canal, stern first,
with the cutter in tow. No less than a hundred and
one survivors from the blockships were on board the
motor launch. Under ordinary circumstances such
craft can carry from forty to fifty passengers with a
bit of a squash ; a hundred and one passengers, several
of them wounded, must have crowded every inch of
her deck.
M.L. 282, commanded by Lieutenant Percy T.
Deane, R.N.V.R., and M.L. 526, commanded by
Lieutenant H. A. Littleton, R.N.V.R., had followed
the blockships, exactly in accordance with the Plan,
during their perilous journey from the Mole. These
officers had been specially chosen for the rescue work
from the large number of volunteers for that danger-
ous task.
M.L. 282 had steamed straight into the canal and
stopped between the two sunken blockships. She
came under heavy machine-gun fire from close range,


RESCUE OF THE CREWS 233
but was not in the least deterred from the work of
rescuing the blockships' survivors. The fact that this
motor launch was not sunk and that the crew sur-
vived was little short of a miracle. Lieutenant Deane,
with his precious cargo, turned his boat round as soon
as he was clear of the canal. Owing to the steering
gear having been damaged, he was forced to steer by
means of working the engines at unequal speeds. He
passed as near to the Mole as was possible to escape
the gun-fire from that direction— the reverse of the
usual procedure being necessary under the peculiar
circumstances in which they found themselves. After
passing the Mole the launch was steered to the north-
westward and fell in with the Vice-Admiral's vessel,
H.M.S. Warwick. Many casualties had been sus-
tained as a result of the continual fire which she had
experienced.
M.L. 526 had steamed into the sunken blockships
in the canal, embarking many of Intrepid's men from
a cutter, and then proceeded to Thetis, where all the
survivors from that vessel were also embarked from
a cutter. The motor launch had come under heavy
fire from the shore guns and her escape added one
more item to the long list of miracles which took
place that night. With sixty-five survivors Lieutenant
Littleton steamed out to sea past the Mole and made
the entire passage to Dover under her own steam,
in spite of the gruelling which his frail vessel had gone
through.
The rescue work, as carried out by these two
motor launches, compels admiration. Their chances
of success had seemed to be exceedingly remote. Yet,
in spite of all the difficulties, they had rescued no less
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than one hundred and sixty-six men from right under
the enemy's batteries. It will be remembered that
Intrepid had not disembarked her surplus crew at
position D on the passage across, with the result that
she carried no fewer than eighty-seven officers and men
into the canal. Of these, every single officer and man
was brought back to Dover, although one petty officer
had been killed and one officer mortally wounded
whilst being rescued.
Of the crew of M.L. 282 one officer and two men
(out of four) laid down their lives in this splendid
achievement. Of all the blockships' officers and men
not a single living soul fell into the hands of the enemy.
In a subsequent chapter I shall give a more detailed
description of the results of the actual blocking.
There can be no two opinions concerning the han-
dling of the blockships. The utmost that can be said
of the diversions, from the point of view of their con-
nection with the main object of the enterprise, is that
they assisted the blockships to pass a danger point
nearly a mile short of the canal entrance, and, to a
lesser extent, diverted some of the enemy's attention
during the final run to the blocking position.
From the vicinity of the Mole batteries to their
final destination the blockship commanders had to
depend almost entirely on their own efforts. Running
the gantlet of modern batteries at point-blank range
would ordinarily appear to be foolhardy in the ex-
treme. Yet these officers made light of the task and
showed that difficulties cannot always be judged by
first impressions. The navigation alone was hazard-
ous enough ; concentration of thought in that particu-
lar direction must have been greatly hampered by the
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kaleidoscopic conditions of the situation. But per-
haps the finest feat of all was the splendid display
of seamanship in the face of extraordinary difficulty.
The complete absence of local knowledge, the oppo-
sition of the enemy, and the unavoidable lack of
practice in sinking vessels under such conditions, all
combined to make the task appear quite impracti-
cable. Yet all difficulties were surmounted and the
object of the operation was achieved.
Of all the happenings on that memorable night
the outstanding feature, which turned success from
a possibility into a certainty, was the magnificent
handling of the blockships by Commander Sneyd
and Lieutenants Bonham-Carter and Billyard-Leake.
This fact cannot be too strongly emphasised, for,
although it was naturally and fully realised in the
Navy, there were indications that it was not so well
grasped by the man-in-the-street.
CHAPTER VIII
THE RETIREMENT
IT
had been arranged that the storming parties on
the Mole should have twenty minutes' warning of
Vindictive leaving the outer wall. A maximum
length of stay alongside had also been laid down
so that, under certain circumstances, watches would
provide some guide as to the amount of time available.
The warning signal for leaving the Mole was to
consist of a succession of long and short blasts on the
siren, or a particular method of waving the searchlight
beams, or, if all other means failed, a message con-
veyed by runner.
At about 12.50 A.M., three-quarters of an hour after
Vindictive^s arrival alongside, the question of the
length of stay was considered. The blockships had
been seen passing the lighthouse en route to the canal,
the viaduct had been blown up. The diversion on the
Mole had throughout served to attract the fire of a
large number of enemy batteries. From this followed
the deduction that some chance of rescue work had
probably offered itself to our motor launches. It was
likely that in another twenty minutes these latter ves-
sels would have definitely succeeded or failed in their
object.
The primary object for which the attack on the
Mole was designed had been attained. There re-
mained the secondary object of demolition. The only
guns in Vindictive which could have borne directly
on the Mole had been put out of action. Her upper
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works were still being hit every few seconds with
a continually increasing list of casualties amongst
those in exposed positions. Owing to the failure of the
Mole anchors no member of the storming parties
could hope to return if Daffodil was disabled. That
the latter vessel had thus far escaped destruction was
little short of a miracle. The maximum period al-
lowed for the operations of the storming parties would
expire at twenty minutes past one. Thirty minutes
remained. If the warning signal was made immedi-
ately, the storming parties would have theirmaximum
time cut down by only ten minutes.
The question which arose out of the foregoing con-
siderations was as to whether it was worth while to
remain alongside during the last ten minutes for the
sake of demolition work whilst risking, at the least,
the loss of the whole of the storming parties then on
the Mole.
Shortly after 12.50 a.m. the order was given to
make the retirement signal. Findictive^s sirens had
both been shot away. The starboard searchlight had
received a direct hit from a projectile and had been
hurled off the bridge down to the upper deck. The
port searchlight had also been put out of action. An
order was passed to Daffodil to make the retirement
signal on her siren. The latter spluttered and gurgled
whilst emitting a veritable shower bath, but presently
began to show signs of being useful. A low groan de-
veloped into a growling note which in turn travelled
gradually up the scale until loud enough to be heard
at a distance. The signal was repeated several times
and then came an anxious period of waiting.
At about this time a large stack of Stokes bomb
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boxes, containing fused bombs, was set on fire by
a shell. All the fire-extinguishing apparatus in the
vicinity had already been shot away. The chief
Quartermaster, Petty Officer E. G. Youlton, whilst
shouting to others to take cover, extinguished the fire
by hauling out the burning boxes and stamping on
them. A few moments later the fire broke out afresh.
Youlton repeated his very gallant efforts and suc-
ceeded in saving a very awkward situation.
The storming parties commenced to return to the
ship almost at once. Many of the ship's company,
officers and men, assisted in carrying the wounded
on board over the gangways, which were as rickety
as ever. One Marine carried a disabled man on
board, placed his charge on the deck, kissed him on
both cheeks and was heard to remark, "I was n't
going to leave you. Bill."
I have seen both statements and illustrations to
the effect that our storming parties, before leaving,
erected a staff on the Mole and hoisted a Union Jack
upon it. It may seem a pity to spoil a good story, but
this event was quite imaginary. A memento of our
visit, however, was prepared in the shape of a board
to which were attached our visiting cards bearing the
letters P.P.C., but there is no very clear evidence as
to whether this memento was left on the Mole, though
I believe that was the case.
A shell burst just outside the conning tower whilst
three of us were discussing the probability of any
men being still on the Mole. Lieutenant-Commander
Rosoman was shot through both legs; Petty Officer
Youlton had an arm shattered ; a very slight wound in
the shoulder was my own share of the damage.
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By the time that fifteen minutes had elapsed from
the sounding of the retirement signal practically all
the storming parties had returned. No more men were
seen to come back, but I had given a definite promise
that the full twenty minutes' notice would be allowed.
After repeated assurances from other officers, backed
up by my own personal observation, that no others
were returning we decided to leave the Mole. The
cable had already been unshackled ready for slipping
overboard when no longer required.
Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman, in spite of his
wounds, accompanied me to the conning tower. He
absolutely refused to sit down, but remained standing
so that he could keep a lookout through the slit in
the armour.
The conning tower was of very small dimensions.
Four wounded men had previously crawled inside
and had died where they lay. Three or four other
wounded men had crawled in later on and had col-
lapsed. One of the telegraphs to the engine-room had
been shot away, but the telephone was intact.
All the other compasses having been destroyed, we
had to depend upon the conning-tower compass. The
magnetic directive force on a compass needle is neces-
sarily very weak in a conning tower of such small di-
mensions. The ship had received so many hard knocks
that the magnetism on board was pretty certain to
have undergone considerable change. Thus, whereas
this particular compass was somewhat independable
before, it was now exceedingly unreliable.
In spite of the many hundreds of times that I must
previously have instructed young officers that no iron
should be placed within five feet of the compass, I have
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my first lieutenant to thank for pointing out that the
presence of so many steel helmets in the conning
tower was inadvisable.
Daffodil was ordered to tow Vindictive''s bow away
from the wall. Lieutenant Campbell obeyed at once;
our anchor cable was slipped overboard. Directly
after the strain came on the DaffodiVs hawser the
latter broke, but it had served its purpose. " Full speed
ahead" was ordered and the ship moved forward
almost immediately. This was at i.ii a.m.
A large steel boom— the original mainmast of the
ship — had been rigged over the port side of the
quarter-deck, jutting out rather further than the port
propeller with the object of saving the latter from
hitting the wall. When Vindictive's helm was put
over to port, her stern swung towards the Mole, but
the boom saved the situation as a result of a heavy
blow against the wall.
As soon as Vindictive had moved a few feet the
gangways slipped off the wall and fell overboard with
a resounding crash. For a few moments the wreckage
fouled and stopped the port propeller, but quickly
cleared again without having done any serious dam-
age.
It is not difficult to gauge the feelings of the enemy
when they first noticed the ship moving off. We had
taken them more or less by surprise on arrival and
had managed to storm the Mole in spite of every
effort to prevent us. The enemy could not have been
over-pleased about that. The ship had been able
to remain at the Mole for one hour and ten minutes
without sustaining any vital damage. That fact was
not calculated to engender a pleasant frame of mind
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amongst the enemy. But they knew exactly where we
were. They knew we should endeavour to leave sooner
or later; they knew that any attempt to do so would
inevitably expose the vitals of the ship to their bat-
teries at point-blank range; they thought they knew
that our fate was sealed immediately we were clear
of the wall ; there could be no surprise about leaving.
But all such matters had been carefully thought out
beforehand. Vindictive, Iris, and Daffodil each car-
ried several sets of artificial smoke apparatus for use
on retirement. Immediately we started to go ahead
orders were given for the smoke to be turned on. In
less than a minute all previous fog records were
beaten beyond comparison. Thus in place of a victim
the enemy found a fog.
We steamed away to the northwestward at utmost
speed. The flames were pouring through the holes in
the funnels; the ship had the appearance of being
heavily on fire. The wind being now offshore brought
the fog along with us ; fortunately for the navigation
we had a clear lookout ahead. The enemy cannot
have seen much more than the vivid glare of our
funnel flames illuminating the upper part of the fog.
From all accounts their batteries were far from idle.
As the ship sped seaward we had the sensation of the
ship jumping at irregular but frequent intervals. This
may have been due to the concussion of heavy shell
striking the water near the ship. Whether any shell
hit us or not during the retirement is unlikely to be
known. One could hardly see one's own feet. The
ship had already been hit so often that any further
damage of the same description would hardly have
been noticed. Suffice it to say that no vital damage
to the hull was received.
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After steaming for twenty minutes the first lieu-
tenant reported a light off the starboard bow. It was
the Blankenberghe buoy, which we had passed during
the approach. We altered course to pass close to the
buoy and then for our line of retirement.
Presently the dark form of a vessel was sighted
ahead. Our guns' crews were ready for any emer-
gency, but the vessel proved to be H.M.S. Moorsom,
one of the patrolling destroyers. All the bridge sig-
nalling lamps had been destroyed. With an ordinary
pocket torch we flashed a signal requesting Moorsom
to lead us as our compass was hopeless.
On the way across to Zeebrugge my anxiety with
regard to accuracy of compass course had led me to
criticise the steering of one of the quartermasters.
Now, on the return voyage, I had become quarter-
master, in the absence of Petty Officer Youlton, and
am afraid the steering was execrable. That fact was
officially recorded by the Commanding Officer of
Moorsom who, knowing nothing about our amateur
steersmanship, reported, "... Vindictive appeared
. . . steering a very erratic course!" Fortunately the
services of another petty officer, as steersman, were
obtained later on.
Lieutenant-Commander Rosoman combined the
duties of lookout and navigator ; his advice was most
helpful. A visit from the stretcher parties relieved
the congestion in the conning tower. Another mem-
orable incident was the arrival of the Paymaster with
a jug full of a certain stimulating beverage which put
new life into us; I shall not complete the testimonial.
Several signals were interchanged with Moorsom
on the subject of shoals; it was a great relief when
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we eventually located a buoy marking a danger spot.
Vindictive was steaming nearly seventeen knots
until daylight— a great achievement on the part of
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander Bury and his de-
partment.
Soon after daylight a destroyer was observed to be
racing up from astern at high speed. She quickly
ranged up alongside and proved to be H.M.S. War-
wick. The first signal from her, "Well done, Vindic-
tive^^ cheered us up immensely, not because of its
actual import, but because it looked very much as if
the Vice-Admiral were alive. To make sure we en-
quired if that surmise was correct and, greatly to our
relief, received a reply in the affirmative.
H.M.S, Warwick had continued throughout the
operation to patrol in a central position, namely, near
the Mole lighthouse. She had come under a heavy
fire and altogether experienced a couple of hectic
hours. Soon after one o'clock she had moved towards
Vindictive and suddenly came upon the latter leaving
the Mole. Vindictive's smoke screen made it impos-
sible to keep touch, so the Vice-Admiral decided to
search for Iris and Daffodil in case they should re-
quire assistance. Shortly after this M.L. 282 was met
and transferred her blockship survivors to Warwick^
who was also informed that Iris and Daffodil had
left the Mole. Warwick then escorted some motor
launches out of the danger zone, and, after rallying
several other craft at a prearranged rendezvous, she
steered for Dover and overtook Vindictive as men-
tioned above.
Admiral Keyes ordered Moorsom to lead Vindic-
tive to Dover, to which place Warwick proceeded at
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high speed to land her wounded and to arrange for
the arrival of the casualties from the remaining
vessels.
The weather being misty, we did not sight Dover
until within a mile or so. Our reception was wonder-
ful, the result of the operation being already known
at Dover. I think everybody cheered himself hoarse
that morning. Presently we were ordered to pro-
ceed alongside the railway jetty. Within me there
was some feeling of satisfaction at having berthed the
ship at Zeebrugge, a place which I had never seen, in
face of certain difficulties additional to the tide. Any
feeling of pride, however, was quickly dispelled when,
in accordance with the routine of the port, on my
ship being ordered to proceed alongside Dover jetty
in broad daylight, with no opposition from the enemy,
and with every convenience in the way of hawsers and
bollards, a -pilot was sent on hoard to handle her!
On arrival alongside the wounded were disem-
barked into a Red Cross train, which immediately
took them off to hospital. Those who had laid down
their lives were then carried ashore; this, indeed, was a
sad parting. Finally we moved out to a buoy to make
room for other vessels.
After our arrival at Dover it was discovered that
a large block of concrete was jambed between a
fender and a ledge on the port side of the ship. Ap-
parently a German shell fired from one of the heavy
land batteries had struck the upper part of the outer
wall and had torn away this block, which fell into the
position mentioned. This concrete block, weighing
nearly half a ton, was hoisted on board. A few pieces
were taken as souvenirs. The main portion was pre-
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sented to the Imperial War Museum and formed
rather a unique piece of evidence, not only of the fact
that Vindictive lay alongside the Mole, but of the
exact position at which the Mole was stormed. The
illustration facing page 74 shows the damaged portion
of the wall from which this block of concrete was torn.
Daffodil was exceedingly fortunate in having
escaped serious damage. Her hull had been exposed
to the fire of the German batteries throughout the
whole hour and the odd minutes during which she
had been keeping Vindictive alongside the Mole. On
the retirement signal being made everything was
prepared for towing the bows of Vindictive away from
the wall. Immediately the order was received, Lieu-
tenant Campbell turned his ship and commenced to
tow. The hawser had parted almost at once, but that
was of no consequence. Daffodil then steamed away
to the northward under cover of her own artificial
smoke and eventually spoke H.M.S. Trident, The
latter took her in tow and brought her safely to Dover,
which was reached at i p.m. The enthusiastic recep-
tion commenced all over again. It must be realised
that the fate of each vessel was unknown to the ma-
jority of the remainder until some hours after the
completion of the operation.
It has already been described how /m, after leaving
Vindictive and suffering severe damage from hostile
gun-fire, had been smoke-screened by a motor boat
and had disappeared from view. This smoke screen,
augmented by further smoke from their own appa-
ratus, undoubtedly saved Iris from destruction.
Under the directions of Lieutenant Oscar Henderson,
R.N., who had assumed command after his captain
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had been mortally wounded, Iris steamed away to
seaward and eventually proceeded to Dover under
her own steam, whilst being escorted by other vessels
met with in the small hours. She arrived at Dover
at 2.45 P.M. and, once more, everybody cheered him-
self hoarse.
At intervals throughout the forenoon and afternoon
of the 23 d the several vessels and craft arrived at
Dover. We then had the opportunity of piecing to-
gether the information obtained from each unit and
were thus able to gauge the probable results attained.
The air force had been requested to obtain new
photographs of Zeebrugge as early as practicable,
but the sky was so clouded over that no absolutely
indisputable evidence was obtained until 2 p.m.,
when a photograph was taken through a chink in the
clouds. This photograph showed the positions of the
inner blockships and the break in the railway viaduct.
The operation had been an unqualified success.
The operation at Ostende had unfortunately failed.
The difficulties of navigation had been accentuated
by the change of wind which brought the artificial fog
back to seaward. The consequent obscuration of the
harbour entrance made it necessary to place some
dependence on a buoy which had, unknown to us and
by the merest coincidence, just been moved a mile or
so to the eastward by the enemy. In spite of the most
gallant attempt by Commander A. E. Godsal in
H.M.S. Brilliant and Lieutenant-Commander H. N.
M. Hardy in H.M.S. Sirius, ably assisted as they
were by their officers and men and by a large number
of other craft, the blocking attempt had not achieved
success. The Vice-Admiral decided, therefore, to
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make another attempt at the earliest possible mo-
ment. Vindictive, being the only suitable vessel avail-
able, was immediately prepared for this further
service. Owing to a continuation of impossible
weather conditions the operation could not be carried
out until May loth; thus it is clear that if our expe-
dition had not started on their journey on April 22d
the operation at Zeebrugge could not have taken
place during the allotted period.
Just one other reference to the further use of Vin-
dictive cannot be omitted. Immediately on their re-
turn, after the failure to block Ostende, both officers
who have been mentioned above as commanding the
blockships at that place, begged to be given ships for
a further attempt. They had failed through no fault
of their own and had gone through some terrible ex-
f>eriences. Nothing could curb their ardour, and I
believe they gave the Vice-Admiral no peace until he
consented to give them another chance. Poor Godsal.
Nothing could have been finer than his handling of
the old Vindictive on the night of May Qth-ioth, but
he was killed at the very moment when complete suc-
cess seemed to be assured; Ostende was partially
blocked.
It was with considerable feelings of regret that, on
April 25th, we made way in Vindictive for the new
crew destined to take her to Ostende. It was a sad
farewell.
The behaviour of the wounded had been splendid
;
their cheerfulness was unbounded. One poor fellow
who had suffered severe internal injuries as well as
the loss of both legs was asked if he was sorry that
he went over to Zeebrugge. He replied, "No, sir,
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because I got on the Mole." That was all that mat-
tered to him. There was practically no chance of
saving his life, but "he had got on the Mole."
The spirit of all the men in Vindictive was fine.
Nevertheless, I do not deceive myself into imagining
that these men were exceptional. They only repre-
sented one small contingent of many which fought at
Zeebrugge and Ostende on St. George's Day; the
combined crews of all the vessels in the operation
only represented a trifling percentage of our total
naval personnel ; the behaviour ofmy men was merely
typical of all those others.
Those of our survivors who had not been sent to
hospital with wounds proceeded on a few days' leave
before rejoining their depots or their ships in the
Grand Fleet. What a piratical appearance the crew
presented on their departure! Many of them had
lost all their clothes, except those in which they stood
during the action. Those others whose clothes had
survived the fight were not much better off. The
souvenir hunters had raided my ship, had "picked
up" some of the men's belongings, and had even been
inconsiderate enough to break into my cabin and
make a complete clearance of the officers' handbags
placed there for safety.
One last story of a personal nature. On receipt of
the news at Dover a young officer, in his desire to do
me a kindness, decided to wire the good news to my
wife. He forgot that she would know nothing of the
enterprise or even of its preparation, and he worded
the telegram: "Operation successful. Husband quite
all right." The recipient's feelings may be easily
imagined; she guessed it was appendicitis!
^<<'ik

CHAPTER IX
THE MATERIAL RESULTS
THE results of the operations on the night ofApril 22-23, 191 8, were undoubtedly impor-
tant. They can be classified under the two
headings of "material" and "moral."
The degree of moral effect cannot usually be as-
sessed until long after an operation has been com-
pleted. Recognisable evidence comes to hand very
gradually. The actual results of moral effect may be
early experienced without being recognised, espe-
cially in the case of effect on the enemy's morale.
Material results are more easily gauged. In this
particular case photographic evidence was soon ob-
tainable.
I must recall to the reader's mind the description of
the entrance channel of the canal. It was shown in
Part I, Chapter II, how very narrow the navigable
channel had become owing to the silting of the sand,
and how rapidly the latter process would accentuate
the obstructive quality of a sunken vessel. It was
also shown why the channel at the shore end of the
two curved piers was the ideal position at which to
place the blockships. Intrepid and Iphigenia had been
sunk by us exactly at their selected positions. Each
vessel spanned right across the dredged channel, and
therefore blocked it effectually. For the first time in
naval history a blocking operation had been carried
out successfully in the face of up-to-date defence
measures.
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Some of the photographs, taken at high tide, appear
to show sufficient space through which vessels could
pass on either side of the blockships. But the pres-
ence of water does not signify the presence o^ sufficient
water to float such craft as submarines and destroyers
even at high tide. Two other photographs show
clearly that the ends of the vessels were practically
on the edges of the sandbanks.
The Germans, as prompt in propaganda as they
were unenterprising in sea-fighting, at once published
a communique to the effect that the operation had
utterly failed, adding that the blockships had been
sunk by the German batteries before reaching their
goal. Curiously enough, their official statements were
strangely silent on the subject of prisoners. They
also averred that the attack on the Mole had been
driven back. Not content with these "terminolog-
ical inexactitudes," they went so far as to take a
photograph to prove their contention. The photo-
graph was taken with the camera pointed inland.
The land was eliminated from the background in the
original so as to give the impression that the camera
was pointing out to sea. A line was drawn between,
and parallel to, the blockships and marked "The line
of the channel," whereas it was a line nearly at right
angles to the channel. Words were added to the ef-
fect that the photograph proved clearly that the chan-
nel was not blocked, and copies of the photograph
were circulated all over Germany and neutral coun-
tries. What wonderful liars!— but clumsy! The amus-
ing part of it was that we knew the German naval
authorities reported "Zeebrugge is blocked" to their
craft stationed elsewhere, and, further, our airmen
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obtained photographs day after day showing some
twenty-three torpedo craft and twelve submarines
bottled up at Bruges.
From the morning after the operation until the
Germans finally evacuated Zeebrugge, our aerial
bombers dropped, on the average, four tons of bombs
daily on that place. Our special measures with re-
gard to constructive work in each blockship, designed
to hamper the work of salvage, must have presented
the enemy with a formidable problem. The work of
clearing the channel was certainly not assisted by the
dropping of bombs upon the salvors. To what extent
the Germans attempted to remove the vessels is un-
known to me, but we do know well enough that none
of the three was moved a foot nor were they cut away
to allow vessels to pass over them. Thanks to our
airmen, we knew, almost from hour to hour, what
measures were being taken to dredge a new channel.
I believe that no torpedo craft or submarines could
use the exit for a considerable time, and that about
five months elapsed before they could enter or leave
the canal at any other period than the top of high
tide.
Having contrived that each blockship should em-
body all the main obstacles to salvage work, we were
more or less confident that, if once placed in position,
these ships could not be easily removed. Subse-
quently, at the earliest opportunity, our own salvage
service commenced their endeavours to clear the
canal. In January, 192 1, two years and three months
after Zeebrugge was again in the hands of the Allies,
the last of the three blockships was moved sufficiently
to enable the channel to be used with freedom. A
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great amount of labour and money had already been
expended, but still further efforts were required be-
fore the canal could be altogether freed from obstruc-
tions. One may certainly remark that the canal was
"well and truly blocked."
Information reached us afterwards that the Kaiser
personally visited Zeebrugge shortly after the opera-
tion so that he could discover the actual truth for
himself. What his remarks were on arrival is not
known to me, but a photograph in my possession,
taken on that occasion, certainly does not give him
an air of affability.
The main material result, then, was that the canal
was blocked and that the services of twelve subma-
rines and twenty-three torpedo craft were unavail-
able for a considerable period. As long as the canal
remained blocked, German submarines detailed for
operating against Allied commerce in the English
Channel and other waters outside the North Sea
were, for the most part, compelled to do so from the
Heligoland Bight. This increased the length of voy-
age to and from their areas of operation and conse-
quently reduced the duration of their stay in such
waters.
But there were other material results. Firstly, the
German High Command considered it necessary to
send reenforcements to Ostende in the shape of mod-
ern destroyers. Now vessels, like individuals, cannot
be in two places at once. Those sent to Ostende had
to be drawn away from the Heligoland Bight, con-
sequently the forces in the latter area were weakened
in strength pro rata.
The loss of German lives and vessels and the dam-
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age sustained during the action were by no means
negligible.
Then again the efficiency of Bruges as a naval base
was greatly lessened because the canal exit to Ostende
proved to be too shallow for the larger craft. The
fuel, dockyard, and stores at Bruges were also ren-
dered comparatively useless as means of support for
sea-going vessels.
The Mole, as a seaplane base, must have lost much
of its value owing to the severance of the railway com-
munication, heavy stores having to be transported
to the Mole by sea-carriers. Finally, the work of
"locking the stable door after the horse had been
stolen," as practised by the enemy on this occasion,
entailed extra mining at sea, mounting additional
guns on the outer wall, and covering the floor of the
Mole with such an abundance of barbed wire as to
make the place exceedingly uncomfortable for them-
selves.
Our own losses consisted of one destroyer and two
motor launches; no other vessel was rendered unfit
for further services. Our casualties at Zeebrugge
amounted to approximately one hundred and seventy
killed, four hundred wounded, and forty-five missing;
the majority of the latter were believed to have been
killed. The casualties in Vindictive, including her
storming parties, were sixty killed and one hundred
and seventy-one wounded.
With regard to the loss of material we had not paid
a high price considering the results achieved. The
loss of personnel was small in comparison with losses
sustained in military fighting, but was none the less
keenly felt by those of us who had been in personal
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touch with these splendid fellows. They had all
realised the danger and had been perfectly willing to
lay down their lives in the attainment of the desired
end. They did not die in vain.
TCHAPTER X
THE MORAL EFFECT
^ g ^HE moral effect on the enemy was shown, to
a certain degree, almost at once. The fact
that they thought it necessary to indulge in
falsehood to appease their own countrymen, although
they must have realised that the truth would inevi-
tably become known, was clear enough proof that their
morale was badly shaken.
Their earliest report stated that the attack had
failed and that three British cruisers had been sunk
at Zeebrugge. The latter portion of the statement
was correct. The ships had, indeed, been sunk— by
ourselves. All reference to the destruction of the via-
duct was withheld until later. The fact of no prisoners
being captured from any of the three British cruisers
was never mentioned. As soon as our own reports
had been circulated, the German authorities appar-
ently considered it necessary to account for our
success by stating that some Belgian fishermen had
been arrested for piloting our vessels into position!
Imagine, for a moment, the effect on our own pub-
lic if they heard that the enemy had attacked Dover,
stormed the breakwater and remained in possession
of it for over an hour, destroyed the railway jetty,
and blocked the entrance. Even such a case as that
would not be wholly analogous, for the blockships
at Zeebrugge had sunk themselves nearly a mile
inside the outer entrance. Imagine the outcry and the
2S6 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
question, "What is the Navy doing?" It is not diffi-
cult to conceive the downfall of highly placed person-
ages and the feeling of insecurity that would pervade
the atmosphere in our own country. Not only would
the public be shaken by such news, but the loss of
morale would be felt in the fighting services, firstly
as a result of their own ineptitude, and secondly
because of the visions of further enemy operations
which would be conjured up.
Some such effect as described above was inevitable
amongst both the German civilian element and their
fighting services. We know that the operation caused
a great scare at Bruges. Many of the German officials
there hurriedly collected their effects ready for
evacuating the city; it had been reported that the
allies were landing an immense force on the coast of
Flanders.
It is not generally known that friendship between
the German Navy and Army was conspicuous by
its absence. They had been at daggers drawn for
some years; the Crown Prince himself was in the
habit of being openly rude to naval officers of
high rank. This antagonism was evidenced recently
in a letter written by a certain German general to
his brother-in-law, a young officer in our Navy.
Apparently the general hated the German Navy to
such an extent that his letter remarked that there
were two British officers with whom he particularly
desired to shake hands— one was the officer in
charge of our siege guns on the Flanders coast and the
other was the officer commanding the attack on Zee-
brugge ; his friendly feelings arose from the fact that
these two officers had "put it across" that section
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of the German Navy which had charge of the
Flanders coast defences.
The German Information Bureau had never ceased
to sing the praises of their Navy; that fact was con-
ducive to increasing the shock received by the enemy
when they learned the truth. Many excuses have
been invented in Germany to account for the fact
that the final breakdown of morale which immedi-
ately preceded the ignominious flight of their War
Lord emanated from the so-called High Seas Fleet,
and that this breakdown coincided with the receipt
of orders to try conclusions with our fleet. It can
hardly be styled far-fetched if one suggests that the
loss of morale was intimately connected with the situ-
ation at sea. It is also not outside the bounds of
possibility that, in some measure, the events of St.
George's Day, 191 8, assisted towards the debacle. A
certain highly placed German official at Bruges cer-
tainly exaggerated when he averred that "the hopes
of the Fatherland were buried at Zeebrugge," but
such a statement as that clearly indicates the weaken-
ing of confidence.
The other aspect of the efi^ect on morale may be
worthy of mention. I refer to the effect on our own
public, on our fighting services, and on neutral and
Allied countries.
The great German military offensive, which every-
body realised indicated the supreme effort on the
part of the enemy, was in full swing in the month of
April. The Allied troops were stubbornly contesting
every inch of ground, but were being steadily pushed
back on important sections of the main battle front.
The British Fifth Army had suffered appalling losses.
258 THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
The Allies had their backs to the wall. The tension
at home was apparent in all walks of life, and the
extremely anxious days of 1914 were being repeated.
Future generations will never be able to realise the
depression and anxiety which pervaded the public
mind. Everybody was wondering what the outcome
would be, and there were days when one hardly dared
to scan the morning paper. That very fact had pro-
vided us with an additional reason for wishing to
register a success.
There is very little doubt that the success attained
had a marked effect on the public; the latter fairly
jumped at the opportunity to show enthusiasm. In
addition to that, the public palate was tickled by
the unusual and apparently spectacular nature of the
attack.
This sudden rise of the "moralometer" served a
good purpose. The pessimist changed his tune, the
optimist earned the qualification "cheery." To those
ignorant of naval matters the operation seemed to
have bordered on the accomplishment of the impos-
sible. "We always knew," they declared, "that our
fighting men were invincible." Their old certainty
of ultimate victory was re-born. That was all to the
good. Modern war is national war. War is not merely
a struggle between fighting forces, but between the
opposing "crowds." The destruction of an enemy's
Army or Navy is of primary importance as a means
to an end, but the ultimate end and aim of each bel-
ligerent is to exert influence on the "crowd," to
nourish the will to win amongst their own public and
to bring about a feeling of hopeless despair, a com-
plete loss of morale, throughout the enemy's country.
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It is for that important reason that the sentiments of
one's own pubhc must ever be borne in mind by the
Higher Command.
The receipt of the news on the western front is re-
ported to have been beneficial. Every fighting force
must occasionally have its dark days ; they are never
so dark that news of success on another front will fail
to bring a ray of light. Those of us in the fleet itself
had often experienced such feelings of elation when
our military brothers had brought ofi^ a "coup." The
Navy and Army, and the Air Force with them, are
one at heart. The fighting services are interdepend-
ent. Our Navy cannot win a war unaided any more
than our Army can prevent Great Britain from being
defeated by starvation. The waging of war, in the
case of a maritime country which is unselfsupporting,
cannot rightly be divided into naval warfare, military
warfare, and combined naval and military operations,
though the three types are commonly referred to and
in that order. All war in which the British Empire
is involved is in the nature of combined naval and
military warfare. The actions of one arm are inevi-
tably reflected in the other.
The Grand Fleet, from which so many of our offi-
cers and men were drawn for the operation on St.
George's Day, was naturally elated at the result.
Certainly the morale in the fleet had always been of
a high order, but an extra touch of enthusiasm was
not without value.
Of the effect in neutral countries I am not compe-
tent to speak, but I have some personal knowledge
of the manner in which the news was received in the
United States. The enthusiam in that part of the
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world was genuine enough and undoubtedly assisted
to cement the friendship between that country and
our own Empire, a friendship which has a firm foun-
dation even if the latter be occasionally hidden
beneath a political superstructure which we are apt
to mistake for the foundation itself.
CHAPTER XI
SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE
THIS book would be incomplete if I omitted
to append some general remarks on the opera-
tion and on the factors which led to success.
First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in com-
parisons. The enterprise described in this book at-
tracted attention owing to its somewhat unusual
type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless,
there are many points of similarity between the attack
on Zeebrugge and the military trench raids which
took place night after night on the Allied fronts. The
preliminary bombardment, the advance under cover
of darkness and smoke, the wild firing of star shell, the
rush across No Man's Land, the encounter with
barbed wire and other defence material, the leap
down into the enemy's trench, the hand-to-hand
fighting, the holding of the position whilst demolition
work was in progress, and the final withdrawal when
the object had been attained ; such was a trench raid
as carried out again and again by our brothers in the
Army. In their case the following day brought a two-
line communique, e.g., "Last night in the Ypres
salient our troops carried out a trench raid ; they cap-
tured seven prisoners." In our case the communique
and unofl[icial reports filled many pages. I would
warn the reader not to be misled into thinking that
the military raids were any less hazardous than our
own.
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The story provides just one more illustration of the
fact that, however large may loom the difficulties with
which one is confronted, the means to overcome them
can usually be found if one possesses the "will to win
through."
The fundamental principles of war demand the
Offensive and Concentration. The all-important ele-
ment of strategy to be utilised against a strongly en-
trenched enemy is that of Surprise. From the latter
spring Diversion and Mystification.
An attempt has been made to describe the manner
in which the seemingly impossible was accomplished
without very great difficulty.
The plan was built up on the foundation of surprise
— not surprise in the sense that something would sud-
denly occur where all had been quiet up to that mo-
ment, but surprise in that the real object of the enter-
prise would be concealed up to the latest possible
moment, the concealment to be brought about by
mystifying the enemy and diverting his attention.
Whilst concentrating all available powers of of-
fence against the enemy, and allowing nothing to
divert us from our main object, we took every step
to bewilder the defence and to shift the weight of the
difficulties upon the shoulders of our opponents. But
that was only the foundation. The material brought
into use was the best available at the moment; it is
not suggested that, given further time, it would have
been incapable of improvement.
Earlier in this book a few remarks were offered on
the importance of the personnel. Many further re-
marks could now be added after the story has been
told. I only propose, however, to deal with certain
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aspects which, by their nature, are less likely to be
reaHsed by the man-in-the-street.
It has already been mentioned that a considerable
percentage of the vessels and craft engaged in the
attack were commanded and manned by officers and
men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve. The majority of the smoke-
screening craft and rescue craft came under that
heading. Without the smoke the operation must have
failed. Without the rescue work the price paid for
success would have been excessive. These represent-
atives of the auxiliary naval services earned a full
measure of admiration. Their daring in the face of
danger, their coolness in situations which lacked
nothing in excitement, their initiative when con-
fronted with the unexpected, and their perfect co-
operation with the remaining forces engaged in the
enterprise, were worthy of the best traditions of the
Navy. The more that one considers the dependence
upon seamanship, the practical use of technical
knowledge, the mental and physical strain, the value
of perfect discipline, and the initiative called for on
such an occasion, the greater is one's admiration for
these fine fellows ofwhom the majority had seen com-
paratively little of sea life and had lacked that severity
of training which is inseparable from the naval
profession.
The reports of all Commanding Officers contained
one particular similarity— I refer to the behaviour
of the men. The cynic who might be inclined to dis-
count such unqualified praise, on the plea that the
men were specially chosen, could easily be silenced.
The specially selected personnel were certainly picked
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with difficulty, not because the desired qualities were
rare, but for exactly the opposite reason. The Grand
Fleet and naval bases contained many thousands of
such men ; the embarrassment lay in deciding who
of these thousands should be taken to make up the
seventeen hundred and eighty personnel required.
But the latter were only required for some ten vessels
out of one hundred and sixty-two; required because
those ten vessels were out of commission and there-
fore had no crews. The remaining one hundred and
fifty-two vessels and craft took part in the operation
with their ordinary crews, and I repeat that the be-
haviour of the crews of all units was exemplary.
But co-operation between units, and efficiency of
individuals, are not alone sufficient to ensure success.
Absolute confidence and perfect co-operation between
officers and men, founded on true discipline, is of vital
importance. Without these, little or nothing can be
achieved in war. The seeds of these vital requirements
were sown by our forefathers. Those of our predeces-
sors who, although too old to serve in the Great War,
were still in the land of the living had reason to feel
proud at the success attained by their pupils.
There is one other human aspect which cannot
be omitted without leaving a serious blank in these
pages. That aspect is the one of Leadership.
Leadership has been defined as that power in a man
which causes others to follow him irrespective of the
direction in which he leads.
It would be a presumption, almost amounting to an
impertinence, for me to endeavour to measure out the
praise which is due to the Vice-Admiral in command
of the enterprise, now Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes.
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The reader will understand my difficulty. In past
history, again and again, it was manifest that some of
the outstanding factors which led to success were the
personality of the leader, the supreme confidence in
him held by all ranks, his realisation of the powers
and limits of his subordinates, his personal courage,
and his intensity of purpose. The outstanding factors
which brought success on the particular occasion de-
scribed in this book have served to repeat and illus-
trate these old historical lessons.
A few more words and I shall have finished.
I venture to suggest that this particular exploit pro-
vides just one more example, such as are recorded
again and again in the histories of most civilised
countries, of what can be accomplished in the face of
difficulty. Unfortunately, when hostilities cease, we
are prone to forget, not only the sacrifices by which
successes were achieved, but also the principles which
guided us in the achievement. We are all ready
enough to admit that confidence and co-operation are
of prime necessity for the preservation of our lives and
our interests when danger threatens us in war, but,
somehow, when the welfare of communities is threat-
ened in days of so-called peace, by international sus-
picions, by revolutionary doctrines, by economic
difficulties, by unemployment, and by political
schisms, we weaken ourselves as a result of deconcen-
trating into numberless camps, one against the other,
in direct opposition to those fundamental principles
which are the root cause of our existence.
It is all very strange, and, I suppose, very human,
for nothing is stranger than humanity. How many of
us reahse that our superiority over the rest of the ani-
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mal world is directly attributable to the fact that hu-
man beings, alone, have sufficient understanding to
combine when danger threatens ? Having successfully-
combined for the greatest of all causes, are we now to
revert to the instincts of the inferior animals ? Are we
to persuade ourselves that co-operation merely results
from paper treaties rather than from a common spirit,
forgetting that officers and men, armies and navies,
needed no signed agreements between them for the
overthrow of the greatest menace to civilisation that
the world has ever seen?
The Great War is over; is a Great Peace to fol-
low?
What is our object? Surely it is the welfare of
civilised communities and the progress of those who
are less enlightened.
There will always be secondary objects calculated
to divert us from our purpose. There will always be
individuals who, for their own ends, will endeavour
to sow discord and confuse the issue. It is of para-
mount importance that we keep our object in view,
and that we cultivate intensity of purpose and whole-
heartedness, without which our object is unattain-
able.
We know that the right spirit exists, but it is of
little value if we keep it locked away within us until
disaster is imminent; the mere fact of its existence
cannot keep us free from danger any more than the
existence of medicine stored at the apothecary's can
protect us from infection and illness.
Let each one of us, each class, each sect, each na-
tion, each group of nations, do all that is humanly
possible to foster that spirit, to further mutual under-
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standing, to breed confidence in one another, and to
co-operate for the weal of all.
Without such confidence and co-operation success is
impossible; with them, our well-being is assured.
THE END

APPENDIX
The following vessels and craft took part in the simultane-
ous blocking operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende.
The Zeebrugge Enterprise
(a) Special services during the oversea voyage
Aerial Escort—
6ist Wing of Royal Air Force.
Other services —
Special service vessel Lingfield, Motor Launches Nos.
555, 557.
(b) Offshore forces
Outer Patrol —
Scout— Attentive.
Destroyers — Scott, Ulleszvater, Teazer, Stork.
Long-range Bombardment—
Monitors— Erebus, Terror.
Destroyers— Termagant, Truculent, Manly.
(c) Inshore forces
Flagship—
Destroyer— Warwick (Flag of Vice-Admiral R. J. B.
Keyes).
Blockships —
Light Cruisers — Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia.
Storming Vessels—
Light Cruiser— Vindictive.
Special vessels — Iris, Daffodil.
Attack on Viaduct—
Submarines — C I, C 3, and one picket boat.
Aerial Attack—
Aircraft— 65th Wing, Royal Air Force.
Other Operations —
Destroyers— Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield,
Whirlwind, Myngs, Felox, Morris, Moorsom, Mel-
pomene.
270 APPENDIX
Motor Launches— Nos. 79, no, 121, 128, 223, 239,
241, 252, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308, 314, 345, 397,
416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533, 549, 552, 558,
560, 561, 562.
Coastal Motor Boats — Nos. 5, 7, 15, 16A, 17A, 21B,
22B, 23B, 24A, 25BD, 26B, 27A, 28A, 30B, 32A, 35A.
The Ostende Enterprise
{a) Bombarding forces
Monitors —
Marshall Soult, Lord Clive^ Prince Eugene^ General Crau-
furd, M. 24, M. 26, M. 21.
Destroyers—
Mentor, Lightfoot, Zubian.
Motor Launches —
Nos. 249, 448, 538, and three others.
French Destroyers and Torpedo Boats --"
Lestin, RouXj Bouclier, and Torpedo Boats Nos. i, 2, 3,
and 34.
French Motor Launches — Nos. i, 2, 33, 34.
British Siege Guns in Flanders.
(b) Inshore forces
Blockships —
-
Light Cruisers— Sirius, Brilliant.
Destroyers—
Swift, Faulknor, Matchless^ Mastiff, Afridi, Tempest,
Tetrarch.
Motor Launches—
Nos. II, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279,
283, 429, 512, 532, 551, 556.
Coastal Motor Boats —
Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 29A, 34A.
Covering Squadron for both Enterprises
Forces from Harwich —
Light Cruisers, seven.
Leaders, two.
Destroyers, fourteen.
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557. 560, 561, 562; App.
Myngs, H.M.S., 224; App.
Napoleon's maxim, 95
Navigation, coastal, 56, 57
difficulties and dangers, 7, 8, 40, 41
importance of accuracy, goff., 178
open sea, 56
Nelson, Lord, 55, 147, 148
Newbold, Lieut. Aubrey C, R.N., 210,
214
Nieuport, 6, 7, 8
North Star, H.M.S., 220, 221, 222, 223;
App.
Objectives, difficulty of locating, 42,
.
56, 71
Objects, secondary, 77
Offensive measures, 16, 17, 43, 262
Officers, choice of, 106, 107
Orders —
art of writing, 66, 67
the drafting of the, 66, 67, 140, 156,
166
Osborne, Commander E. 0. B. S.,
R.N., 178
Ostende —
attack on, in 1798, 54, 55, 56
description of, 9, 10, 11, 12
difficulty of locating entrance, 42, 71
reason for blocking, 42
reason for omitting story, 41, 42
Outhwaite, Sub-Lieut. C, R.N.V.R.,
219
Patrol craft, German, 40, 96
Peace, 266
Period available for attack, 134
Personnel, remarks on behaviour, 263,
264
selection of, 102 ff.
training of, 112, 125, 126
Phoebe, H.M.S., 220-224; Appu
Photography, 129, 1 30, 246
Plan —
credit for, 17, 18, 19
how built up, 262
inception. 17. 18, 67
history of, 17, 18, 6^, 68
modifications of, 65
previous suggestions, 17, 70
various stages of, 64 f., 72, 76
Plans department, 17, 67
Poison gas, 60
Port Arthur, attempts to block, 54, 56,
S8
Postponement, first, 148
second, 154
Power, Rear Admiral L. E., R.N., 100
Preparations —
preliminary, 12$ ff,
final, 145, 167, 168
Preservation of life, 87
Prince Eugene, H.M.S.; App.
Printing the orders, 140
Puerto Cabello, attack on, in 1799} 54
Pyrotechnic Brigade, 194
Rain, effect of, 171, 172, 173
Rescue of men from Mole, 218
Rescue work, 87, 88, 89, 132, 229 jf.,
244-249
vessels, 84
Results —
material, 249-253
moral, 255-260
Retirement, 132, 252-260
Rigby, Lieut. Charles N. B., R.M.A.,
191,192
Robinson, Lieut. J. W., R.N.V.R., 224
Robinson, Lieut. O., R.N.V.R., 224
Rocket apparatus, 194
Rodman, Rear Admiral Hugh, U.S.N.,
107, 108
Rosoman, Lieut.-Comdr. R. R., R.N.,
176, 184, 188, 238, 239, 242, 259
Roux, French destroyer; App.
Royal Air Force—
6ist Wing, 85, 130
65th Wing, 85, 146
Royal Naval Reserve, 130, 263
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 1 30,
263
Rufigi River, attempt to block, 54
St. George for England, 169
Salvage—
effect of silt on, 23, 24, 25, a8, 51
German attempts, 251
importance of, 44, 45
previous experience, 25
remarks on, 25, 26, 44 jf., 25 1, 252
Sandford, Lieut.-Comdr. F. H., R.N.,
213, 214
Sandford, Lieut. R. D., R.N., 210, 21 1^'
213
INDEX 275
Santiago, attempt to block in 1898, 54,
56,58
Scott, H.M.S.; App.
Seamanship, importance of, 41, 57,
58
Seaplane base, German, 12
Secrecy, 100, iii, 120, 121, IJJ
Secret, divulging the, 108, ng, 120
Shoals, 7, 41
Siege guns, 84
Signalling difficulties, 137, 138
Silt, description, 23, 24
effect of, 24, 28, s I
Sirius, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App.
Smith, Petty Officer, R.N., 209
Smoke, artificial—
limitations of, 59, 60, 99
use of, 59, 60, 83, 99, 100, 175, 176,
208, 216, 217, 218, 246
Smoke-screen vessels, 83, 175
Sneyd, Commander R. S., R.N., 226,
228, 229, 235
Souvenir hunters, 248
Staff, operational duties, 66, 67, 139
Star shell, 38, 175
Stonewall Jackson's maxim, 60, 61
Stork, H.M.S.; App.
Storming the Mole, 186, 187, 188, 2CX>-
204, 213
Submarines —
attack on viaduct, 82, 100
defensive use, 40
German, 4, 40
shelters, 10, II
Submarines —
C I, 210, 211, 214; App.
C 3, 210-211, 213, 215, 224; App.
Success, chances of, 54, 62
Supporting squadrons, 146
Surprise, 59, 60, 61, 262
Surveys, 7, 91
Swift, H.M.S.; App.
Swin Deep, 118, 153
Synchronisation of events, 137, 138,
170
Teazer, H.M.S.; App.
Tempest, H.M.S.; App.
Teneriffe, Nelson's attack on— in
1797, 54, 55
Termagant, H.M.S.; App.
Terror, H.M.S., 174; App.
Tetrarch, H.M.S.; App.
Thetis, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 226 /.,
233; App.
Tidal stream —
description, 7, 24, 30, 74
effect, 24, 92, 174, 183
Tide, rise and fall, 8, 48, 49
Tigris River, blocking of, 58
Time factor, 137-139
Time table, 138, 156
Tomkinson, Captain Wilfred, R.N.,
220
Towing—
necessity for, 142
of Iris and Daffodil, 142, 143, 173
Trench raid, analogy, 112, 113, 265
Trident, H.M.S., 224, 245; App.
Truculent, H.M.S.; App.
Ulleswater, H.M.S.; App.
United States —
battle squadron, 107
personnel, 107, 108
Velox, H.M.S., 224; App.
Viaduct—
attack on, 194, 195, 210-215
description, 23, 25, 82, 83
Vindictive, H.M.S. —
anchoring, 184
attack on Ostende, 247
choice of, 76, 126
command of, 114
damage, 181, 182, 198, 238, 239, 241,
255, 256
fitting out of, 77-79, 100, 1 10
position at Mole, 128, 129, 202, 203
proceedings of, 143, 148, 150, 170,
173, 176, 179/., 200/.
retirement of, 236^.
Visibility, 156, 165
Volunteering—
for danger, 89, 122-125, 189, 202
how arranged, 104, 105, 122, 123
Von Capelle, Admiral, 158
Walcheren expedition, 136
Walker, Lieut. H. T. C, R.N., 190
Warwick, H.M.S., 144, 168, 173, 220,
221, 222, 233, 243; App.
Weather, vagaries of, 41, 93, 246
Weller, Major B. G., R.M.L.I., 202
Welman, Lieut. A, P., R.N., 217
Wemyss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, R.N.,
Whirlwind, H.M.S., 224, 230; App.
Wind, importance of direction, 60, 13 1,
176
Wounded, behaviour of, 196, 197
Youlton, Petty Officer, E. G., R.N.,
238, 242
Young, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 22$
Yser Canal, 7
276 INDEX
Zeebrugge, 7, 8, 9, II
batteries, 28, 29, 31, 33
craft based at, 11, 32
German belief in security at, 33, 34
German constructions at, 26, 28, 29
canal, 10, 22
canal lock, 22, 29, 43, 44, 49
navigable channel, 28, 49
obstruction and boom, 32, 33, 41, 227
tidal harbour, 22
village, 22
Zeebrugge Mole, description, 22, 23,
24, 26, 27
approach to, 27-30
attack on: see Storming the Mole
buildings on, 26, 28, 29, 32, 183
currents alongside, 30
garrison, 32, 81, 82
lighthouse extension, 27
outer wall, 26-28, 73, 74, 76
peace use, 22
seaplane base, 29, 32
souvenir, 244, 245
viaduct, 23, 25
Vindictive's position, 128, 129, 202,
203
war use, 29, 30
Zero time, meaning and object, 170, 173
Zone of fire, German batteries, 30
Zubian, H.M.S.; App.
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